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Articles
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis
MARY SUE BACKUS* AND PAUL MARCUS**'
I. How CAN THIS BE HAPPENING?
A. THE EXAMPLES ARE EVERYWHERE
In a case of mistaken identity, Henry Earl Clark of Dallas was
charged with a drug offense in Tyler, Texas. After his arrest, it took six
weeks in jail before he was assigned a lawyer, as he was too poor to
afford one on his own. It took seven more weeks after the appointment
of the lawyer, until the case was dismissed, for it to become obvious that
the police had arrested the wrong man. While in jail, Clark asked for
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quick action writing, "I [need to] get out of this godforsaken jail, get back
to my job... I am not a drug user or dealer. I am a tax-paying
American."' During this time, he lost his job and his car, which was
auctioned. After Clark was released, he spent several months in a
homeless shelter.3
Two recent Georgia cases can only be seen as shocking, though in
very different ways. Sixteen-year-old Denise Lockett was retarded and
pregnant. Her baby died when she delivered it in a toilet in her home in a
South Georgia housing project. Although an autopsy found no indication
that the baby's death had been caused by any intentional act, the
prosecutor charged Lockett with first-degree murder. Her appointed
lawyer had a contract to handle all the county's criminal cases, about 300
cases in a year, for a flat fee. He performed this work on top of that
required by his private practice with paying clients. The lawyer
conducted no investigation of the facts, introduced no evidence of his
client's mental retardation or of the autopsy findings, and told her to
plead guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced to twenty years in
prison.' Tony Humphries was charged with jumping a subway turnstile in
Atlanta to evade a $1.75 fare. He sat in jail for fifty-four days, far longer
than the sentence he would have received if convicted, before a lawyer
was appointed, at a cost to the taxpayers of $2330.!
A mother in Louisiana recently addressed a state legislative
committee:
My son Corey is a defendant in Calcasieu Parish, facing adult charges.
He has been incarcerated for three months with no contact from
court[-]appointed counsel. Corey and I have tried for three months to
get a name and phone number of the appointed attorney. No one in
the system can tell us exactly who the court[-]appointed attorney is.
The court told us his public defender will be the same one he had for ajuvenile adjudication. The court[-]appointed counsel told me he does
not represent my son. The court clerk's office cannot help me or my
son. We are navigating the system alone.
Eight weeks ago we filed a motion for bond reduction. We have heard
nothing-not even a letter of acknowledgement from the court that it
received our motion. Without a lawyer to advocate on Corey's behalf,
we are defenseless. How many more months will go by without contact
2. Brooks Egerton, They Had the Wrong Man, But No One Believed Him, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 16, 2000, at 27A.
3. Id.
4. Our Opinion: Poorest Georgians Get Assembly-Line Defense, THE ATLANTA J.-CONST., July
15, 2001, at D8; see also Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, Gideon's Heroes: Honoring Those Who
Do Justice to Gideon's Promise, Mar. 2003, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender-Gideon/
DefenderGideonHeroesBenham [hereinafter Gideon's Heroes].
5. Gideon's Heroes, supra note 4.
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from a lawyer? How many more months will go by without
investigation into the case?
6
Fifty-one criminal defendants in Western Massachusetts were
arrested and jailed without any legal representation for many weeks at a
time. As one government official stated, "One woman has been sitting in
jail [for two months] without counsel and has not even been able to get a
bail review. This is an embarrassment. How can we tolerate a system
where people don't have lawyers?" 7
The Chief Public Defender of Fairfax County, Virginia
(metropolitan Washington, D.C.) resigned in July 2005, after just ten
months in the position. She said that even with legislative reforms in
Virginia her office had so many clients and so few lawyers that the
attorneys simply could not adequately represent the defendants at trials
and on appeal. Last year, the twenty lawyers in the office defended more
than 8ooo clients.8
A defendant in Missoula, Montana, was jailed for nearly six months
leading up to his trial. During the months before his trial, the defendant
met with his court-appointed attorney just two times. That attorney did
nothing to investigate the defendant's allegations that police obtained
evidence against him during an illegal search. A second court-appointed
lawyer subsequently had the case dismissed.9
The first rule of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct indicates that "competent representation" requires
"the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." Yet in Broward County, Florida, the
elected public defender felt compelled last year to forbid his attorneys
from advising indigent criminal defendants to plead guilty unless they
have had "meaningful contact" with their clients in advance. The head of
the office said that public defenders are often ill-informed about their
6. Testimony of Grace Bauer, Lake Charles, Louisiana, presented to the House Committee on
Administration of Criminal Justice, June 7, 2005, in support of SB 323 by Senator Lydia Jackson.
The situation in much of Louisiana is dire. The Calcasieu Parish Public Defenders Office
represents nearly 9o% of the approximately 3000 persons accused of felony crimes in that
Parish.... cases often languish three years or more before they are finally resolved, and
then it is almost always by plea bargain. Thus, innocent people may sit in jail for months
awaiting trial if they are unable to make bond, while those who can make bond are forced
to live in a prolonged world of uncertainty.
Sylvia R. Cooks & Karen Karre Fontenot, The Messiah is Not Coming: It's Time for Louisiana to
Change its Method of Funding Indigent Defense, 31 S.U. L. REV. 197, 2o8 (2004). The Honorable Sylvia
R. Cooks is an Appellate Judge of the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit.
7. David Weber, Indigent Defendants Languish Without Counsel in W. Mass., BOSTON HERALD,
July I, 2004, at 34.
8. Tom Jackman, Fairfax's Chief Public Defender Quits, WASH. POST, July 8, 2005, at B8.
9. Matthew Kowalski, Defensive Holding: ACLU'S Public Defender Lawsuit Deferred to 2005




clients' cases and circumstances before advising them to take pleas
offered by prosecutors at arraignment. "It's not fair to make life-altering
decisions while handcuffed to a chair with fifty people standing
around.... They meet with an attorney for sixty seconds, then they plead
guilty and surrender their rights.... That's going to stop," the director
stated.' °
Roberto Miranda was charged with first-degree murder with a
deadly weapon, robbery with a deadly weapon, and larceny. He was
appointed a public defender who was just out of law school and had
never defended a murder suspect. Miranda vigorously maintained his
innocence throughout the proceedings and supplied his defender with
numerous people who would testify on his behalf. Miranda claimed that
of the forty people who could have served as witnesses, the lawyer only
interviewed three and did not serve a subpoena on a single one. Miranda
also asserted that the lawyer's trial performance was equally deficient,
resulting in him being found guilty of all charges and sentenced to death.
After having spent fourteen years in prison, Miranda was found
innocent, his conviction was reversed, and he was released."
B. MANY OF THE SYSTEMS Do NOT FUNCTION
Poor people account for more than 8o% of individuals prosecuted. 2
These criminal defendants plead guilty approximately 90% of the time.
In those cases, more than half the lawyers entered pleas for their clients
without spending any significant time on the cases, without interviewing
witnesses or filing motions. Sometimes they barely spoke with their
clients.'3
Io. Dan Christensen, No More Instant Plea Deals, Says Public Defender, DAILY Bus. REV., June 6,
2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= i 11778952036o. While the Florida defender is
remarkably candid, he is not the only lawyer taking this approach. In St. Louis the public defender's
office recently began to refuse to represent defendants charged with minor offenses because of
concerns with rising caseloads. The Missouri State Defender supported the move away from the
current system which he described as "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em." Robert Patrick, Public
Defender Rules Are Set to Change: Lawyers Say it's Unethical to Represent Some with so Little Time to
Prepare, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 3, 2005, at EI.
I I. Miranda v. Clark County, 279 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002). Clark County ultimately settled
with Robert Miranda for $5 million after the Ninth Circuit ruled that counties can be sued for failure
to provide adequate representation. Carri Geer Thevenot, Settlement Ends Ex-Inmate's Saga, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., June 30, 2004, AT IA.
12. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES I
(2000); STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (1996).
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL. 443, 452 (1997). And the actual number of such individuals will increase as the number of poor
people in the United States (currently estimated at 37 million) goes up. See Associated Press, U.S.
Poverty Rate Rises to 12.7 Percent, CBS NEWS, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stoies/
2oo5/o8/3o/ap/business/mainD8CABO08i .shtml.
13. Many sources substantiate these statements. For an excellent overview of the entire area (and
a fine discussion of these points), see DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 122-24 (2004).
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An attorney was found to have entered pleas of guilty for more than
300 defendants without ever taking a matter to trial.'4 In one case from
Mississippi, a woman accused of a minor shoplifting offense spent a year
in jail, before any trial, without even speaking to her appointed counsel.'5
In some places, one lawyer may handle more than twenty criminal cases
in a single day, with a flat rate of $50 per case. 6 In others, some defense
lawyers providing counsel to indigent defendants under a state contract
system can be responsible for more than iooo cases per year." In one
major metropolitan area, San Jose, California, numerous defense
attorneys failed to take simple steps to investigate and prepare their
cases for trial. Some attorneys went to trial without ever meeting their
clients outside the courtroom. Some neglected to interview obvious alibi
witnesses. Some accepted without question reports from prosecutors'
medical and forensic experts that were ripe for challenge.' 8
Entire systems have been viewed as essentially incapable of
preserving fundamental constitutional rights. Here are a few examples:
e Georgia: "[T]he right to counsel guaranteed by the state and federal
constitutions is not being provided for all of Georgia's citizens.""
* Virginia: "[The] indigent defense system is deeply flawed and fails to
provide indigent defendants the guarantees of effective assistance of
counsel required by federal and state law."". "The deficiencies in
Virginia's indigent defense system are notorious and have persisted
despite production of numerous reports documenting the problems in
the last three decades.",
2
'
e Louisiana: "[T]he indigent defense system devised by the legislature
in Louisiana delivers ineffective, inefficient, poor quality, unethical,
conflict-ridden representation to the poor.,
22
* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania does not guarantee indigent criminal
defendants adequate, effective representation. 3
14. Id. at 126.
15. Id.
I6. Id.
17. Id. at 128. As Professor Rhode explains, the resulting situation is dreadful. "Unsurprisingly,
these attorneys frequently missed deadlines and court appearances, and many would have been unable
to pick their own clients out of a lineup." Id.
I8. Frederic N. Tulsky, The High Cost of a Bad Defense, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), Jan. 24,
2oo6, at 3A.
i9. REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE'S [GA.] COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PART I, at 3 (2002)
available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idcreport.doc.
20. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA I
(2004) [hereinafter INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA].
21. Id. at 7.
22. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LOUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON 56
(20o4), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/io78863541.49/Avoyelles%2oParsh%
2oBody%2oText.pdf [hereinafter TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE].
23. Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, Gideon Reviewed: The State of the Nation 40 Years
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e North Dakota: "The current system is in danger of failing to fulfill
its constitutional mandate of providing indigent defendants with
effective assistance of counsel. 24
One point must be emphasized here. In reviewing the difficulties
found throughout the nation with right to counsel for poor people in
criminal cases, many have expressed special concern regarding the
relationship between the right to a lawyer and wrongful convictions.
Apart from the constitutional right, for many people this concern can be
an extremely compelling argument for having a functional strong
defense. And, in light of the Supreme Court's right to counsel decisions,
one of the most important changes in indigent defense is that we now
know with certainty that we sometimes convict innocent people. Until
the past decade, an argument about wrongful convictions as a basis for
enhanced defense services was unavailable. But it is available now. We
now have evidence that overworked and incompetent lawyers contribute
to wrongful convictions and that truly well-prepared defense lawyers,
with adequate support services, can attack the other causes of wrongful
convictions, such as mistakes in eyewitness identifications and
insufficient investigations.
Is there a remedy for an outrageous state of affairs that leads to
greater risks for the public and the deprivation of constitutional rights?
Of course, such a remedy exists, and we have known this for decades.
The remedy is the well-recognized approach of decent financial support
from the government for indigent defense, and the presence of well-
prepared, reasonably paid, resourceful lawyers. Former Attorney
General Janet Reno stated the matter forcefully:
A competent lawyer will skillfully cross-examine a witness and identify
and disclose a lie or a mistake. A competent lawyer will pursue
weaknesses in the prosecutor's case, both to test the basis for the
prosecution and to challenge the prosecutor's ability to meet the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
A competent lawyer will force a prosecutor to take a hard, hard look at
the gaps in the evidence.... A competent lawyer will know how to
conduct the necessary investigation so that an innocent defendant is
not convicted .... In the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against
wrongful conviction. 5
While tremendous problems exist in providing legal services to poor
people in criminal cases, it is important to note that the Committee and
its Reporters were greatly impressed with the services offered by many
Later, http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1o474I638i.38/Gideon%2oReviewed%2o-%2oThe%2o
State% 200f%2othe% 2oNation % 2040% 2oYears% 2oLater.pdf (last visited Apr. 14. 2006).
24. ABA, REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN NORTH DAKOTA 1 (2004).
25. Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the National Symposium on Indigent Defense (June
29, 2000), in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DET. OF JUSTICE, REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE: A CONFERENCE REPORT vi (2000) [hereinafter Reno Remarks].
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dedicated defense lawyers across the nation. Moreover, despite the
systemic difficulties documented in the pages that follow, one can
certainly identify-and we do-some fine defense programs that function
effectively.
II. AN OVERVIEW
Many features of the criminal justice system in the United States are
often severely criticized, and fairly so. Complaints are common as to
problems about sloppy investigative work, rules of evidence in
prosecutions, the plea bargaining process, and a shifting focus in
sentencing. In one area, however, lawyers and judges most often speak of
the tremendous progress and foresight of the United States in promoting
equal rights for all in the criminal justice system. This area is, not
surprisingly, the right to counsel for indigents in virtually all criminal
cases in the United States. The United States Supreme Court has twice
spoken with great eloquence of the need for such rights, and has
responded accordingly to difficult situations.
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court struck down convictions in an
egregious case involving indigent defendants:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.26
In the landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Black wrote
eloquently:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to
protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the
best lawyers they can to prepare and present their defenses. That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
26. 287 U.S. 45,68-69(1932).
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widespread belief that lawyers in criminal cases are necessities, not
luxuries."
The impact of the Gideon decision, especially, was amazingly broad.
It was held to have full retroactive impact, the violation of the rule can
never be deemed harmless error, and the right to counsel was extended
well beyond the trial itself soon after the Court's decision.28 The right
extends to the vast majority of defendants. 9
The Supreme Court did not give as full a right to a lawyer as it could
have, leaving to the discretion of trial judges the appointment of lawyers
for activities that occur prior to a formal charge,3" non-mandated
appeals,3 ' and the minor cases where no imprisonment will be ordered.32
Still, in the main, our Justices deserve a reasonably high mark for taking
action in a relatively short period of time to extend the right to a lawyer
to most indigents in most important proceedings in most criminal cases.33
It is, in addition, gratifying to realize that our fellow citizens have reacted
positively to the broad Sixth Amendment rulings. The most extensive
polling data available indicates that the public is both overwhelmingly
satisfied with this direction and supportive of spending government tax
dollars to promote this Sixth Amendment right.34
27. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL (2002).
28. The counsel right applies to post-charge interrogations. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964). It also applies in some identification procedures which occur before trial. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The defendant is entitled to a lawyer at various pretrial proceedings such
as arraignments and preliminary examinations. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (I9o). The
defendant must be represented by counsel at sentencing, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), and
with any automatic appeals, the right to counsel is applied automatically. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).
29. HARLOW, supra note 12, at 1; CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LrrRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999 I (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf; Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Rates F, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Dec. 12, 1990, AT IA (Georgia); NEBRASKA MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM IN NEBRASKA (2004), available at http://court.nol.org/community/ind-def-study.pdf (Nebraska);
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON GENDER & RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL
REPORT 164-193, available at www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.ch5.pdf
(Pennsylvania); Hon. Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Address to
the Joint Session of the Louisiana Legislature (May 3, 2005) (Louisiana). See generally RHODE, supra
note 13, at 122.
30. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
31. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo (i974).
32. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
33. One notable exception has been the Supreme Court's disturbing and disappointing view of
the requirement of effective assistance of counsel for defendants. In a series of cases, the Justices have
established a low standard for representation (reasonable competence) and a tough requirement for
impact (competent counsel would have affected the outcome of the proceeding) before the Sixth
Amendment right will be violated. See infra, text accompanying notes 294-310.
34. BELDEN RUSSENELLO & STEWART, AMERICANS CONSIDER INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION (2002). A few points are especially worth noting. When presented
with the statement "[plroviding competent legal representation is one of our most fundamental rights
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If the public appears supportive, if the judiciary and the organized
bar are justly proud of the right to counsel, how can those deeply
disturbing and widespread problems discussed at the start of this Article
be found so readily? The answer is that the promise of Gideon, giving
fair and adequate representation to all criminal defendants in almost all
prosecutions, simply has not been fulfilled as a matter of practice in
many parts of the United States. To be sure, in a host of areas, thoughtful
commentators refer to the justice system, at least with respect to the right
to counsel, as being in critical disarray."
The practical problems are widespread in the system, and shared by
most states throughout the country. Indeed, details of such problems in
any one jurisdiction can fill hundreds of pages, as indicated in the many
in depth studies produced over the past two decades. 6 Five years ago, a
U.S. Department of Justice report indicated that "indigent defense in the
United States today is in a chronic state of crisis."37 That state of crisis
has certainly not been eliminated in this brief period. As one astute
observer has stated:
The goal in providing lawyers, as Gideon emphasized, is to assure
fairness in our adversary system of justice and prevent the conviction
of innocent persons. Yet, forty years after Gideon, this nation is still
struggling to implement the right to counsel in state criminal andjuvenile proceedings. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that systems of
indigent defense routinely fail to assure fairness because of under-
funding and other problems. It is also more evident now than ever
before that innocent persons, sometimes represented by incompetent,
in the U.S.," 88% of those polled found this statement convincing and 65% very convincing. Id. at 5.
The report found that a majority of Americans believe that low-income people who are charged with a
crime should be represented by attorneys with small enough caseloads to provide the necessary time
to prepare a defense for each person they represent: 94% think it is important, and 57% say it should
be guaranteed. Id. at 3. A majority of Americans also believe that low-income persons' attorneys
should have the same resources per case that prosecutors have: 88% support the idea and 64%
support it strongly. Id. at 4. A majority also believes that low-income persons should be provided with
the resources to hire investigators to check evidence and find witnesses (91% think it is important and
55% guaranteed), and the resources to obtain DNA and other scientific testing (94% important; 64%
guaranteed). Id. at 3. More recent polling data from the Commonwealth of Virginia is similar. See
VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT DEFENSE COALITION, PUBLIC OPINION IN VIRGINIA ON INDIGENT DEFENSE (2004).
35. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1515 (2005); Cooks
& Fontenot, supra note 6 at 197; Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2005); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 838 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall,
Gideon's Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (2004); Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line:
A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003); George C. Thomas
Ill, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 544 (2004); Jeffrey Levinson,
Note, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 149 (2001).
36. Almost all of the reports have been compiled by the National Committee and are now readily
accessible. See infra, text accompanying notes 55-56.
37. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS IX (1999).
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unqualified, or overburdened defense lawyers, are convicted and
imprisoned. 35
A recent ABA Report also highlights this dismal picture:
Overall, our hearings support the disturbing conclusion that thousands
of persons are processed through America's courts every year either
with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time,
resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effective
representation.39
Many thoughtful Americans believe that we must take a very close
look at the indigent counsel problems that are present throughout our
nation.40 It is beyond time to have a serious discussion about how such
problems can be addressed nationally. To that end, the Constitution
Project and the National Association of Legal Aid and Defenders two
years ago established the National Committee on the Right to Counsel,
bringing together interested citizens from across the country in a
bipartisan effort to create consensus recommendations for reforms. The
Committee consists of state and federal judges, prosecutors, law
enforcement leaders, policy makers, defense lawyers, and academics.4
38. Lefstein, supra note 35, at 838. As an example of this problem, a recent report from Oregon
describes a "fiscal and public safety crisis." PUB. DEF. SERVS. COMM'N, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S BIENNIAL
REPORT TO THE OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 7 (2005). By early 2003, Oregon's public defense and
public safety systems had suffered unprecedented setbacks: a cut of more than t6% in the 2001-03
budget for public defense services during three of the five Special Sessions of the Legislative Assembly
in 2002. Id. This resulted in disruptions in public defense services, catastrophic losses to public defense
contractors, and threats to the continued operation of the state's public defense system. Id. Further,
this resulted in the postponement of the appointment of public defense counsel in more than 27,000
cases until the 2003-05 biennium; delays in the prosecution of those 27,000 cases increased threats to
the public safety of all Oregonians as a consequence. Id.
39. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITrEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIoEoN's BROKEN PROMISE IV (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/
brokenpromise [hereinafter GIoEON'S BROKEN PROMISE].
40. One well-known lawyer sadly reminds us that "[nlo constitutional right is celebrated so much
in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel." Stephen B. Bright, Gideon's
Reality: After Four Decades Where Are We?, ABA CRIM. JUSTICE MAG., Summer 2003, at 5.
41. There are two honorary chairs. Former Secretary of the United States Department of
Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr. serves on the American Law Institute Council and is a
member of O'Melveny & Myers LLP. Former Vice President Walter Mondale, who also served as
United States Senator, and-as Minnesota Attorney General-organized the amicus brief of twenty-
two states in support of Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright. He is currently a partner at the law firm of
Dorsey & Whitney LLP. The three co-chairs are: Honorable Rhoda Bryan Billings, Professor of Law
Emeritus, Wake Forest University School of Law [formerly Chief Justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court]; Honorable Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney [Minnesota]; Honorable
Timothy K. Lewis, Of Counsel at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis [formerly of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit]. Members of the Committee are: Shawn Marie Armbrust,
Esq., Washington, D.C.; Honorable Jay Burnett of Houston; Colonel Dean M. Esserman, Chief of
Police of Providence; Dr. Tony Fabelo of Austin; Professor Monroe H. Freedman, Hofstra University
Law School; Susan Hermann of New York; Robert E. Hirshon, CEO of the Tonkon Corporation;
Professor Bruce R. Jacob of the Stetson University College of Law; Abe Krash of Washington, D.C.;
Professor Norman Lefstein of the Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis; Honorable Larry
Thompson, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, General Counsel of Pepsi Co., Inc.; and
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The Committee's work was informed by several nationwide research
efforts, and also received valuable assistance from organizations such as
the ABA, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA),
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the ACLU.
In this Article we will follow up on the work of the National
Committee by looking to the background of the right to counsel in our
nation and the problems encountered throughout American jurisdictions.
We will also discuss remedies proposed to solve those problems. We start
with a brief review of the constitutional right.
III. THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL42
In the early part of the 20th Century, little concern was expressed
about the right to an attorney in criminal cases. The Supreme Court
began a significant expansion of the right starting in the 1930s. In 1932,
the Court decided in Powell v. Alabama that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment required that an indigent defendant on trial
for a capital offense be provided counsel.43 While the facts there were
extreme,44 the Justices' language, as noted earlier, was very broad. The
Court expanded the right to representation when it later held in Johnson
v. Zerbst that an individual accused of a felony in a federal court has a
right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment if he or she is
unable to afford an attorney.4 In a major retreat, however, the Justices
soon decided in the well-known case of Betts v. Brady46 that the right to
counsel in the federal constitution could not be applied routinely to
Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation. Mr. Johnson is a past president of the National
District Attorneys Association. Dr. Fabelo previously served as Director of the Texas Criminal Justice
Policy Council; Ms. Herman was the Executive Director of the National Center for Victims of Crime;
Professor Jacob and Mr. Krash both served as counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright; Professor Lefstein was
the Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice; Mr. Thompson was the
Deputy Attorney General in the United States Department of Justice; and Mr. Williams was the
Police Director of New Jersey.
42. These matters are explored in far more detail in several of the articles cited supra note 35.
43. 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932).
44. This was the famous "Scottsboro Boys" case in which police officers pulled nine young black
men off a train after two white women on the train accused the men of rape. Alabama law required
the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not substantively consult with their
clients and had done little more than appear in order to represent them at the trial. In fact, the
defendants did not speak with the lawyers until just minutes before their trial. An all-white jury
convicted them of murder, and all but the youngest was sentenced to death. The trials were rapidly
conducted, taking less than one day. See generally JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF ScoTrsBoRO (1995).
45. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
46. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
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states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
The Betts decision lasted for two decades.
Finally, in 1963, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Betts and
ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright s that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applied to defendants charged with felonies in state court under
the Due Process Clause. In oft-cited language, the Justices concluded
that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."'49
Justice Black, writing for the Court, found that average citizens lack the
necessary legal skills to be able to mount an effective defense. The result,
he stated, is that indigent defendants cannot be ensured a fair trial
without the guiding hand of counsel. ° The decision in Gideon was based
on the principle that all individuals in the criminal justice system must be
offered a fair opportunity to defend against charges brought against
them. The Court reasoned that the lack of counsel for most indigent
defendants presented a direct threat to the equality and fairness of the
judicial process:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.'
A criminal defendant's right to counsel "may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours."
5 2
47. The case was decided over the vigorous dissent of Justice Black:
A practice cannot be reconciled with "common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right," which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely because of
their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as
here, denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of
certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately presented....
Denial to the poor of the request for counsel in proceedings based on charges of serious
crime has long been regarded as shocking to the "universal sense of justice" throughout this
country....
It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen put in
jeopardy of life or liberty should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to employ
such aid. No Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The
defense of the poor in such cases is a duty resting somewhere, which will be at once
conceded as essential to the accused, to the Court, and to the public.... [Most states] assure
that no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty. Any other practice
seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under
the law.
Id. at 476-77 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. Id. at 344, 343.
50. Id. at 345.
51. Id. at 344.
52. Id. Of course, the right to counsel in criminal cases is not just a federal right. It is also
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Gideon certainly did not answer all the key questions involved with
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.53 Still, it set the principal
benchmark against which the American criminal justice systems today
must be measured.
IV. THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED
A. THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
For the first time in their histories, the Constitution Project and the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) joined forces
in early 2004, in a partnership to work on this crisis with the right to
counsel. Together, they established the National Committee on the Right
to Counsel.
The Constitution Project is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization that
seeks to educate and promote reform in areas involving controversial
legal and constitutional issues. In recent years, the Project has sponsored
successful initiatives dealing with sentencing, separation of powers,
liberty and security, constitutional amendments, the death penalty, and
the courts.
The NLADA is the nation's leading advocate for legal professionals
who work with and represent low-income clients, their families, and
communities. Speaking on behalf of legal aid and defender programs, as
explicitly guaranteed in most state constitutions. Most specific, perhaps, is the Louisiana state
constitutional provision, Article I, Section 13, which directs the legislature to "provide for a uniform
system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents" at "each stage" of criminal
proceedings. See also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person, and by counsel."); Miss. Const. art III, § 26 ("In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both."); Neb. Const.
art. I, § is ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person or by counsel."); N.H. Const. art. 15 ("Every person held to answer in any crime or offense
punishable by deprivation of liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the state if need is
shown."). It is not only a constitutional right that is at stake in indigent defense. As recently noted in
the report on the Oregon defense system, broader issues of safety, economy of resources, and public
confidence are also of concern:
The legal services provided ... represent an essential component of [the] ... public safety
system. Without public defense services, the .. .[state] could not prosecute crime, protect
children and families or hold offenders accountable....
[The] public defender attorneys also contribute directly to public safety by advocating for
effective criminal sentences, correctional programs, family placements and juvenile
dispositions that promote the reduction of crime and delinquency.
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES COMMISSION, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR's BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE OREGON
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (JULY I, 2003-JUNE 30, 2005) 1, available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/
osca/opds/Reports/Executive%2oDirector's%2oBiennial%2oReport%202o03-o5%2Owith%2oappendies.pdf.
53. Later Supreme Court decisions were to determine, for instance, when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches, what level of counsel and counsel-related services is guaranteed, and how to
measure the effective assistance of counsel. See generally Tomkovicz, supra, note 27; Amanda Myra
Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to
Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495 (2005).
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well as individual advocates, it devotes its resources to serving the broad
equal justice community. The NLADA provides a national voice in
public policy and legislative debates on the many issues affecting the
equal justice community.
In their joint endeavor, the two organizations brought together on
the Committee an extraordinary group of Americans: those with
experience as judges, prosecutors, defenders, academics, victim
advocates, law enforcers, and policymakers. Their task was to examine
whether indigent criminal defendants across the nation receive
competent assistance from attorneys,54 and also to create consensus
recommendations for any necessary reforms.
B. THE CoMMIrEE's RESEARCH AGENDA
Several research projects were initiated by the Committee in order
both to inform the members and to provide a basis for later action. These
projects will soon be available in electronic form on the website of the
Constitution Project.5 The law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP, on a pro
bono basis, prepared a substantial report that traced the historical setting
for the evolution of the law under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, reviewed the key United States Supreme Court
decisions in the area, explored current litigation regarding the right to
counsel, and offered a set of innovative recommendations for change.
The American University School of Public Affairs Justice Programs
Office conducted an exhaustive literature review and analysis of every
report, judicial, legislative, professional, and academic, written in every
jurisdiction in the United States. The results are staggering, with literally
hundreds of such reports now available in one place for consideration."
Law students at the College of William and Mary worked to collect,
organize, summarize, and analyze a representative sample of media
coverage of indigent defense issues nationwide over the past ten years.
While not intended to be an empirical study, the goal of the project was
to compile a substantial sample, the breadth and depth of which would
fairly reflect the salient issues confronted by states in attempting to
provide poor criminal defendants adequate legal representation. The
resulting database contains more than 900 newspaper articles and
54. At no time during the past thirty years has any other person or organization undertaken a
comprehensive analysis of the problems with the right to counsel in criminal cases in every American
jurisdiction.
55. See Constitution Project, http://www.constitutionproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
56. For the first time, these hundreds of reports are now available electronically in one place for
those researching right-to-counsel issues. It should be noted that other older studies do exist and are
not part of the final American University product. References to these reports were found in the
Committee's research, but the reports themselves could not be located by the Committee, William and
Mary law students, or American University.
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editorials from state and national newspapers from all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico from 1994 through 2004."7
Newspaper coverage is best viewed as a broad reflection of non-legal
views from news reporters and the general public; still, the startling
consistency of the media coverage across the nation suggests that there
are well known problems with the indigent defense system nationwide.
In addition, members and staff of the Committee visited a number of
cities and met with numerous criminal justice professionals during early
2006. The visits helped inform the Committee in a very real way of the
problems being encountered across the country. But they also showed
that while the public seems strongly supportive of the right to counsel for
all Americans,5 one task of the Committee will be to educate the nation
about the inequities and problems that members found almost
everywhere. All too often, the discussion among non-criminal justice
professionals begins with the expression of surprise that there are any
serious problems with the constitutional guarantee. As one well-known
non-law commentator wrote recently, "the right to an attorney ... [is]
taken for granted today.
59
The research projects taken together reveal that there are
overarching, common issues facing state and local governments in
meeting the constitutional obligation established by Gideon and later
federal and state cases. The committee obtained compelling evidence of
a true constitutional crisis. The problems documented by the research
are all the more startling given their breadth and depth. In the remainder
of this Article, we discuss these problems and lay out broad proposals for
changes that need to be initiated if our nation is to adhere to the
mandate of the Sixth Amendment and the desires of our fellow citizens.
V. THE CRISIS
A. FINANCIAL SUPPORT
By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice
system, the defense function for poor people is drastically
underfinanced. 6 This lack of money is reflected in a wide range of
57. The end product, though huge in scope and reasonably comprehensive, is understandably
incomplete due to limitations of time, newspaper postings on web sites, and restrictions of licensing
agreements with LexisNexis and Westlaw. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that the result is a good
overview of the national picture. It certainly cannot be taken, however, as laying out every article in
every newspaper in every state. For instance, in large states such as California, New York, Texas and
Florida, the participants were able to look at several of the leading papers in each state, but not at
every one of the many papers in each.
58. As reflected in the polling data discussed supra note 34.
59. Anna Quindlen, Keeping the Robes Clean, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 2005, at 68.
60. The disparity in funding between defense and prosecution is estimated to be enormous. We
currently spend about one hundred billion dollars each year on criminal justice, but only about 2-3%
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problems, including poor people's limited access to attorneys and the
resulting ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which are discussed
later in this Article. Here, however, we examine the broader impact of
inadequate funding, excessive public defender caseloads and insufficient
salaries and compensation for defense lawyers.
i. Funding
Methods of funding indigent defense differ among all fifty states and
the District of Columbia. A nationwide study a few years ago revealed
that in twenty-three states the state government is responsible for
providing lOO% of funding for indigent defense." In contrast, two states,
Pennsylvania and Utah, provide no funding at the state level and leave
the responsibility solely to individual counties. The District of Columbia,
of course, receives all of its funding from the federal government.
The remaining states vary greatly in the amount of funds provided
by the state and by county governments and the methods through which
those funds are derived. In some states, the public defense system is
financed mainly by the state with minimum contributions by counties.
Other states leave it to the county to establish a system of public defense
and then either reimburse a percentage of the costs or provide
supplemental funding. A few states, on the other hand, require counties
to pay all costs at the trial level; the state then bears the responsibility for
any appeals.
While commentators have long been concerned with the funding
problems for indigent defense," most state and local governments have
of that total goes to indigent defense. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 94 (2oo). Moreover, poor defendants, in one commentator's words, "receive only an eighth of
the resources per case available to prosecutors. The disparity is still greater when adjusted for the
amounts available to other law enforcement officials for assistance in investigation and trial
preparation." RHODE, supra note 13, at 123; accord DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 64, 84 (1999);
Douglas McCollam, The Ghost of Gideon, AM. LAW., Mar. 2003, at 63, 67; Editorial, State Should Pay
for Indigent Defense, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 31, 2001, at A-I I (an eight-to-one disparity). This is not
to suggest that prosecutors may not also have serious funding problems, as they well may. See Ronald
George, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary Address by Chief Justice
Ronald George to a Joint Session of the California Legislature (Mar. 23, 2004); Ronald Goldstock et
al., Justice That Makes Sense: Prosecution & Defense Find Common Ground,
THE CHAMPION, 2001, http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsfChampionArticles/97deco i?
OpenDocument; Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Legal Safeguards Don't Hamper Crime-Fighting,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 1988, at 5. Still, the striking numbers reflected above and below must give concern
as to the particular needs for indigent defense. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219 (2004).
61. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
IN FISCAL YEAR 2002 34-35 (2003). The most recent count indicates the number has risen to twenty-six
states. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM.
ATTACHMENT B I (2005) [hereinafter MISSOURI ASSESSMENT]. Data on the fifty states was
commissioned by the ABA and prepared by The Spangenberg Group. It appears on the ABA website,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
62. It is not just the low levels of financial support for the defense programs which are
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only come to this realization relatively recently.63 Connecticut is a good
example of a state that has taken strong steps to bolster its system. There,
public defense is organized by the state and administered through
regional offices. These offices handle nearly all indigent defense. In
2003-2004 they took on more than 89,000 cases and had a budget of $35
million.6' For this amount the state was able to provide I88 attorneys and
18i administrative and support staff.6' The ACLU sued Connecticut a
decade ago because of its inadequate system of public defense. In 1999,
Connecticut reached a settlement with the ACLU in which the state
agreed to reform the system and provide better funding, lower caseloads,
and improved training. Between 1997 and 1999, the state legislature
increased public defense funding to a level that allowed for the hiring of
approximately eighty additional attorneys.6 That is about 44% of the
current number of Connecticut public defender attorneys made available
in 2003-2004. Today, the state describes its public defender system as
cost-effective 67 and as having adequate funding and resources to keep
caseloads within mandated goals.6
troublesome. In addition, as one thoughtful commentator noted, there are invisible but great financial
advantages given to prosecution offices, but not defense offices.
Finally, prosecutors have greater access to investigators and experts than the typical
publicly funded defense attorney. Putting aside the police resources necessary to build a
case file to present to the prosecution, the government often spends further resources for a
follow-up investigation to strengthen the case in ways identified by the prosecutor's reading
of the file. Prosecutors also turn to expert assistance and testimony relating to scientific
evidence more often than the defense. All of these components-salary, workload, and
support services -combine to produce an overall gap in spending between the prosecution
and defense functions.
Wright, supra note 60, at 232. The issue is discussed later in this Article.
63. The impetus for change differs greatly throughout the United States. In some states such as
Texas and North Carolina, dedicated legislators promoted movement. See infra Part VI.A. In others,
such as Georgia, Washington, and Virginia, it was the result of a shaming process coming from
shocking exposes in news articles or comprehensive studies. The process of change in those states is
also explored in Part VI.A. Of course, one should not discount the role of litigation here. As discussed
in Part VI.B, actual or threatened litigation led to substantial changes in states as varied as Arizona,
Michigan, and New York. See Wright, supra, note 60, for a thoughtful analysis of the role of litigation
with attorney funding.
64. CONN. Div. OF PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT: COST OF PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES
(2oo5), available at http://www.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content/Annual2oo4/zo04Chap4.htm.
65. Id.
66. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Reached in ACLU's Class-Action
Lawsuit Alleging Inadequacy of CT Public Defender System (July 7, 1999), available at
http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/genIbol38prs'9990707.html.
67. CONN. Div. OF PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., supra note 64.
68. Id. Another good example is North Dakota. Until last year, per capita spending on indigent
defense in North Dakota was among the lowest in the country. In 2005, the state legislature doubled
the funding, from approximately $5 million in the last two-year period to $io million for the next two-
year period. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-O1.1 (2oo5). See generally Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers, North Dakota's Indigent Defense System, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/
Northdakotaoo2 (last visited May, 15, 2o06). Connecticut and North Dakota are not unique in
increasing funding, several other states have also boosted financing here substantially. Still, on a
nationwide basis, the funding levels remain terribly low.
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However, the budget picture in most other states is not nearly as
positive. The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) received
increased appropriations in Fiscal Year 2004, 69 but the amount spent per
case still declined by 4.2% from 2003.70 This is due to a 12% increase in
public defender cases during Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004.7' The
increase in overall funding in 2004 followed a reduced budget in FY 2002
that was held over in FY 2003.72 The current level of funding in Kentucky
permits public defenders to spend, on average, a total of 3.8 hours on
each case.73 Earlier, DPA adopted performance guidelines for public
defenders, under which they were to complete all of the following in the
time allotted: review the charges, obtain and review discovery, meet with
the client, interview witnesses, appear for arraignment, research and
write motions, enter guilty plea or conduct a judge or jury trial, and
attend a sentencing hearing.
74
In Ohio, where counties can seek partial reimbursement from the
state, the costs of public defense are climbing. Summit County, which
includes Akron, has seen its share of the costs (after state
reimbursement) rise from $1.9 million in 2000 to more than $3 million in
2004. This is due to increasing caseloads and a decreasing percentage of
reimbursement from the state. Criminal cases prosecuted in Summit
almost doubled from 2000 to 2004. As these prosecutions increased, Ohio
reduced its reimbursements from 45% of the cost to 27%."5 The Ohio
Public Defender Commission, in its 2004 annual report, listed the total
costs reported by the counties to the state and the amount the state
reimbursed. For the thirty-five counties that sought reimbursement, Ohio
paid approximately 31% of the total cost. 76 In Fiscal Year 1998, Ohio
reimbursed 44% of the costs to counties seeking payment.77
69. Ernie Lewis, Rising Caseloads Continue to Threaten Kentucky Public Defender System,
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (Department of Public Advocacy), Fall 2004, at I, available at http://dpa.ky.gov/
library/legupd/Fallo4_LegUpdate.pdf.
70. Associated Press, Public Defenders Say Money Short for Indigent Defendants, AP ALERT-KY,
May 21, 2005. The problems in Kentucky continue. See Press Release, Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy,
Despite Modest Gains, KY Public Defenders Experience Caseload Growth for 5th Consecutive Year:
KY Public Advocacy Commission Responds, http://dpa.ky.gov/news/pressRelease.php (last visited
Apr. 14, 2006).
71. Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy, supra note 70.
72. Lewis, supra note 69, at 2.
73. Id. at 4; see also Associated Press, supra note 70.
74. Lewis, supra note 69, at 4.
75. Phil Trexler, Summit May Alter Its Legal Aid: As Criminal Defense Cost Rises, Non-profit
Lawyers Group Has Plan to Take on Some Work, AKRON BEACON J., May I5, 2005, at Bi.
76. OHIo PUB. DEFENDER COMM., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2004), available at http://www.opd.
ohio.gov/us/us_2004.pdf.
77. OHIO PUB. DEFENDER COMM., I999 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (i999), available at
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/us/us 1999.pdf.
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Indigent defense in Minnesota has been funded fully by the state for
more than a decade. Public defender budgets there were cut in 2003 and
2004. In 2003, the Minnesota Board of Public Defense asked the
legislature to add an additional 102 public defender positions. Instead,
twenty attorney and staff positions were cut."s In 2004, Minnesota public
defenders operated on a budget of $53 million, which provided for about
380 full-time staff attorneys. However, a plan to provide more funding by
charging co-payments was found by the Minnesota Supreme Court to be
unconstitutional, depriving the public defenders of $7.6 million in
expected funds.79
A new statewide public defender system in Georgia was
implemented in 2004 in response to a 2002 Georgia Supreme Court
ruling that the old system was "a hodgepodge of uneven, under-funded
and overwhelmed county-run programs" that "heightened the risk of
innocent people being wrongly convicted." ' The new system is funded
through increased court costs, criminal fines, and bonds. Nevertheless,
the director of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council said,
"Our budget is as bare-bones as we can come up with .... Anything less
would put us in a position of not being able to fulfill our mandate."8'
In Louisiana, the issue of indigent defense funding is at the center of
a statewide debate. In a recent editorial, The Shreveport Times wrote:
Overhauling Louisiana's woefully under-funded indigent defense
system to provide competent legal counsel to crime suspects isn't a
social program for the poor. It's about justice for the accused, yes, but
also about protecting the interest of crime victims ....
"We owe it to our citizens," [Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice
Pascal] Calogero said, in an account in the Advocate of Baton Rouge,
"especially to the victims of crime, to do what we can to ensure that
convictions are obtained that will survive the appellate process and
constitutional challenge.., so another victim does not have to go
through the agony of an overturned conviction. ' ' "2
The comments of the Chief Justice and The Times follow an April
2005 ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court that funding for indigent
defense is not a local government responsibility. 83 In its editorial, The
78. Tom Robertson, Minnesota Lawyers Frustrated Over Shortage of Public Defenders,
MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/
features/2oo3/o9/3orobertsont-pdshortage/.
79. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410 (Minn. 2004). See Tim W. Budig, Budget Cuts, Lack of
Funding Puts Public Defender Effectiveness in Jeopardy, ECM CAP. REP., June 22, 2004, available at
http://www.hometownsource.com/capitol/2oo4/june/22publicdefense.html.
8o. Bill Rankin, Defender System Gets Early Praise; State Indigent Program Off to Quiet Start,
ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Feb. 6, 2005, at IF. The new system is discussed in Part VI.A.
8i. Id.
82. Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 61.
83. State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 335 (La. 20o5). In sharp contrast, the Mississippi Supreme
Court recently held that the state legislature's failure to fund a statewide public defender program did
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Times further points out that a 2003 United States Department of Justice
report revealed Louisiana to have the highest adult incarceration rate in
the nation. However, the state only spent $2.10 per capita on indigent
defense; neighboring states spent two to four times that amount.°4 In
2005, the state public defender system received funding of about $32
million, $20 million below the level thought to be needed.8s Only $9
million of that $32 million currently comes from the state, with local
parishes responsible for funding the remainder primarily through court
fees associated with traffic fines. 6 However, in some parishes, ticket
writing can decrease and the court fees may not be imposed, which
leaves certain locales without the necessary revenue stream for adequate
indigent defense."' As an example of inadequate funding, the public
defender's office in Lake Charles, Louisiana had a negative balance of
$I6,ooo though it still had six capital murder cases remaining in the
year.88 The local court was then forced to order the parish council to
provide $275,000 for defense attorneys and other resources."' In 2005, the
state legislature began to take action aimed at reforming the system.
Among the elements of a bill passed by the state Senate and approved by
a House committee was a uniform statewide fee from traffic fines that
replaces the varying fees assessed locally throughout the state.' The bill
also would provide guidelines for judges to follow before declaring a
not violate the Constitution, as the county could not show that the system resulted in "systemic
ineffective assistance of counsel in [the county] and throughout the state." Quitman County v. State,
910 So. 2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005). The dissenting justices strongly disagreed:
The trial court ignored the following evidence:
a. There are a substantial number of instances where neither lawyer nor defendant
recognize each other at arraignment, and prisoners remain in jail up to 4 to 5 months
without any contact with their attorney.
b. Client meetings are held in groups in the courtroom within earshot of the prosecutor
and the judge.
c. Public defenders routinely waive preliminary hearings, accept facts in indictments,
and do not ask for investigators or experts.
d. There is no opportunity for the investigation or communication necessary to make
an informed decision when pleas are entered on arraignment day.
e. There is a vast disparity between the resources of the State and public defenders.
Id. at 1o5o-51 (Graves, J., dissenting).
84. Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, supra note 82.
85. Elizabeth Fitch, Indigent Defenders Overloaded, Underfunded, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La.),
May 5, 2005, at iA.
86. Id.
87. Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, supra note 82.
88. Talk of the Nation, Radio Interview with Mark Ballard of The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.),
(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 13, 2005). available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=4598755.
89. Id.
90. John Hill, Indigent Defender Reform Heads Into Final Stretch, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES , June 8,
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defendant to be indigent, as opposed to the current practice of relying
solely on the discretion of the judge.
Missouri provides the most stark illustration of the funding problem.
The state bears full responsibility for funding the indigent defense
system. It provides a statewide public defender program. The state is not
generous, however, in its funding, giving the lowest financing, on a cost-
per-capita basis, of any state in the nation. Moreover, Missouri has failed
to provide any additional funding to the system in the past four years.'
No other state in the nation has done that, and most states have
increased budgets by more than io% during this time.92
Many states, including California, Mississippi, and Arizona, starkly
illustrate the funding problems of indigent defense programs. None,
however, is more startling and sobering than the Massachusetts
experience, and this in a state which provides excellent oversight and
training for its defense counsel. In 2003, court-appointed attorneys
representing indigent defendants in Suffolk County, Massachusetts
refused to take on new cases.93 Their stand was the result of a dispute
over back pay from the previous year. After two days, the Governor
signed a spending measure that made up for the amount owed.' 4
The concern of public defenders and appointed counsel in
Massachusetts is not simply that they are not getting paid what they are
owed, but that the rates at which they are paid are desperately
inadequate. In 2003, the state paid its appointed counsel the third-lowest
rate in the nation. For district court cases, court-appointed attorneys
received $30 an hour, which was five dollars less than they had been paid
seven years earlier. For superior court cases, the rate was $39, and in
murder cases an attorney could earn $54 an hour.9' Believing these rates
to be so low as to violate the defendants' right to effective assistance of
counsel, attorneys sued the state to force an increase. 6 The
Massachusetts defenders sought raises in hourly rates to $6o for district
court cases, $90 for superior court cases, and $120 for murder cases.97
Because of the low pay and high caseloads, the number of attorneys
willing to act as appointed counsel declined by 9% from the late i990s
through 2003.98 In some places the number of available attorneys
91. Joe Lambe, Public Defense System in Dire State, Report Says, KAN. Cnr STAR, Jan. 8, 2006, at
B4 (discussing the 2005 evaluation of the Missouri System).
92. MISSOURi ASSESSMENT, supra note 61, at app. BI.
93. Kathleen Burge, Ending 2-Day Standoff, Lawyers Now Accepting New Cases, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 8, 2003, at B3.
94- Id.
95- Id.






declined by io%.9 The same problem surfaced with state-employed
lawyers:
Across the state right now, people are leaving our agency and we can't
fill [the jobs] because they've under-funded us again this year. It's a
critical situation .... We have been cut for about three years in a row;
it's around another 5% this year, to the point where we have about an
$8oo,ooo shortage in the budget to pay the staff salaries around the
state. Right now, there's the possibility that we're going to have
voluntary furloughs next spring, the end of the fiscal year.
The chief counsel for the governing state agency illustrated the
problem with ensuring quality counsel in Massachusetts for indigent
clients. His example focused on an attorney who had come to
Massachusetts from the University of Michigan. However, after five
years of service, the $39,000 annual salary she made in Massachusetts
could not compete with the $74,000 salary she received when she
accepted a position with the Washington, D.C. Public Defender
Service.''
Their paltry salaries are a disgrace to the quality of justice in
Massachusetts, and the Commonwealth is ill-served by not being able
to retain the services of these dedicated public servants. Yet it does not
have to be this way. For less than $i.5 million, all Committee for Public
Counsel Services (CPCS) staff attorneys could be raised from their
current financial abyss to the salary levels of other state counsel. For
another $7.5 million, all assistant district attorneys and assistant
attorneys general could receive identical financial justice.-
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that
indigent defendants were in fact not receiving the constitutionally
guaranteed right to counsel. The ruling said that, as a consequence,
defendants could be jailed only for seven days without a lawyer and that
after forty-five days without seeing a lawyer charges would be dropped."3
One county judge followed the ruling and, despite objections, released
three defendants charged with drug offenses."'4 What the court did not
99. Id.
Ioo. Hamilton Kahn, Court Appointed Attorneys Face Budget Cuts, Heavy Caseloads, THE
PROVINCETOWN BANNER (Mass.), Oct. 9, 2003 (quoting Bill Robinson, attorney-in-charge of the
Committee for Public Counsel Services in Massachusetts).
ioi. William J. Leahy, Editorial, As You Were Saying: State Pays Third Rate Wages to First-Rate
Public Attorneys, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 1, 2004, at 26.
102. Id.
103. See Lavallee v. Justices, 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass. 2004).
104. See Jonathan Saltzman, Court Slams Low Pay Rate For Defense Lawyers SJC Says The Poor
Are Denied Rights, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 2004, at BI. With terrible shortages of defense lawyers
in New Orleans-the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and severe funding problems-" [t]wo of the 12
judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court have raised the prospect of mass releases of
defendants by suspending prosecutions in their courts." Laura Parker, Lack of Public Defenders May
Force New Orleans to Free Accused Felons, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 20o6, at IA.
[VOL. 57:Io3I
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
do, however, was order a pay raise for defenders, though the judges'
language is strong:
Public safety... comes with a cost. One of the components of that cost
is the level of compensation at, which counsel, for indigent defendants
will provide the representation required by our Constitution.... The
inadequacy of compensation for private attorneys who represent
indigent criminal defendants has persisted for many years. The
continuation of what is now an unconstitutional state of affairs cannot
be tolerated.' °5
In 2004, the Massachusetts legislature did raise fees for appointed
counsel, but not to the levels sought. Instead of hourly increases to $60,
$90, and $120, legislators added an addition $7.50 per hour."° A state
commission had recommended much greater increases in hourly pay
rates."° Two years after the Suffolk County defenders refused to take on
further cases, threats of a work stoppage arose again. "
A major, and potentially very positive, legislative development then
occurred in July 2005, when the state legislature passed even more
significant changes for Massachusetts. This legislation raised
compensation levels higher, with counsel in district court receiving $50
per hour, lawyers in superior court getting $6o ($Ioo per hour for
homicide cases), and restrictions being imposed on the number of hours
court-appointed attorneys could bill the state annually (I4oo).' °
2. Caseloads
Firmly enmeshed in the funding dilemma is the problem of
overwhelming caseloads carried by public defenders and appointed
counsel."0 As a result, defendants can often spend weeks or months
105. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 9IO.
IO6. See Michael Levenson, Pay Controversy Leaves Attorney Struggling, Angry Says Family
Needs Must Come First, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2004, at B4 .
107. See Editorial, Fair Pay for Defenders, BOSTON HERALD, June 20, 2005, at 28.
io8. See Maggie Mulvihill, Public Defenders' Threat Over Pay: 'It Will be Chaos', BOSTON HERALD,
June 17, 2005, at 7. The problems in Massachusetts have continued, and they are not limited to one
county. Just this past year, as explained in one news article:
[J]udges in Middlesex and Suffolk counties sent court officers to scour the hallways of their
courthouses to solicit attorneys willing to represent indigent clients.., there was no lawyer
available in Chelsea District Court, where sixteen new defendants were
charged.... Attorneys were not available for the domestic violence session at Dorchester
District Court or Boston Municipal Court, [and in] Roxbury District Court, more than fifty
criminal cases were continued ... so attorneys could be rounded up.... In April, a
commission appointed by the governor to study the pay-rate issue recommended fee hikes,
but the Legislature has failed to fund them.
Maggie Mulvihill, Kerry Decries States' 'Unconstitutional' Law Crisis, BOSTON HERALD, July 7, 2005, at
7.
io9. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE HISTORY OF
REFORM 5 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
MAindigdefreform2005.pdf [hereinafter MASSACHUSETrS REPORT]. It is estimated that Massachusetts
now spends $120 million annually on indigent defense. Id. at 6.
I Io. Part of the difficulty is that no uniform system nationwide defines "caseloads." In some states,
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without meeting their attorneys and defense lawyers sometimes have just
minutes to prepare for court hearings or even trials. At a 1998 press
conference, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers president
Gerald B. Lefcourt commented:
But no matter how dedicated or idealistic, a public defender carrying a
caseload of as many as 700 cases a year, with no investigator, no
secretary, no paralegal, no law library, no computer, none of the
resources that police and prosecutors take for granted-that lawyer
cannot effectively represent his clients."'
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals set forth recommendations for limits on public
defender caseloads. The NAC stated that a single attorney in a year
should not carry more than 150 felonies, or more than 400
misdemeanors, or more than 200 juvenile cases or more than twenty-five
appeals. If an attorney handles the limit in one category then those are
all the cases that person is to handle. Many lawyers throughout the
nation do not come close to meeting that standard." 3
the number of cases a public defender carries is the actual number they report. However, other states
create formulas through which certain types of cases are given greater weight than others. In Benton
County, Washington, objections were voiced in 2001 to a plan by which the county would count "less-
serious" cases as one-half of other more serious cases. Janine Jobe, Defenders Reject Benton's Offer,
TRI-CrrY HERALD (Wash.), Nov. 28, 2001, http://www.tricityherald.com/news/20oi/1i28/Story3.html.
However, in Connecticut, weighting of cases has become standard. Caseloads in Connecticut are
defined as "new cases assigned." Div. OF PUB. DEFENDER SERV., STATE OF CONN., THE DEMAND FOR
PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES, available at http://www.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content/Annual2004/
2004Chap2.htm. Depending on the type of public defender office the case comes to, Connecticut
identifies "new cases assigned" differently. In Judicial District offices, caseloads are calculated by
noting each murder and non-death penalty capital case as two cases. Each capital felony case in which
the death penalty is sought is counted as ten cases. Then, minor felonies, misdemeanors, motor
vehicle, cases transferred by the Special Public Defender, and other cases are subtracted.
Geographical Area public defender offices determine caseload by subtracting transferred cases from
the Special Public Defender and "cases that are nolled or dismissed on the date of appointment and
bail only appointments." Id. And, finally, Juvenile Matters offices subtract various categories of cases.
Id. For many years, commentators have argued for a uniform reporting system. See NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING, (2003), available at
http://www.ncsonline.org/D-Research/csp/StCtGuide-StatReportingComplete-
colorlo-26-o5 .pdf.; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT MODEL STATISTICAL DICTIONARY: A
JoINT EFFORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS AND THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, (1989). NLADA has also prepared materials on case weighting and analysis. See NLADA
Defender Legal Services- Standards http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/
DefenderStandardsHome (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
iii. News Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Wenatchee Witch-Hunt Emphasizes
Need for Public Defender Funding (June 2, 1998), available at http://www.nacdl.org/MEDIA/
proooI I8.htm.
112. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.i (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC
DEFENSE].
113. Workload limits have been reinforced by a number of systemic challenges to under-funded
indigent defense systems, including judicial determinations that a defender's caseloads may preclude
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By 2001 the Clark County (Nevada) Public Defender Office had
juvenile caseloads at about seven times the NAC recommended limit.
Each of the two attorneys on the juvenile division staff had caseloads
approaching 1500."' A NLADA survey found that as the cases in the
division increased from 1993 through 2001, the focus of the attorneys was
not so much on representing their clients as it was "about processing
cases."...5 The evidence they present shows a more than 5o% decrease in
the amount of time available to the office to dispose of a case. In 1993, an
average case took about sixty-three days to complete. By 2001, it was
down to approximately twenty-six days.
In Louisiana, a public defender in Rapides Parish told the judge in a
recent murder prosecution that she could not adequately defend the
accused because she was so overwhelmed with cases that "if you divide
the number of hours in a day by the number of cases... , I would be
allowed.., to devote eleven minutes ... to each of the Public Defender
files that I have .... [I]t's just not humanly possible for me to do that.""..6
Each defender there has a caseload of 472 clients."7 Because of the
caseload burden, Rapides Parish public defenders began to refuse new
clients, so a judge in Louisiana's Ninth Judicial District used the
telephone book to call attorneys and appoint them to represent indigent
defendants. Recognizing the situation as dire, the judge said, "We've run
into a real crisis that we just can't address on the local level. What we
need to do is hire more attorneys and pay them well, at least as much as
the prosecutors are making."
' 1
8
The ninth Judicial District in Minnesota covers seventeen counties
and has the highest caseload in the state."9 The chief public defender in
the district has had to deal with lawyer resignations-eight within one
year-and says that without additional funding the situation could be
the furnishing of adequate defense representation. See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (iith Cir.
1988); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Hanger, 7o6 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985);
Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. i99I); Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984);
People v. Knight, 239 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1987); Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562 (Fla. i99o), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 957 (199o); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 199o); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan.
1987); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 78o (La. 1993); Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d i (Minn. 1996); State
v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. i98I), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 199o); Mount Vernon v. Weston,
844 P.2d 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). This matter is discussed further in detail in Part VI.B., infra.
114. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, NAT'L COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
EXCESSIVE CASELOADS, available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender-Kit/NCRC.
I15. See id.
II6. State v. Bell, 896 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
117. See id.
118. Mark Ballard, Public Defender Changes Sought, THE SUNDAY ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.),
May 23, 2004, at i-A.
I19. See Robertson, supra note 78.
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disastrous. On the whole, public defenders statewide each handle more
than 900 cases a year."'
The Colorado State Public Defender Office says that the number of
cases handled by its attorneys is both growing in number and in
complexity. 2' Also, the increase in the number of cases has outpaced
population growth in the state-5% versus 1.8%.2'
In 2004, the Washington State Bar Association released a paper that
revealed that even in places where public defender programs are strong,
they are far from perfect:
Despite the existence of strong public-defender programs, and able
individual [sic] assigned counsel and contract defenders in Washington,
there are many cities and counties where the lawyers are totally
overwhelmed by crushing caseloads .... Often, they are coping with
their caseloads, but do not have the resources to send lawyers to
arraignment hearings.' 3
In Seattle, a 2004 plan to revamp public defender services was met
with criticism by the King County Bar Association. One of the
complaints against the proposed system, designed to eliminate the
county's role in public defense and allow the city to contract directly with
private attorneys to handle indigent defense, was that it did not impose
stricter limits on caseloads.'" The fear was that the city's misdemeanor
caseloads (about 380 cases per year) were perilously close to the ABA
recommended limit of 400 cases. The caseloads of Seattle defenders had
already exceeded the state bar's limit of 300. '25 This followed on the heels
of a 2001 situation in Washington State in which Benton County public
defenders-all of whom are part-time-rejected a contract offer because
of overwhelming caseloads beyond suggested limits.I2 6 One mayor, also a
public defender, said, "They can't do the numbers they do and expect a
first-rate defense.',
2 7
The need for reduced caseloads is central to improving the defense
for indigent clients. In Virginia, Fairfax County public defenders asked
that traffic violations be dropped from their assignments in order to
120. See id.
121. See Office of the State (Colo.) Public Defender, http://www.state.co.us/defenders/
services.htmi.
122. See id.
123. Robert C. Boruchowitz, The Right to Counsel: Every Accused Person's Right, WASH. STATE
BAR ASS'N BAR NEWS, Jan. 2004, available at www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/2oo4/jan-o4-
boruchowitz.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2o06).
124. See Ken Armstrong, Legal-Defense Cost Cutting? Mayor Urged Not to Tinker, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 14, 2004, at Bi.
125. See id.
126. See Jobe, supra note i Io.
127. Id.
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lighten caseloads.2' That request was granted. What was not granted was
a request to hire more attorneys.'29 In 2004, Fairfax County public
defenders represented more than 8ooo clients and currently carry a
caseload of more than 400 cases each.'30 , James .M. McCauley, ethics
counsel to the Virginia State Bar, wrote:
Overwhelming caseloads, especially for public defenders, contribute to
the perception by many that "assembly-line" justice is all one can
expect. Effective assistance of counsel means "that the lawyer not only
possesses adequate skill and knowledge, but also that he has the time
and resources to apply his skill and knowledge to the task of defending
each of his individual clients." Caseloads for Virginia indigent defense
counsel render effective assistance impossible in many instances.'3'
A plan in Wisconsin would decrease caseloads by decriminalizing
driving without a license, an offense that makes up 70% of the cases in at
least one Wisconsin county's court.'32 Though the plan appears to have
been pushed principally in order to reduce the workload on prosecutors,
the plan would remove state public defenders from those cases entirely.'33
In Kentucky, the need to overhaul the indigent defense system led to
the creation of the Blue Ribbon Group, which recommended in i999 that
the state provide additional funding to hire thirty-five more attorneys to
help alleviate caseloads. In 2000, the state legislature provided funding
for adding ten new lawyers.' However, further reductions in the budget
decreased that number to five attorneys.'35 In 2004, caseloads per
attorney averaged 489.4136 with sixteen offices in Kentucky having
caseloads ranging between 500 and 6oo, and with another office
registering an average caseload more than 6oo. The Department of
Public Advocacy has deemed these offices at a "critical" level.'37 For
128. See Tom Jackman, With Staff Stretched Thin, Chief Asks Judges to Curtail Caseload, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at C04.
129. See id.
130. Id. While the Fairfax County case reduction plan may assist the public defenders in providing
better service to some clients, courts are then faced with finding counsel willing to handle the traffic
and misdemeanor cases at very low compensation rates. See id.
131. James McCauley, Excessive Workloads Create Ethical Issues for Court-Appointed Counsel
and Public Defenders, VA. LAW., Oct. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/
Octo4/access.pdf.
132. See Andy Neleson, Law Change Could Jump-Start Courts, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, June
5, 2005, at IA.
133. See id.
134. ERNIE LEWIS, DEP'T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE COVERING CRIM. JUSTICE
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, No. 14, DEFENDER CASELOADS RISE IN FYos AND FIRST NINE MONTHS OF FY02 6
(2oo2), available at http://dpa.ky.gov/library/legupd/Juneo2-LegUpdate.pdf.
135. ERNIE LEWIS, DEP'T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE COVERING CRIM. JUSTICE
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, NO. 20, RISING CASELOADS CONTINUE TO THREATEN KENTUCKY PUBLIC DEFENDER
SYSTEM 2 (2004), available at http://dpa.ky.gov/librarylegupd/Fallo4_LegUpdate.pdf.
136. ERWIN W. LEWIS, DEP'T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, DEFENDER CASELOAD REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003-2004, at 6 (Sept. 2004), available at http://dpa.ky.gov/library/caseloado4.pdf.
137. Lewis, supra note 135, at 2.
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Fiscal Year 2005 the DPA anticipated funding for ten caseload relief
attorneys, but even with such funding, the caseloads per attorney would
only drop to 471, from 489, and that is "only if the recent trend upward in
overall caseloads ends." 3' The Kentucky DPA releases a legislative
update twice a year. In fall 2004, the focus was on the caseload dilemma:
When caseloads are as high as they presently are in Kentucky...
neither the client nor the individual public defender is being treated
with fundamental fairness. It is unfair to give an indigent accused a
lawyer who does not have time to handle his case .... Kentucky relies
upon its public defenders to ensure that when liberty is taken from a
citizen, we can rely upon the judgment that took that liberty. Public
defenders truly operate as a check on government, to make sure that
the police are arresting properly, that prosecutors are charging
properly, and that sentences are fair and just. When caseloads are so
high that a public defender can only spend 3.8 hours per case, including
serious felony cases, Kentucky's public defenders cannot ensure
reliability.' 39
The problem of heavy caseloads caused a stir in New Mexico when,
seeking to alleviate the burdens on state public defenders, government
officials placed an ad in the New Mexico Bar Bulletin seeking private
attorneys willing to work for free for indigent defense at the appellate
level. '4
In 2000, the President of the Florida Public Defender Association
wrote to the Governor under the specter of statewide budget cuts. The
letter spotlighted the fact that the more anti-crime initiatives the state
legislature passed, the more work public defenders were responsible for
handling. Though remaining sensitive to the priorities of anti-crime
legislation, the writer pointed out that chaos would result if budgets were
slashed. The resultant backlog of cases would render public defender
offices unable to perform their functions. 4'
In Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, nine defendants waited two years for
their trials to begin. As a result, the state supreme court said that courts
could stop capital prosecutions against indigent defendants until more
funding became available.'42 Because of lack of funding, public defenders
in Calcasieu Parish carry caseloads at nearly four times the ABA
recommended levels.43 Another account put the number in Calcasieu at
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 4. The problems in Kentucky remain. See supra note 69.
140. See Jeremy Pawloski, State's Ad Has Defense Lawyer Up in Arms, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 9,
2005, at I.
141. See Letter from Howard H. Babb, Jr., President, Fla. Pub. Defender Ass'n, to Gov. Jeb Bush,
Gov. of the State of Fla. (Nov. t, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
bostonda/elsewhere/babb.html.
142. See Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 61.
143. See id.
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almost six times the ABA limits." In Louisiana's Ninth Judicial District,
public defenders have caseloads much closer to the ABA limit than in
Calcasieu. But in the Ninth District it is estimated that nine more
attorneys are nevertheless needed to meet the caseload burden.'
3. Compensation
Of course, a great deal of funding for indigent defense goes into
paying the attorneys representing the defendants. Depending on the type
of indigent defense system used by a state or county, payment may be in
the form of set salaries linked to full or part-time employment, or fees
based on a contract rate, or on an hourly basis. And, as with the general
funding issue, the question is whether the amount available is sufficient.
The answer, generally, is no.
a. Fees
For court-appointed counsel, states or counties often set limits on
the hourly rates and total compensation for the attorney. The most
discussed, and criticized, system is Virginia's. Here there are "hard caps"
on the amount a court-appointed attorney is to be paid, regardless of the
length of the trial or the total hours she spent working on it. The
Washington Post editorialized:
[Virginia] too has abdicated its responsibility to provide reasonable
counsel to defendants, a constitutional obligation the U.S. Supreme
Court articulated more than four decades ago. The problem in Virginia
144. Fitch, supra note 85.
145. Id. As statewide remedies are sought, a large part of the problem in Louisiana is inadequate
record keeping. Without proper records on the number of cases, those trying to fix the indigent
defense system really have no idea about how serious the caseload problem is. The Executive Director
of the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board told The News Star (Monroe, LA), "I think we
need to have some system of counting cases so we can determine caseload that is uniform throughout
the system .... If they are all counting cases in the same manner we can talk apples and apples." Id.
Nevertheless, under any set of calculations, it is clear that the State of Louisiana has extremely serious
problems in this area. See Cooks & Fontenot, supra note 35, at 208-99, stating:
[T]he caseload for the average public defender in Calcasieu Parish is more than three times
the caseload recommended by the Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance Board and more
than four times the caseload recommended by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Seven staff attorneys handle an average of 59° felony
cases and 15o misdemeanor cases.
While the average time from arrest to disposition for felony cases nationwide is 214 days,
in Calcasieu Parish it takes an average of 5o days to dispose of a felony case, with only
20% of all felony cases disposed of within one year of the date of arrest.
The greatest disparity is in time spent with the client. Jail visitation logs "identified a
total of 31 trips by public defenders to visit clients, an average of io visits per month for the
entire office. By comparison, private attorneys made 236 trips to visit incarcerated clients.
The difference is pretty dramatic when one considers that the private attorneys handle only
15% of the felony cases in Calcasieu Parish, while public defenders handle the rest.
Id.
The problems throughout the gulf coast states will likely worsen after Hurricane Katrina, as
discussed supra note 104. See Henry Weinstein, Evacuated Prisoners are Captive to Legal Limbo, L.A.
TiMEs, Oct. 16, 2005, at 26.
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is not that funds run out but that payments to court-appointed lawyers
are capped at levels so absurdly low as to be inconsistent with a
constitutionally adequate defense in any case that is the least bit
complicated. A lawyer facing a potentially lengthy trial for a pittance
has an overwhelming interest in a quick guilty plea, not an aggressive
defense. The Virginia courts cannot order the legislature to lift the fee
caps. They could, however, bar prosecutions when the state refuses to
pay adequately for an indigent's defense.1
6
While court-appointed attorneys in Virginia may claim up to $90 per
hour in fees, they are faced with the lowest payment cap in the nation,
$I235.' But, that total is only for attorneys representing defendants who
face twenty years to life in prison; if the potential sentence is for fewer
than twenty years in prison the cap is $395. '48 And, for a misdemeanor
punishable by jail time the cap is $1I2.'4 These caps are not waivable.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia touched on the
subject briefly, but accurately:
The issue of funding for court-appointed counsel has been a major
concern for many years. When the Supreme Court submitted its
budget request for the current biennium, the Court sought funds to
increase significantly compensation paid to court-appointed counsel
who represent criminal indigent defendants. Court-appointed counsel
in Virginia are the poorest paid in the nation, and we must work hard
to eradicate this problem .... For the first time in many years, the
General Assembly allocated additional funding of $2,000,000 for court-
appointed counsel who represent indigent criminal defendants. This
increase is a small but important step in the right direction. However,
we need more money to improve compensation for these attorney."'
Caps exist elsewhere in the country, too, though they can be waived.
In Ohio, a recent case highlights the inability of court-appointed
attorneys to be compensated at levels that make it possible for them to
offer an adequate defense. The caps, set by Miami County, limited the
compensation for a death penalty case to $40,000, which was to be split
between two attorneys and had to be used by them to pay support staff
and take care of other expenses. 5 ' This total compensation may be
146. Editorial, Louisiana's Wise Word, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2005, at A20.
147. Christina Nuckols, Legal Reform Lags in Year-Old Effort, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 25, 2005, at
B5 .
148. See id.
149. McCauley, supra note 131, at 2.
150. See Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, 2005 Virginia State of the Judiciary Address, available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/stateof.theejudiciary-address.html. Additionally, the Virginia
Indigent Defense Coalition gave the state a grade of "F" for being unable to reach the goal of placing
defense counsel in parity with the prosecution. See VA. INDIGENT DEFENSE COALITION, VIDC REPORT
CARD, www.vidcoalition.org/reportcard.html. Proposed legislation has recently been introduced in the
Virginia legislature which would eliminate the caps. See Hugh Lessig, Virginia Warned on Poor's Legal
Aid, DAILY PRESS, Feb. 2, 2006, at AI.
i51. Nancy Bowman, Lawyers Shun Death Cases Because of Low Pay, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, May
9, 2005, at Ai.
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compared to the $40,000 spent by the prosecution in the same case
merely to have one witness give expert testimony."2 However, Miami
County is in the middle of the pack in terms of caps set by counties in
Ohio. The caps range from $3000 in one county through a maximum of
$75,000 set by two counties.'53
In Iowa, the former president of the Iowa State Bar Association
decried the use of caps in paying for indigent defense. He asserted that
the system actively discouraged competent attorneys from taking
appointments. Recent law school graduates can no longer seek viable
employment in the area because the debt loads from law school are too
much and the compensation for indigent defense appointments is too
little. "There is no chance," he wrote, "of servicing a $75,000 debt, let
alone paying for a car, house and family, on the fees from indigent
defense."'54 In 2003, Iowa defenders could claim an hourly fee of $5o an
hour for misdemeanor and some felony representation, but were faced
with a $iooo cap for felonies and $500 for misdemeanors.'55
Assigned counsel rates in New York increased in 2004 for the first
time in seventeen years. From the mid-i98os through the turn of the
century, lawyers received $40 per hour for in-court time and $25 per hour
for work outside the courtroom. The new rates were set at $6o per hour
for misdemeanors and $75 per hour for felonies., 6
In 2001, Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas raised fees for indigent
defense for the first time in thirteen years. Prior to the increase an
attorney could make a maximum of $200 per day in court, but could now
earn up to $750 per day on a first-degree felony.'57
In California, where some counties pay private attorneys a flat
contract fee to handle indigent defense, the state bar is critical of the
results such contracts achieve. A study by the State Bar of California
stated, "flat rate compensation.., encourages attorneys to do what is
most profitable for them and what is efficient for the system ... but not
what is in the best interest of clients.' ' 58
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Alan Fredregill, A Changing Oil vs. Changing Venue-A Case Study on Societal Values, IOWA
LAW., Mar. 14, 2003, at 5.
155. Id.
I56. John Caher, Statewide Standards Urged for Indigent Defense Counsel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 2005,
at I.
157. Lisa Sandberg, Poor's Counsel to be Quicker, Better Paid, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEws, Dec.
4, 2001, at IA.
158. John F. Berry, County's Cost-Saving Practice Draws Criticism from Review, PRESS-




In addition to fees and flat contract rate payments, there are
thousands of public defenders who receive annual salaries. Salaried
public defenders sometimes face paychecks that are less than their
counterparts in prosecutor offices, despite an ABA-adopted standard
that public defenders and prosecutors be paid at "comparable" rates.'59
In many states the parity does exist.' 6 In others, however, the defense
lawyers receive lower salaries.
In Baton Rouge, the twenty-seven attorneys earn between $i8,ooo
and $35,000 annually, figures that are about 30% less than the salaries in
the district attorney's office.' Public defender salaries in Alameda
County, California ranged much higher than in Baton Rouge, anywhere
in excess of $50,000 to greater than $130,000, but the top prosecutor
salaries there far exceeded those of the public defender office.162 In
Georgia, entry-level district attorney and public defender positions both
start out at the same annual salary, but the upper limit on the public
defender salary scale is lower than that of the district attorney salary.'6 3
The average salary for a Portland, Oregon public defender in 2000 was
$45,426 compared to $61,638 for a prosecutor there.'64
The key problem may not necessarily be a disparity in salaries
between prosecutors and defense lawyers, though such a disparity
certainly exists in many parts of our country.'65 Rather, the more serious
dilemma may be that both sets of lawyers, at the state level, are paid too
little.' 66 In many states, including Alaska, Maryland, Idaho, Mississippi,
Ohio, Illinois, California, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, prosecuting
and defending lawyers are paid less than $40,000 per year.67
159. See generally Wright, supra note 6o, at 232.
16o. Id. at 232-33. A 2004 survey by National Association for Law Placement (NALP) revealed
salaries of public defenders and prosecutors to be similar. The median salaries for entry-level public
defenders was $39,000 versus $40,000 for entry-level local prosecutors and $40,574 for state
prosecutors. At the five-year mark, the median public defender salary was $50,000 versus $52,ooo. At
the eleven-to-fifteen-year milestone, public defenders fall slightly behind with a $65,000 median versus
$69,255 and $68,139 for local and state prosecutors, respectively. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Law
Placement, NALP Publishes New Public Sector and Public Interest Attorney Salary Research (Aug.
31, 2004), available at http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=6.
161. Ballard, supra note 118, at IA.
162. PBS, Presumed Guilty (2002), http://www.pbs.org/kqed/presumedguilty/3.2.o.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2006).
163. Dana Mulhauser, Pay Dirt: States Are Beginning To Pay Public Defenders As Much As
Prosecutors. That's The Wrong Solution To A Big Problem, LEGAL AFF., Nov. 2004, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2oo4/argument-mulhauser-novdeco4.html.
164. Michelle Roberts, Public Defenders Go On Strike: Contract Discussions Break Down, THE
OREGONIAN, June 27, 2000. at BI.
165. See Wright, supra note 6o, at 230.
166. The federal experience is quite different. See What Lawyers Earn 2000,
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/nlj/earn/earns4.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
167. For instance, in Fairfax County, Virginia, a very high-cost community in the Washington,
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The 2004 annual report by the Missouri Public Defender
Commission cites low pay as one reason for the chronic problem of
attorney retention. '6' The current annual turnover rate in Missouri is
more than 21%. Those leaving the system include entry-level attorneys
and other more senior attorneys who depart for careers in the private
sector. A targeted pay raise has not occurred there in ten years, and
general state employee raises were not sufficient to retain attorneys.'
69
The high turnover rate resulted in a backlog of almost 22,000 cases. "
B. THE SPECIAL AND HIDDEN COSTS: FINDING LAWYERS TO REPRESENT
UNPOPULAR CLIENTS
Our country has a proud tradition of providing defense to even the
most hated defendants. A defendant's right to a fair trial was not only
embodied in the Constitution by our founders, but also exemplified by
their actions. In 1770, John Adams showed his belief in this right by
defending British soldiers charged with manslaughter for their part in the
Boston Massacre. He won an acquittal for the commanding officer and
six of the eight accused soldiers. As a patriot, he chose to defend them
because of his belief in a principle and not because he had sympathy for
their cause. He took the case despite much criticism from his fellow
patriots and risk to his business and personal safety.'7' It is in this
tradition that many modern defense attorneys follow.
The law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP is well known for its public
service representation of unpopular clients and causes. "' In her essay
D.C. area, the starting salary for a public defender is $41,ooo with senior defenders making up to
$55,000. Jackman, supra note 8. One promising approach here is the innovative legislation recently
offered in the United States House and Senate. The Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act would
authorize funding for student-loan repayment for public attorneys working in the criminal justice
system. Its purpose "is to encourage qualified individuals to enter and continue employment as
prosecutors and public defenders." H.R. 198, Io9th Cong. (2005). See Rhonda McMillion, A Lighter
Load, 91 A.B.A. J. 64, 64 (2005).
168. J. M. ROBINSON & KATHLEEN L. LEAR, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM IN MISSOURI 63 (2004), available at http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/
about/FY2oo4AnnualReport.pdf.
169. Id. The most recent Missouri findings show that the turnover rate for lawyers over the past
five years was almost too%. See MISSOURI ASSESSMENT, supra note 61.
17o. ROBINSON & LEAR, supra note 168, at 64. A recent article recounted the financial difficulties of
two lawyers working in the Nashville criminal justice system, one a prosecutor the other a public
defender. Each had multiple jobs in addition to her legal work, because "a lot of young attorneys in
our office live from paycheck to paycheck." Each of the lawyers had a law school debt of $ioo,ooo or
more. Each started work for the government at just over $40,00o per year. Sheila Burke, Government
Lawyers Try to Make Ends Meet, TENNESSEAN, July i8, 2005, at IB.
171. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2ooi).
172. And, of course, the firm acted as counsel to Clarence Earl Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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honoring Professor John Ely, Professor Barbara Babcock recounts the
way in which the firm responded long ago to concerns over such work.
In the summer of 1962, John Ely and I were law clerks at Arnold,
Fortas & Porter. This was a very hot ticket, and we were proud to win
it because the firm was the model for doing good while doing well. The
principals were major New Dealers, now corporate lawyers and
Washington insiders, who also represented poor criminal defendants
and the politically oppressed.
Notably, they had taken on the cause of accused communists, clients
many lawyers turned away as the Cold War raged on. And Abe Fortas
had been the lawyer for Monte Durham, the indigent defendant whose
case established the [then] modern insanity defense. Firm members
often told about the big business executive (and potential client) who
asked Paul Porter whether the firm in fact represented the likes of
communists and rapists. "That's right, we do," Porter responded.
"What can we do for you?"'73
According to ABA model rules and guidelines, defense attorneys
should not consider the unpopularity of a potential client when deciding
whether to accept a case. ABA Defense Function Standard 4-I.6(b),
states that "all... qualified lawyers should stand ready to undertake the
defense of an accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or
personal distaste for the offense charged or the person of the defendant."
ABA Defense Function Standard 4-1.2(a) stresses the importance of
defense counsel: "Counsel for the accused is an essential component of
the administration of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to
hear a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the
judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and
counsel for the accused." The Model Code of Professional Conduct
maintains that "a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its
duty to make legal counsel available."'74 The point is further made in the
Ethical Considerations from the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. EC 2-27 notes that, "History is replete with instances of
distinguished and sacrificial services by lawyers who have represented
unpopular clients and causes. Regardless of his personal feelings, a
lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is
unpopular or community reaction is adverse." EC 2-29 is similar: "When
a lawyer is appointed to defend an unpopular client by a court, a
'compelling reason' that might justify the lawyer's asking to be excused
from the appointment does not include such factors as the repugnance of
the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person
involved in the case."
173. Babcock, supra note 35, at 1490.
174- ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (i98o).
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The Model Rules also discuss a lawyer's duty to defend unpopular
clients. While the Ethical Considerations were only recommendations
with no consequences for violation, violation of the Rules can result in
disciplinary action. Model Rule 6.2 addresses the issue with regard to
appointments. "A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a
tribunal to represent a person except for good cause." The comment to
Rule 6.2 states:
All lawyers have a responsibility in providing pro bono public
service .... An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting
a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A
lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve
unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.
Unfortunately, not all members of the public understand why an
attorney should be willing to represent the accused. They may have little
knowledge of a lawyer's professional obligations or the workings of an
adversary system of justice. This creates the perception of lawyers as
"hired guns," willing to represent anyone who can pay the fee (ironically,
these difficult cases are often taken on appointment for little or no pay).
This misperception leads to criticism, making it even harder to find
attorneys willing to take on difficult cases. Large law firms may want to
avoid being associated with unpopular causes because of the way it
affects their professional image. Lawyers in smaller communities could
risk losing a significant amount of business by defending someone
unpopular in their community.
An attorney with political aspirations may have to worry about
being labeled soft on crime and criticized for trying to help criminals
exploit loopholes in the law. The 2005 Virginia gubernatorial race is a
sad example of this. During the campaign, one of the candidates was
criticized in print and in television ads for being an "ACLU lawyer" who
defends death row inmates.'75 The attorney, then state lieutenant
governor, had handled two death-row appeals cases, though not with the
ACLU. He was appointed counsel in both cases. The criticism was most
unfortunate as it received wide coverage and it was so misguided. Death
penalty appeals can be especially time consuming, difficult, and
thankless. There is a great deal of pressure because a person's life is on
the line. The pay, if any, is almost always well below what a lawyer could
make in private practice. Taking on these cases shows the kind of
character and professionalism that a lawyer should be able to cite with
pride in an election campaign. '76
175. Magaret Edds, The ACLU, Death Penalty and Gubernatorial Spin, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 2,
2005, at Ji; Editorial, Death Penalty Smear, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2005, at Ai6.
176. As stated most recently by Justice Stevens at the ABA Annual Meeting in August 2005:
"[Slome of the best lawyers in the country have spent countless uncompensated hours in capital
litigation, not only in post-conviction and appellate work, but also at the trial level. The Profession can
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To counter the public criticism and misperception of criminal
defense attorneys, it is important that members of the bar strongly
recognize and praise attorneys who represent unpopular clients. One way
to encourage this behavior is for organizations to acknowledge the effort
and sacrifice of the lawyers who do such pro bono work. Highlighting the
reasons this work is necessary would help counter the criticism those
defenders receive. Fortunately, those who see the value of defending
unpopular clients have already begun to take such steps. The John
Adams Award, given to defenders in the Baltimore area, was created in
1997 for this purpose. "I wanted to send the message that the work that
these lawyers do in defending the people who live in the shadows is an
act of patriotism," its founder notes. "I believe most of them do it out of
a love for their country and a love for this wonderful justice system we
have.' 77 One recent recipient of the award is Joshua Treem, a successful
private defense attorney who regularly accepts appointments to defend
indigent defendants. Perhaps his more famous unpopular client was Lee
Malvo, one of the 1-95 snipers.'
Another way to keep down the hidden costs of having counsel
available to represent the unpopular client is to have prominent
members of the bar visibly accept such representation. In his biography,
the well-known Washington lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, wrote of
his commitment to such representation.
[I am obliged because of] the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution and the role of the advocate in Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence.... [F]or the trial lawyer the unpopular cause is often a
post of honor. Like other lawyers who try criminal cases, I have taken
on many difficult cases for unpopular clients, not because of my own
wishes, but because of the unwritten law that I might not refuse. 9
A recent example can be shown with the activities of law dean, and
former federal judge and United States Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr,
who took on a death row inmate as a client. He and his law firm,
be justly proud of their work." Hon. John P. Stevens, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Address at American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva
(Aug. 6 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-o8-o6-o5.html. The
Virginia lawyer who was attacked was elected governor in November 2005.
177. Stephanie Hanes, Attorney Award Gives Credit Where it is Due, BALT. SUN, July 19, 2004, at
iB.
178. Brian Witte, Malvo's Lawyer Has Been Down Similar Path, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 2002, at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bal-sniper-lawyerO31,0,3702I58.story. A similar approach is taken
in Wyoming with the "Gideon Award" being given to lawyers dedicated to assisting "the poor and
downtrodden." See Press Release, University of Wyoming, Public Defenders Office Honors University
of Wyoming Professor (Oct. 1o, 2005), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/news/
showrelease.asp?id=2821.
179. EDWARD B. WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM 12-13 (1962). The point is well made in Babcock,
supra note 35, at 1515-16. For a more detailed look at Williams and his remarkable career, see
generally EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE (1991).
[Vol. 57:103 1
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, accepted the matter pro bono and Starr handled
the representation personally. ' The client always maintained his
innocence with regard to the murder. Starr, in the appeal before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, asserted that the
State had acted improperly by destroying the DNA evidence linking the
defendant to the murder weapon. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
conviction and sentence,'8 ' and the Supreme Court denied review.52 Starr
then sought clemency for his client. The Virginia Governor granted the
request, sentencing the client to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. 8, Starr's efforts, as a widely known and well-qualified attorney,
set an outstanding example for the rest of the profession, and made a
clear statement to the public about the necessity of such work by
attorneys.
Other lawyers and law firms, too, have joined to provide competent
legal assistance to poor people in the criminal justice system, or to
challenge insufficient indigent defense systems. Atlanta-based King &
Spalding is now sending attorneys to a Georgia county to represent
indigent defendants in a variety of criminal cases. The presiding judge
there commented that the addition of these attorneys is "certainly a
blessing.' '8' The overworked defender office had been handling more
than twice the maximum number of cases recommended by the Georgia
Supreme Court.'5 The Washington, D.C., office of O'Melveny & Myers
LLP operates a similar program, but it works through the Public
Defender's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland. The firm receives
both felony and misdemeanor files and assigns a junior lawyer to the
individual cases. Those young attorneys operate under the direct
supervision of a senior partner in the firm, handling all matters and
taking the cases to verdict, if necessary.' 86 Many firms throughout the
nation actively involve their lawyers as counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. Jenner & Block LLP of Chicago, and Williams & Connolly
of Washington, D.C. are especially well known for their involvement. A
striking example of such work involved our newest United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice, John Roberts, who participated in a
i8o. Donna St. George, Starr, in New Role, Gives Hope to a Needy Death Row Inmate, WASH.
POST, Mar. 14, 2005, at AI.
18i. Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, I88 (4th Cir. 2005).
182. Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3 d 171 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 400 (2005).
183. Frank Green, Warner Extends Clemency to Death Row's Lovitt, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RTD/
MGArticle/RTDBasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=i 128768421539.
184. Bill Rankin, Premier Law Firm Defends Indigents, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 31, 2002, at iH.
I85. Id.
186. See Correspondence from K. Lee Blalack, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, to Paul Marcus
(Nov. 7, 2005) (on file with author).
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difficult capital case in Florida while he was in private practice at the law
firm of Hogan & Hartson LLP. 87
In 2002, Davis Polk & Wardwell represented the New York County
Lawyers' Association against New York State and New York City in a
suit seeking to raise the rates of compensation paid to assigned counsel
who represent children and indigent litigants in family and criminal court
proceedings in New York City. The rates were $25 and $40 per hour for
out-of-court work and in-court work, respectively. The trial judge
granted NYCLA's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the
City and State to raise compensation rates." In response, the legislature
lifted rates to $60 and $75 per hour.
All of these activities are in the grand tradition of our profession:
The Constitution does not contemplate that prisoners shall be
dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, however
conscientious and able those agents may be. Undivided allegiance and
faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the
American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth
Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service deemed
more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an accused
too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member
of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense
which is peculiarly abhorrent.l8
187. The case is Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1982). See generally Myma Oliver, Hard
Work, Low Pay: Death Row, Few Lawyers for Big Task, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1988, at Ai. A large
number of law professors have also provided representation in many well-known matters. For
example, Abner Mikva, University of Chicago (and formerly judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit) was counsel in United States v. Ward, 146 F. App'x 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (appeal of
bank robbery conviction); Sheri L. Johnson, Cornell Law School, in Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847
(4th Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus appeal in death penalty case); David Siegel, New England Law School,
in Commonwealth v. Laguer, No. 8310339I, 200I WL 1194619 (Mass. Super. May 2, 2001) (motions for
DNA testing for defendant with rape conviction); David D. Cole, Georgetown University, in Al Najjar
v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 (irth Cir. 2001) (habeas corpus appeal for relief pending deportation
proceeding); Barry Scheck, Cardozo Law School, in Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 4o8 (2d Cir. 1997)
(appeal of grant of habeas corpus for denial of right to counsel); and Robert D. Bartels, Arizona State
University (formerly at University of Iowa), in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (confession
voided due to famous "Christian Burial Speech" by interrogating police officer).
188. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 419 (Sup. Ct. 2003). Other major law
firms have also worked hard to ensure success in law reform efforts in this area. One prominent effort
was with Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP assisting the ACLU in the legal action which ultimately
resulted in major changes to the Montana indigent defense system. See Press Release, Am. Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Files Class-Action Lawsuit Against Montana's Indigent Defense Program
(Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/ios27prS20o20214.html.
189. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948). Perhaps the surest way of guaranteeing high
quality representation is to have experienced and well regarded private lawyers leave individual
practice to work as public defenders. While not a common occurrence, it does happen. A very visible
recent illustration took place in Tucson, Arizona when two of the best-known trial lawyers in the
community agreed to become, respectively, the Public Defender and the Chief Public Defender of
Pima County. See Tom Beal, Flashy Lawyers Leave Private Practice for Public Defender Jobs, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Apr. 24,2005, at Ax.
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Many lawyers and law firms throughout our nation tirelessly devote
their time to assisting in the quest for competent legal assistance for poor
people. These efforts of well-known and highly qualified attorneys set a
fine example for the profession and help to educate the public as to the
importance of lawyers being willing to represent all defendants, even
those charged with or convicted of vile crimes. No responsible observer,
however, would suggest that volunteer lawyers can discharge the duty of
indigent defense given the massive nature of the undertaking and the
constitutional responsibilities of government. Such pro bono work is an
important supplement to the public defense work authorized and funded
by state and local governments. It is certainly not a substitute.
C. INDEPENDENCE
Virtually everyone working in the criminal justice system appears
strongly to agree with the notion that the defense function should be
independent. It should not be too closely linked with, or controlled by,
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary or the prosecution. As
explained in one national report, "[T]he ethical imperative of providing
quality representation to clients should not be compromised by outside
interference or political attacks."'' " To be sure, the very first of the
ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System makes clear
that the "public defense function, including the selection, funding, and
payment of defense counsel, is independent." 9' No one truly disputes this
view in theory. Judges should not be making assignments for personal
reasons, and defenders should be held responsible for their actions in a
careful professional setting. In practice, however, one finds very
troubling situations involving a genuine lack of independence with
indigent defense in several key areas.
- Virginia: These comments from experienced lawyers are, sadly,
heard throughout the nation and make clear the scope of the problem
with appointments: "You have to have a bar card, you have to have a
190. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS REPORT, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE X (2O0), available at http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/
icjs.pdf.
191. The comments to the Principles explain further:
The public defense function should be independent from political influence and subject to
judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as retained counsel. To
safeguard independence and to promote efficiency and quality of services, a nonpartisan
board should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or contract systems. Removing oversight
from the judiciary ensures judicial independence from undue political pressures and is an
important means of furthering the independence of public defense. The selection of the
chief defender and staff should be made on the basis of merit, and recruitment of attorneys
should involve special efforts aimed at achieving diversity in attorney staff.
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note 112, at 2 (internal citations omitted).
June 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pulse, and you have to know a judge willing to make the
appointment..".9
* Texas: "Judges who are in charge of paying the defense lawyer's bill
should not be presiding over the case; there are supposed to be two
teams and a referee. The way it actually works is, it's just one big
team.";' 93 "[S]ome attorneys seeking court appointments believe they
must contribute to judges' reelection campaigns if they are to receive
appointments";' 94 and, [by a state judge] "I don't like making
appointments. There's something inherently political about making
appointments."
95
* In several states, the public defender is appointed by a government
official that "further exacerbates the risk that the state public defender
will not pursue necessary resources and technical support when
needed."' Yet with jurisdictions that have more separated contracting
systems for the appointment of defense attorneys, such systems may be
"created for the sole purpose of containing costs, [and] they pose
significant risks to the quality of representation and the integrity of the
criminal justice system. ' 9""
* In Washoe County, Nevada within the past year, a search committee
was formed to select a new Chief Public Defender. The entire
committee initially consisted of two county commissioners, the
prosecuting attorney, and a judge. There were no other lawyers, no
members of the government, no one with any connection to criminal
defense activity.
* The public defender office in St. Louis recently announced that it
could no longer represent a class of defendants charged with minor
crimes because its lawyers did not have enough time to adequately
provide competent assistance. The head of the Missouri system stated
that the "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em" system was
constitutionally invalid. In response to this action, the local criminal
192. Laurence Hammack, Virginia May Raise Standards for Court-Appointed Attorneys, ROANOKE
TIMES, NOV. 30, 2003, at Bt (quoting Matthew Geary, head of Virginia Trial Lawyers Association's
criminal section).
193. Diane Jennings, Legislators Make Case for System Reform, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8,
2001, at 2oA (quoting Law Professor David Dow).
194. These remarks are reported in TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE
REPORT, ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS 21-22 (2000), available at
http://www.equaljusticecenter.org/Fair %2oDefense %2oReference %2oReport.pdf.
195. Id. at 22. In fairness, Texas has made progress here, as noted in Part VI.A. See generally
ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT
DEFENSE IN TEXAS (2000).
196. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE STATE OF NEVADA 75 (2000)
[hereinafter NEVADA INDIGENT DEFENSE].
197. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERIES #3, at I (2ooo).
198. Susan Voyles, Board Under Fire for Putting DA on Selection Panel, RENO GAZETTE-J., Apr.
20, 2005, at 2A. In response to harsh criticism, the committee was ultimately expanded to sixteen
people with community representatives, though the prosecutor remained a member. Dennis Myers,
New Defender, RENO NEWS & REV., June 23, 2005, available at http://www.newsreview.com/
reno/Content?oid=24938.
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court judge announced that he "would no longer allow public
defenders to postpone trials, would go with prosecutors' recommended
sentences over public defenders' recommendations and would no
longer reschedule hearings to avoid conflicts with the public defenders'
schedules."' 99
* With the appointment of counsel, lawyers across the country, as in
the state of Washington, voice concern that judges "play favorites" and
have wide discretion in determining financial support for investigators
and experts.2°°
o When Avoyelles Parish in Louisiana created a local indigent defense
oversight board, its members were appointed directly by the localjudges. No member of the board had any prior experience in the
criminal justice field. 0'
o Entire statewide systems have been sharply criticized for having a
"pervasive absence" of independence for the defense function from the
judiciary (North Dakota) 22 or giving far too much discretion to judges
with the appointment of defense counsel (Texas),2" or not providing
defense counsel who are independent of judges and politicians
(Georgia), 2 0 or not having independent oversight commissions
(Tennessee),0 5 or requiring defense services to compete for financial
support with other government agencies (Nevada).2
Many steps have been taken throughout the nation to combat these
sorts of problems. Independent oversight commissions operate in a
number of states.2 ° Some states very carefully keep the assignment of
lawyers apart from the pre-trial process involving criminal defendants29
199. Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules Are Set To Change, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, July 3
2005, at Es.
200. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, OVERVIEW OF THE CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM IN 2002 15-16 (2002).
201. TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 22, at 29.
202. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN NORTH DAKOTA (2004).
North Dakota recently established a statewide commission on legal counsel for indigents. The
commission is to develop and oversee the state-funded defense services program for indigents accused
of crimes. It will also establish standards for eligibility for services, qualifications for attorneys, and
attorney performance. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NORTH DAKOTA'S INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/Northdakotaoo2.
203. TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, supra note 194, at 21. For a discussion of the recent
efforts to substantially alter the system here, see infra Part VI.A.
204. Bill Rankin, Experts Indict Indigent Defense, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 9, 2002, at IA. For a
discussion of the recent efforts to substantially alter the system here, see infra Part VI.A.
205. This concern goes back many years, but remains a constant refrain today. One of the earliest
complaints can be found in NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
TENNESSEE 83 (I977).
206. NEVADA INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 75.
207. The matter is discussed in some detail infra Parts VI.A. and VI.B., looking at the reforms that
have been taken both legislatively and in response to judicial rulings.
208. The ABA's guidelines here are quite clear. Standard 5-1.3, Professional Independence,
provides:
(a) The legal representation plan for a jurisdiction should be designed to guarantee the
integrity of the relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving
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Still others lay out in some detail the eligibility requirements for counsel
who seek appointments.2" The serious problems remain, however, across
the nation in many places."
D. ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Although constitutionally entitled to legal representation, a
surprising number of indigent criminal defendants are denied counsel
entirely. Referred to as "the dirty little secret of the criminal justice
system, .... poor defendants are often pressured into pleading guilty,
waiving their right to counsel or representing themselves without ever
speaking to a lawyer about the merits of their case or the legal
consequences of their actions. Stringent eligibility requirements, which
can result in coerced self-representation, and the high incidence of
defendants ill-advisedly waiving their right to counsel, systematically
deprive poor defendants of their legal representation.
These routine practices, in addition to abuses of the plea bargaining
process, dispose of cases quickly, but a crowded court docket moves
under it should be free from political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision
only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice. The
selection of lawyers for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected
officials, but should be arranged for by the administrators of the defender, assigned-counsel
and contract-for-service programs.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-I.3(a) (1992). See also, the broad
structural changes made in New Mexico, as discussed in the ABA Report, Gideon's Broken Promise,
supra note 39, at 36. The state has established a statewide Public Defender Department which
maintains trial public defender units across New Mexico. These units have updated technology, are
supported by a staff including paralegals, investigators, social workers, alternative sentencing
advocates, technology, and administrative staff. The units have specialty sections for appeals, death
penalty, post-conviction, and mental health cases; they oversee contracts with private attorneys to
provide services in conflict with the defender's office. Contract counsel must also comply with state
performance standards.
209. Interesting developments have occurred in North Carolina. There, steps were first
systematically taken to go through the court appointment list and take off the names of ineffective
attorneys and to organize the remaining lawyers into groups based on the cases to be handled
(misdemeanors, low-level felonies, and serious felonies). Each list required a varying number of years
of experience. Andrea Weigl, Wake to Review Defense System, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Dec. 28, 2001, at Bi. Also, North Carolina's recent legislative reforms include establishing higher
qualification standards for attorneys seeking appointment to capital cases and appeals, as well as
developing performance guidelines for appointed counsel in non-capital cases. See NORTH CAROLINA
INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., IDS's MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE JULY 2001 (Jan. 2o06), available at
http://www.ncids.org/News%20& / 2oUpdates/ids%2oaccomplishments,%201-06%20update.pdf
[hereinafter IDS's MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS]; NORTH CAROLINA INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2oo5), available at http://www.ncids.org/
Reports%20& % 2oData/Legislature% 2oReport% 202005.pdf.
210. For an excellent analysis, see SCOTT WALLACE & DAVID CARROLL, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
IMPACT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants/
205023.pdf.
211. Nat'l Comm. on the Right to Counsel, Case Study: No Representation by Counsel,
http:l/www.thejusticeproject.org/press/national-committee/224o5.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter No Representation by Counsel].
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along without regard for the rights of the accused. Shockingly, there are
still areas of the country that simply fail to provide defense attorneys to
certain classes of poor criminal defendants at all. Particularly in light of
the Court's most recent right to counsel decision in Alabama v. Shelton,"2
there are likely thousands who face criminal charges across the country
with no lawyer at all. Two of the main findings of the ABA's recent
comprehensive report on the status of the right to counsel are
compelling:
Lawyers are not provided in numerous proceedings in which a right to
counsel exists in accordance with the Constitution and/or state law.
Too often, prosecutors seek to obtain waivers of counsel and guilty
pleas from unrepresented accused persons, while judges accept and
sometimes even encourage waivers of counsel that are not knowing,
voluntary, intelligent, and on the record. Throughout the country,
indigent defendants who have not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived their right to counsel are denied representation at
critical stages of the criminal process, in violation of constitutional
requirements. To make matters worse, prosecutors and judges
sometimes improperly encourage waivers of the right to counsel and
subsequent pleas of guilty from unrepresented indigent defendants, in
violation of disciplinary rules and national standards."'
i. Invalid Waiver as Denial
Despite the "obvious truth" that "lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries,.2. 4 a defendant may choose to waive her right to
counsel. 15 To be valid however, a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent. Given the presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, the judge has an obligation to make a thorough
inquiry into the particular facts of the case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused before finding that a defendant
has waived the right to an attorney., 6 "This duty cannot be discharged as
212. 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (guaranteeing lawyers to misdemeanor defendants facing a
suspended sentence). See generally Anne Endress Skove, Nat'l Center for State Courts, Indigent
Defense Trends in 2003: The Wide-Reaching Effects of Alabama v. Shelton,
http://www.Ncsconline.orgfWC/PublicationsfKISIndDef__Trendso3.pdf (last visited May, 16, 2006).
213. GIOEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 39. The Committee's own research, found in
Appendix B of its Report, confirms this problem.
214. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963).
215. Of course, a defendant does have an affirmative right to represent himself, but invoking the
right to self-representation first requires a valid waiver of the right to counsel. See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975). Where a defendant has chosen to represent herself, the judge has
the additional obligation to assure the individual is made aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation," before permitting her to relinquish counsel. Id. at 835. Although not adopted by
all states, the Juvenile Justice Standards recognize the critical issue of waiving the right to counsel by
recommending that the practice be prohibited entirely in juvenile proceedings. See INST. FOR JUD.
ADMIN., ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
6.iA (1996).
216. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
June 2oo6]
HASTINGS LAWJOURNAL
though it were a mere procedural formality. '21 7 Rather, a judge has a
responsibility to ensure that an accused understands the nature of the
charges against her, the range of possible punishment, possible defenses
to the charges, and any other essential facts to ensure that the defendant
truly understands the consequences of the waiver.218 Where a judge has
not made certain that a defendant has knowingly waived his right to
counsel, there is no valid waiver and thus, a denial of counsel must be
found.
The trial court's duty to insure that each defendant is fully advised of
her rights and the consequences of waiving counsel is in direct conflict
with the demands of crowded dockets and the desire to move cases. As
one criminal judge admitted,
In dealing with large calendars and pro se defendants inexperienced
with the law and legal process, it's easy for judges to let their
frustration get the best of them and look for ways to move the calendar
along. There has been more than one documented case in Washington
where judges have not fully advised defendants of their right to counsel
and to trial by jury or have explicitly encouraged defendants to waive
those rights in the name of efficiency."9
A city judge in Troy, New York was removed from the bench by the
New York Commission on Judicial Conduct, in part for failing to advise
defendants of their right to assigned counsel. He defended the practice of
jailing defendants for several days without advising them of their right to
counsel and then offering their freedom if they changed their plea to
guilty. The judge explained at his disciplinary proceeding that he
assumed the repeat offenders who came before him knew their rights,
while others were not alert enough to understand what he would have
said had he informed them of their rights.2
In a Snohomish County (Washington) municipal court, one woman
stipulated to facts sufficient to convict her, received a suspended jail
sentence, a $500 fine, and a conviction on her record, all without ever
speaking to an attorney. In the one minute and forty-seven seconds it
took the judge to dispose of her case, the judge never inquired whether
she understood her rights.22' After a year of observing Washington courts
the observer who documented that case concluded that "[e]very day in
Washington courts, hundreds of people face criminal charges without
217. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,722 (1948).
218. Id. at 723-24.
219. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 24 (quoting Judge Michael Spearman, Chief
Criminal Judge, King County Superior Court (Seattle, Washington)).
22o. Gerald Stern, Violations of Basic Rights May Constitute Judicial Misconduct, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
15, 2004, at 4.
221. Boruchowitz, supra note 123.
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lawyers, and many of them plead guilty and go to jail, sometimes
unaware that they have a right to a lawyer. ."
A judge in a large municipal court in Ohio was heard to say, "You
have a right to counsel in this case, but if you would like to resolve the
matter today you may waive that right and plead guilty." '223 Explicit
threats intended to coerce waiver of counsel are rare, but the
requirement that a waiver be voluntary requires more than the mere
absence of explicit coercion. 24 The voluntariness of a waiver can also be
questioned where the process imposes costs on the defendant for
requesting representation, such as where a plea agreement is good only
on the day offered or a request for counsel results in the defendant
returning to jail until appointment and recalendaring.225 Comments from
the bench can have an inappropriately chilling effect on defendants'
exercise of their constitutional right to counsel and fuel the perception
that a tacit rule of court is that those who ask for a lawyer are treated
more harshly. As one court succinctly put it, "[A] plea entered on the
basis of a sentencing agreement in which the judge participates cannot be
considered voluntary.",n
6
At times, the lack of a valid waiver goes beyond an individual
judge's failure to make the appropriate inquiry and is systemic in nature.
In the Rhode Island district courts, the arraignment process is so
confusing defendants regularly waive counsel without an appreciation of
what they are doing. During arraignment, a video tape explaining legal
rights is played for a large group of defendants. The tape informs the
defendants that they have a right to counsel and will be referred to the
public defender if they cannot afford counsel. However, the video does
not explain how or when the defendant can talk to the public defender.
Some defendants may not even be aware that a public defender is a
lawyer. After viewing the video, defendants are asked to enter a plea.
The video does not explain that a not guilty plea must be entered before
a defendant can be referred to the public defender. Many are under the
impression that they must assert once and for all whether they are guilty
or innocent. Most do not realize a not guilty plea can be changed after
meeting with a lawyer. Throughout this process the defendants are not
asked whether they want to waive their right to counsel. "The judge will
generally make no inquiry whatsoever into the defendant's background,
222. Id.
223. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN OHIO 50 (199I).
224. See SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF
ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN 106-O7 (1976).
225. ANN SKOVE, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ALABAMA V. SHELTON: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
MISDEMEANOR CASES RESULTING IN SUSPENDED OR PROBATED SENTENCE (2003), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS-IndDefSheltonRes.pdf.
226. Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689,690 (Pa. 1969).
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the defendant's educational history, the defendant's mental or physical
condition, or the defendant's prior dealings with attorneys.
227
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to
prescribe a specific script or formula for determining a valid waiver of
counsel, judges still have an obligation to make an appropriate inquiry to
determine that a defendant "knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open. '' "S Determining that a defendant has enough
information to make an intelligent decision depends upon "a range of
case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and
the stage of the proceeding. 229 Routine mass explanations through video
tapes, forms, or canned presentations by judges or prosecutors are not
sufficient to meet this standard.3
In addition, it is extremely unlikely that these mass information
sessions are capable of addressing the individual collateral consequences
of a guilty plea, which must be taken into consideration if a waiver is to
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Argersinger Court's
acknowledgment that even a defendant's brief incarceration for a
misdemeanor can result in "quite serious repercussions affecting his
career and his reputation ' 3 is an understatement compared to the
complex array of additional punishments a defendant can face today. A
minor drug conviction, for instance, can forever preclude welfare
benefits, public housing, student-loans, voting, government services,
hundreds of different types of jobs requiring licensing, and can mean
mandatory deportation for an immigrant.3" Repeat offenses can result in
"career criminal" designation which can trigger harsh recidivist or three-
strikes sentences and lead to a felon's extended incarceration. These are
precisely the case-specific factors that defendants need to discuss with an
attorney before waiving their right to counsel or accepting a plea bargain.
227. Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law and the Reality in Rhode
Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 409, 421-24 (2004).
228. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S 77, 88 (2004).
229. Id.
230. "[A] mere routine inquiry-the asking of several standard questions followed by the signing
of a standard written waiver of counsel-may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to
an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel." Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). For a description of mass arraignments, use of complex forms and
the inappropriate involvement of prosecutors in waiver of counsel, see GIoEoN'S BROKEN PROMISE,
supra note 39, at 24-25.
23t. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
232. See WASH. DEFENDER Ass'N, BEYOND THE CONvIcTION: WHAT DEFENSE ATrORNEYS NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OTHER NON-CONFINEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
(2oo5), available at http://www.defensenet.org/SNfUpdatedBeyondtheConviction.pdf.
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2. Abuse of Plea Bargains
Invalid waivers of counsel are frequently linked to plea bargain
abuse.233 Few defendants waive counsel with the intention of representing
themselves at a trial. Rather, most waive counsel and immediately plead
guilty to take advantage of a deal being offered by the prosecutor or
judge. Observers of Georgia courts describe a process involving mass
arraignments in which groups of defendants are informed of their rights
by a judge. The judge then leaves the courtroom and the prosecutors
take over. Each defendant lines up to meet privately with the prosecutor.
Once each defendant has met with the prosecutor, the judge returns. At
this point every defendant informs the judge that he would like to waive
counsel and plead guilty.234
Despite national standards that call for judges to refrain from
participating in plea negotiations,235 judges sometimes play a more active
role in the plea bargain process in order to resolve cases efficiently.236
The Troy, New York judge described above used a combination of
exorbitant bail and a taste of jail to coerce defendants into pleading
guilty. 37 If a defendant indicated that she wanted to retain counsel or
that she was too poor to do so, the judge set excessive bail and adjourned
the case for a few days. Upon return to court, the judge asked whether
the defendant would like to change the plea to guilty and be released.
Most did, of course. This judge handled more than 3000 criminal cases a
year, but in a three-year period, presided over only four trials.13 In
upholding the judge's removal from the bench, the majority of a deeply
divided New York Court of Appeals found that "coupled with a failure
to advise these defendants of their right to assigned counsel, [the judge's]
imposition of punitive bail all but guaranteed that defendants would be
coerced into pleading guilty: it was the only way to get out of jail. 2 39
Strikingly similar stories are playing out in courtrooms all across the
country. In Rhode Island, a judge offered the defendant a six-month
sentence for pleading guilty immediately. He warned the defendant,
233. For a comprehensive look at coercive tactics employed by some judges in plea bargaining, and
the negative impact of unprepared lawyers in the process, see generally Richard Klein, Due Process
Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349 (2004), and
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, t 17 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
234. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 24-25; CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT
DEF., THE STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE PART II: IMPACT OF ALABAMA V. SHELTON IN GEORGIA 2 (2004), available at
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idcReport-Io91o4.pdf.
235. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY I4-3.3(c), (d) (i999).
236. Federal judges are strictly prohibited from engaging in plea negotiations by the federal rules
of criminal procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(c)(i) ("The court must not participate in these [plea
negotiation] discussions.").
237. Stem, supra note 220.
238. Id.
239. In re Bauer, 818 N.E2d 1113, I117 (N.Y. 2004).
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however, that if the defendant demanded a lawyer he would probably
receive three years of jail time.4" In Riverside, California, a judge told
defendants, "[I]f you plead guilty today, you'll go home. If you want an
attorney, you'll stay in jail for two more days and then your case will be
set for trial and, if you can meet the bail amount, you'll be released." 4' A
juvenile court judge in Georgia candidly admitted that, "I tell the minor,
I will up the sentence if you take it to trial, because you could have
pleaded and saved us all this trouble." 42
The undeniable message to defendants is that they will be punished
for exercising the right guaranteed to them by the Constitution. Without
the assistance of counsel and afraid to request an attorney, many
defendants plead guilty to avoid the risk of a harsher penalty. Statistics
from Riverside, California provide a particularly disturbing example of
this systemic failure. According to the NLADA, 40-60% of cases are
disposed of at arraignment without counsel in Indio, a branch office of
Riverside. In misdemeanor arraignments alone, 14,365 defendants
pleaded guilty from October I, 1998 to September 30, 1999. Of those
pleas, 12,350 were made without the assistance of counsel.43
Even when defendants manage to get court-appointed counsel it
does not guarantee they will avoid being pressured into plea bargains. As
described in the parts on caseloads and compensation,' "meet 'em and
plead 'em lawyers," in the interest of speed and efficiency, may
encourage a plea bargain that is not be the best choice for a defendant.
Heavy caseloads, per-case fees, and payment caps create incentives for
appointed counsel to dispose of cases as quickly as possible. For
example, an attorney in Georgia working on a fixed contract model only
went to trial three times in a four-year span. Over this same span, his
clients pleaded guilty 313 times. It seems unlikely that all 313 defendants
were best served by pleading guilty. This is especially true in light of the
fact that many guilty pleas were entered after only a few minutes of
discussion between the attorney and client.45
3. Eligibility Standards
Although states have an obligation to provide attorneys for poor
criminal defendants, neither Gideon nor the right to counsel cases that
followed have offered any guidelines for determining who qualifies for
240. GIeON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 25.
241. Id.
242. ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31 (Patricia Puritz & Tammy Sun eds.,
2ooi) [hereinafter REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS].
243. No Representation by Counsel, supra note 211.
244 See supra Part V.A.
245. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the
Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 825.
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court-appointed counsel. National organizations suggest that counsel
should be provided to those who are unable to obtain adequate
representation without "substantial hardship. '2, 6 Even with such a
standard, there is wide variation in how jurisdictions determine who
qualifies for publicly funded lawyers. Overly restrictive criteria may deny
representation to many defendants who are not financially capable of
mounting an adequate defense without assistance. The myriad
approaches to determining indigency that states have employed, and the
wide variations in how these principles are enforced, result in unequal
access to counsel across the nation. In short, a poor defendant denied
appointed counsel in one state might be entitled to appointed counsel
had she been charged in another jurisdiction.247
In Wisconsin, a defendant must make $3000 or less to be appointed
counsel. A person can qualify for food stamps and Medicaid but be ruled
wealthy enough to retain his own attorney. It is estimated that each year
11,000 people who would be appointed counsel by standards used in
other states are denied counsel by the state of Wisconsin.24 A judge in
Kittitas County, Washington routinely denies counsel for college
students because in his view an "able-bodied, employable young person
with no dependants and virtually no debt [who] chooses to forgo
available employment so that he can attain an college degree" is outside
the definition of indigent. In one case, an unsuccessful defendant there
had an annual income of $36oo."4 In another instance, a judge denied
appointed representation to a poor defendant when the contract lawyer
questioned the defendant's eligibility because he had failed to list his
wedding ring, a necklace and a wristwatch as assets on the application he
submitted for representation."'
Limiting eligibility to only the absolute destitute denies
representation to a huge stratum of the population that is excluded from
public counsel, but unable to afford private attorneys. As a result, these
246. Both the Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States issued by the National
Study Commission on Defense Services and the ABA defense services standards utilize the substantial
hardship approach. The NSC Standard 1.5, Financial Eligibility Criteria, states: "Effective
representation should be provided to anyone who is unable, without substantial financial hardship to
himself or to his dependents, to obtain such representation." The ABA Criminal Justice Standards,
Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-7. 1, indicates, "Counsel should be provided to persons who are
financially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial hardship."
247. For an excellent discussion of the need for a more consistent standard for the determination
of indigency and a thoughtful proposal for establishing a constitutional floor for eligibility, see Adam
M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 8o IND. L.J. 571 (2005).
248. See Laura Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, But He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY, Aug.
29, 2005, at IA (quoting the Public Defender of Madison, Wisconsin).
249. Boruchowitz, supra note 123.
250. SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL




defendants have to go to extreme measures to secure counsel. James
Daringer, a defendant accused of arson, found himself in this situation.
He had a job earning $21,000 per year, so he did not qualify for court-
appointed counsel, but because of debts and other liabilities he did not
have enough money to hire a lawyer. He had to choose between
representing himself in court and quitting his job so he could qualify for a
public defender.. Facing up to seven years in prison, Daringer chose to
quit his job so he would meet the eligibility standards for the public
defenders' office."' There is little sense in forcing defendants to render
themselves unemployed, homeless, or without transportation in order to
secure counsel, which ultimately could be more costly to the state than
appointing counsel. Yet, there are many skeptics like the Kentucky
legislator, a trial lawyer opposed to additional funding for state public
defender offices, who commented, "I go to court many times and see
people that take advantage of the public defender when I know I have
similarly situated clients that borrow money or get help from family."25
E. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The challenges facing defenders, including overwhelming caseloads,
lack of supervision and training, inadequate compensation and resources,
and political pressure, all raise significant ethical issues for defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges. Although professional standards for
defenders are clear, systemic deficiencies push defenders to compromise
their efforts on behalf of clients. These questionable compromises
undermine ethical standards and, in turn, contribute to the denigration of
the legal profession and the criminal justice system. Judges, prosecutors,
lawyer disciplinary bodies, and defenders themselves are loath to call
attention to these ethical failings. As one notable commentator
concluded, "there is a huge chasm between what ethics rules demand and
how lawyers actually represent indigent defendants." '253
Virtually every lawyer is governed by some version of the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. '54 Although the rules are not
251. Steve Silverman, Public Defense Not Always Without Cost, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.),
Mar. 19, 2000, at A3.
252. Deborah Yetter, Public Defenders Swamped, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 28, 2004, at
iA.
253. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52
EMORY L.J. i 169, 1178 (2003).
254. With the adoption of the original Canons of Professional Ethics in 19o8 the ABA began
nearly ioo years of leadership in providing model standards on lawyer ethics and professional
responsibility. For a historical description of the committee process and the revisions and amendments
over the years, see Preface to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002). The most recent
comprehensive review and revision was undertaken in 1997 by the "Ethics 2000" Commission.
Although there are significant differences in individual state codes of ethics, the Model Rules are
intended to serve as a national framework for implementation of standards of professional conduct.
Thus a large majority of states pattern their standards after the Model Rules.
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intended to exhaust all the moral and ethical considerations a lawyer
may face, they provide a framework for the ethical practice of law and
establish professional norms for legal representation.55 Failure to adhere
to a jurisdiction's ethics code may result in disciplinary action against an
attorney, up to and including suspension or revocation of an attorney's
license to practice law. The substandard legal representation that often
results from the systemic problems plaguing public defense systems not
only seriously injures poor defendants, but also forces defenders to
violate their ethical and professional standards. This erosion of principles
undermines the credibility and honor of the legal profession and
corrodes the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Ethically a lawyer is required to serve her clients with competence56
and diligence.257 The lawyer must be thorough,25 adequately prepared,59
and a zealous advocate on behalf of the client's interests.26° Regular
communication is expected in order to keep the client reasonably
informed 6' and to respond to the client's reasonable requests for
information. 6 In addition, a lawyer is required to consult with the client
regarding how the lawyer will pursue important objectives 63 and to
explain matters to clients so that they may make informed decisions264
In practice, the average lawyer working in an overburdened public
defender office, or as an appointed or contract attorney whose
compensation is so anemic that the hourly wage barely covers overhead
expenses, may do none of these things. The problem arises, for instance,
with a lawyer carrying a misdemeanor caseload three times the size of
the national recommended standards, who meets a client for the first
time just before court is called into session. That attorney simply does
not have the time or the resources to investigate, prepare, or
communicate adequately with the client so that the client can make an
255. In addition to these general ethical standards which pertain to all attorneys, there are also
specific professional standards for defense attorneys which provide a more detailed guide to
professional conduct and performance. See NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1997); ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION (1993);
ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1993); ABA, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (1992).
256. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
257. Id. R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.").
258. Id. R. l.I.
259. Id.
260. Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
261. Id. R. 1.4 (a)(3).
262. Id. R. 1.4 (a)(4).
263. Id. R. 1.4 (a)(2).
264. Id. R. 1.4 (b).
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informed decision and the attorney can advocate zealously for his client's
best interests. Even where the matters are not complex, sheer volume
can preclude anything other than an assembly line approach, which falls
far short of professional standards. Such is the case for the two contract
defenders in Allen County, Indiana, who were assigned 2668
misdemeanor cases last year.' 6 Each attorney makes less than $2ooo a
month and maintains a private practice on the side. Not surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of defendants plead guilty; only twelve went to
trial in a year.
Calling the practice unethical, chief public defenders in two
jurisdictions, Broward County, Florida and St. Louis, Missouri, recently
refused to continue the "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em"
approach.' 6 In Broward County, public defenders will no longer be
allowed to recommend plea agreements to clients at arraignments or first
hearings unless the attorney has met with the defendant, established a
relationship and has an opportunity to properly assess the case, the client
and any plea offer.' 68 The change was made in acknowledgment that the
prior practice of recommending a plea, often portrayed as a one time
offer that would worsen over time, at a lawyer's first encounter with a
client with almost no information about the case fails to meet ethical
standards. Such an approach makes it nearly impossible to determine
whether a plea is in a defendant's best interest or to fulfill the duty to
explain the matter sufficiently for the client to make an informed
decision. For this reason, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards require
independent investigation: "Under no circumstances should defense
counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed,
including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be
introduced at trial.' 69
Similarly, in St. Louis the chief defender characterized
representation of certain misdemeanor defendants as "unethical,
unprofessional and unconstitutional."'70 As a result, he instituted a policy
of no longer automatically representing defendants the first time they
appear in court after having been arrested on misdemeanor charges. The
chief defender concluded that it was not possible to "render
265. Fred McKissack, Maximum Caseload: Misdemeanor Public Defenders Must Scramble, J.
GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Apr. 3, 2005, at i IA.
266. Id.
267. Geri L. Dreiling, 'Meet-and-Greet' Pleas Not Good Enough, Public Defender in Florida Bans
Long-Standing Practice, ABA JOURNAL EREPoRT, June 24, 2005; Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules
Are Set to Change, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 3, 2005, at EI.
268. Dreiling, supra note 267
269. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standard 4.6 (1993).
270. Patrick, supra note 267.
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constitutional, ethical and professional assistance of counsel upon
walking into court with no discovery, no opportunity for investigation
and no opportunity to counsel the accused. 7' Both of these jurisdictions
have simply recognized that, despite caseload pressures, ethics rules
require more of defense attorneys than encouraging their clients to
accept the prosecution's plea offers.
The ethical dilemmas are not limited to misdemeanor court,
however. They may arise wherever caseload pressures make it impossible
for defenders to devote sufficient time to each case. Noting the trend of
increasing caseloads without corresponding increases in resources, a
legislative audit of the public defender agency in Alaska explicitly
acknowledged a "heightened concern for professional ethics
violations. 272 And, although the state expressed a willingness to defend
its legal professionals against claims of such violations, the report
candidly advised that "each attorney must weigh his/her ever increasing
caseload and the demands from the public, against the potential of
violating the professional code of ethics, resulting in disciplinary
action." '73 That is a rather stark and appalling warning that ethical
violations may be inherent in the job of public defender.
Alaska is not alone in raising the alarm. The recent ABA report
assessing the status of Gideon's mandate across the nation reached a
similar conclusion. It found that "defense lawyers throughout the country
are violating these ethical rules by failing to provide competent, diligent,
continuous, and conflict-free representation." '274 As disturbing as it is to
suggest that ethical violations are commonplace, it is even more alarming
that courts and disciplinary authorities routinely overlook these breaches
of professional ethics. The likelihood of any individual defender being
subjected to discipline for violation of the minimum levels of competence
or zealousness is small.75 Most disciplinary agencies seem reluctant to
bring charges against defenders whose conduct breaches ethical rules, 76
perhaps because it seems unfair to blame an individual attorney when
271. Id.
272. Div. OF LEGISLATIVE AUDIT, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC DEFENDER
AGENCY CASE MANAGEMENT TIME STUDY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW I8 (1998), available at
http://www.legaudit.state.ak.us/pages/audits/2ooo/pdf/453orpt.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA TIME STUDY].
273. Id.
274. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 20. "Lawyers who provide representation in
indigent defense systems sometimes violate their professional duties by failing to furnish competent
representation." Id. at 39.
275. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining
of the Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 162 (1995) ("While the existence of unreported
disciplinary action is certainly a possibility, a computer search indicates no reported case of an
attorney being disciplined for failures related to criminal defense."); see also Suzanne E. Mounts,
Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L.
REV. 473,499.
276. Green, supra note 253, at 1195.
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the failings are more a function of systemic inadequacies. 77 The
reluctance to sanction defenders of the indigent may also reflect the
concern that sanctions could discourage other lawyers from accepting
cases of indigent defendants. Such a result would exacerbate the problem
of an already short supply of attorneys willing to take on this type of
work.27s
Another possible ethics enforcement mechanism, malpractice
actions by defendants, is likely to be as unavailing as recourse to lawyer
disciplinary bodies has been. Many states require that a plaintiff must
first succeed in obtaining post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance
of counsel before bringing a malpractice claim. 79 Moreover, some courts,
including some that require post-conviction relief, have held that the
plaintiff must effectively demonstrate her actual innocence, not just that
she would have been acquitted save for the attorney's negligence.
Prosecutors and judges must also bear some responsibility in
maintaining ethical standards within the criminal justice system, and the
roles of both warrant further exploration. The prosecutorial ideal of
seeking to "do justice," rather than just pursuing conviction of those who
are arrested, has long established roots in our legal tradition. In 1935, the
Supreme Court eloquently expressed the contours of this duty in the
277. Id. at i 196-97.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. i997) (applying Illinois law); Shaw v.
State, 816 P.2d 1358, 136o (Alaska i99i); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999); Berringer v.
Steele, 758 A.2d 574, 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Morgano v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 737 (Nev. 1994);
Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 565-66 (Or. 1993); Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d io8, iI5 (Pa. 1993);
Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3 d 103, 117 (Tenn. 2001); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497-98
(Tex. 1995); Adkins v. Dixon, 482 S.E.2d 797, 8o-o2 (Va. 1997).
280. See Levine, 123 F.3d at 582-83; Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3 d 67o, 672-73 (Cal. 2ooi);
Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 985-87 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695-
96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Kramer v. Dirksen, 695 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (I11. App. Ct. 1998); Ray v. Stone,
952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Mass. 1991);
Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 373-74 (Neb. 2000); Morgano, 879 P.2d at 738; Mahoney v.
Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996 (N.H. 1999); Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d
1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987); Bailey, 621 A.2d at 115; Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497-98; Falkner v. Foshaug, 29
P.3d 771, 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 2ooi). Courts have identified,
[viarious policies or justifications... for the exoneration rule, including: equitable
principles against shifting responsibility for the consequences of the criminal's action; the
paradoxical difficulties of awarding damages to a guilty person; theoretical and practical
difficulties of proving causation; the potential undermining of the postconviction process if
a legal malpractice action overrules the judgments entered in the postconviction
proceedings; preserving judicial economy by avoiding relitigation of settled matters;
creation of a bright line rule determining when the statute of limitations runs on the
malpractice action; availability of alternative postconviction remedies; and the chilling
effect on thorough defense lawyering.
Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P.3d 911, 916 (Kan. 2003). Some courts have refused to adopt the "exoneration
rule." See, e.g., Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237, I238-39 (Ala. 1983); Silvers v. Brodeur, 682
N.E.2d 81i, 817-I8 (Ind. Ct. App. 5997); Duncan v. Campbell, 936 P.2d 863,868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997);
Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d 1O58, io6o-6i (Ohio 1989).
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seminal case of Berger v. United States, holding that:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done."'
Despite their duty to seek justice, there are prosecutors who
zealously pursue their role as a representative of the government's
interest in conviction, often to the exclusion of other interests. Indeed,
some prosecutors are more likely to exploit defense incompetence than
to take steps to guard against it."' For example, there are prosecutors
who encourage quick guilty pleas as a way of clearing their dockets and
maintaining high conviction rates with low costs.2S3
Most authorities hold that prosecutorial intervention in the face of
ethical violations by defense counsel is only required if there is a
constitutional violation, not if the performance of defense counsel is
simply lacking. Indeed, reporting of substandard behavior of defense
counsel by the prosecutor must be undertaken with care. There is a
substantial concern that if the standards were too lax as to when a
prosecutor could report a defense attorney for ethical violations, the
procedure would become another litigation tactic. As a result, such
action should only be taken if the prosecutor has clear and unmistakable
knowledge that an ethical rule has been violated. ABA Standard 3-1.3,
the Prosecution Function, provides that prosecutors should always use
great restraint when tempted to comment on opposing counsel."
The role of judges in both monitoring and correcting ethical abuses
by defense counsel is also worthy of further attention. Although judges
have strong incentives to encourage the quick resolution of cases and to
sidestep the issue of the effectiveness of defense counsel in order to
move the docket along, judges are uniquely situated to prevent ethical
violations. 85 The Supreme Court has recognized the role of the trial court
as a protector of a defendant's right to counsel.
[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of the incompetent
counsel, and ... judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
281. 295 U.S. 78,88 (935).
282. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB L.J. 607,
637-42 (1999).
283. Id.
284. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.3 (1993).
285. See generally Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact
on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988); William W.
Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel- The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1980).
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performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts. 86
In appointing counsel, monitoring pretrial activities and evaluating
counsel's preparedness, observing courtroom performance and
participating in plea bargaining negotiations, the judge must be cognizant
that "[i]t is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for
the conduct of a fair and lawful trial.",287
Regardless of the potential role prosecutors and judges might play in
supporting ethical norms in the criminal justice system, defense attorneys
themselves have a strict ethical obligation to control their workload in
order to ensure that they can deliver competent representation. "' Some
courts have recognized the ethical conflict inherent in carrying an
excessive caseload and meeting the professional obligations of
competence and diligence. They support attorneys' efforts to manage
their workload by either declining appointments or withdrawing from
representation. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested that
if a public defender is overburdened, he may "at any time decline an
appointment, and should decline to accept an appointment if [the
defender] is not in a position to properly defend [an] action." '' 9 Similarly,
the California Court of Appeal stated, "[w]hen a public defender reels
under a staggering workload . . . [he] should proceed to place the
situation before the judge, who upon a satisfactory showing can relieve
him, and order the employment of private counsel at public expense. ' 2
Courts have occasionally done just that. For example, the Florida District
Court of Appeals has upheld a trial court order allowing a public
defender to withdraw from representation in six felony cases because of
an excessive caseload.29'
286. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (197O).
287. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333,341-42 (1978).
288. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2) ("A lawyer's work load must be controlled
so that each matter can be handled competently."); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standard 5-
5.3(a) (1992) ("Neither defender organizations, assigned counsel nor contractors for services should
accept workloads that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations."). The importance of controlling
workload is espoused as one of the core principles in TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note
112, at 1 ("Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.").
289. lacona v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 6oo, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
29o. Ligda v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744, 754 (Ct. App. 1970) (internal citation omitted); see
also State ex rel. Escambia County v. Behr, 354 So. 2d 974,975-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
291. Behr, 354 So. 2d at 975-76. The court found that although the statute required that the
defender represent all indigent defendants and did not provide any grounds to withdraw because of an
excessive caseload, the statute could not be interpreted so mechanically. As a result of the devastation
of Hurricane Katrina, along with the insufficient funding situation in Louisiana, prosecutions in New
Orleans may need to be halted as there are not enough defense lawyers available to handle the
workload. See Parker, supra note lO4.
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Not all courts are as enlightened, however. When a highly regarded
criminal defense attorney filed a motion seeking a dismissal for his client
because Virginia's unwaivable caps on court-appointed fees created a
conflict of interest, one judge responded with threats. 92 The attorney
argued the low compensation paid to court-appointed attorneys created
an overwhelming financial disincentive to mount a competent defense
for an indigent client and thus generated an impermissible conflict of
interest. Another judge, having read about the motion in the newspapers,
greeted the lawyers in his courtroom with the announcement that any
lawyer who had similar feelings would be removed from the court-
appointed list. The threat was clear, "challenge the fee caps at the risk of
your livelihood." '293
I. Strickland and the Undermining of Ethical Standards
Lawyers may often be stymied in their efforts to resolve the ethical
dilemma of how to deliver competent representation in the face of
unreasonable caseloads and few resources. Still, their efforts are further
undermined by the case law surrounding ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Constitutional decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment have
established a standard for effective assistance of counsel that has been
universally criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and
professional standards governing defense attorneys.294 The result is that,
rather than requiring defenders of the indigent to meet professional
standards, the constitutional test for ineffective assistance sets the
standard far lower and permits, and some argue encourages, deficient
lawyering 95 As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall observed,
"'all manner of negligence, ineptitude, and even callous disregard for the
client' pass muster under the Strickland standard.2 96
292. Editorial, Injustice Unchallenged, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2004, at B6.
293. Id.
294. Freedman, supra note 35, at 915 ("There is, of course, wide scholarly agreement that
Strickland has neither discouraged incompetent representation nor prevented wrongful convictions.");
see also Green, supra note 253, at 1186.
295. Green, supra note 253, at 185-9o; see also Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts
Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. Pir. L. REV. 293, 346 (2002)
("[A]II who have seriously considered the question agree that Strickland has not worked either to
prevent miscarriages of justice or to improve attorney performance."); Geimer, supra note 275, at 4
("Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal lawyering.");
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FOROHAM L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2003) ("[T]he
ruling has proved disabling to the right to effective assistance of counsel in practice."); Russell L.
Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 441
(2003/2004) ("[T]he test fails to assure even a minimal level of competence or effectiveness. In general,
the Court appears to be quite willing to accept a low level of competence by indigent defenders.").
296. Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority
and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 86o (I992) (citing Remarks
of Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, Sept. 1988).
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The Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining
when counsel is constitutionally ineffective in its 1984 decision in
Strickland v. Washington." First, "a convicted defendant [who]
complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance... must, show
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. ''29 There are no specific guidelines for determining
whether counsel meets an objective standard of reasonableness."'
Instead, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms... considering all
the circumstances." 3" The second element of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is that "any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be
prejudicial to the defense..... To satisfy the prejudice prong, the
"defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of that proceeding would have
been different. Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. 3W2
Despite some strong rhetoric in support of competent
representation," chilling examples abound of abysmal representation
that was nevertheless upheld under this constitutional test.3 4
Unbelievably, courts have relied upon Strickland to refuse to find
ineffective assistance of counsel even where the defense attorney was
silent during the entire trial, shared delusions about his involvement in a
murder conspiracy with the jury, or was arrested on the way to the
courthouse for driving with a .27 blood-alcohol content.3 5
Not surprisingly, the two-prong Strickland test has been widely
criticized as betraying the promise of Gideon. In practice the test is
297. 466 U.S. 669 (r984).
298. Id. at 687-88.
299. Id. at 688.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 692.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., id. at 686 ("[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.")
(emphasis added); id. at 692 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside
the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.").
304. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, i8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 245-49 (199I) (discussing the deeply distressing stories
of Georgia capital defendants Jack House and Billy Mitchell); Bright, supra note 296, at 86o-6i
(describing the case of a since-executed defendant whose conviction was upheld even though defense
counsel later apologized to the client for being under significant stress during trial because at the time
he was on drugs and breaking up with both his wife and his lover); Roger Parloff, Legal Aid, Barely,
HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1993, at 26 (citing examples of denial of ineffective assistance claims where
defense attorneys were asleep, using heroin and cocaine throughout the trial, or drunk during the
trial).
305. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's
Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 831 (2003).
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nearly impossible to meet. °6 Thus, as courts continue to apply the
demands of the analysis to attorney performance, the definition of
acceptable lawyer behavior departs further and further from ethical
standards and substandard lawyering is routinely upheld."
Although it is not particularly difficult to identify errors that an
attorney made in the course of representing an indigent defendant,
proving the prejudice prong is a hurdle most cannot overcome."° One
central problem is that the trial record, where the prejudice must be
found, is itself a product of the defense attorney's deficient
performance.3" As Justice Marshall, the single dissenter in Strickland,
aptly observed, reviewing the record is unlikely to reveal how the
defendant may have been prejudiced by an attorney's performance:
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better
if his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can
sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a
cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to
ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have
stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact
are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the
defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the
incompetence of defense counsel.3'
306. The practical problem was explained in an article laying out the review of recent criminal
convictions in the San Jose area:
Attorney errors are not easily corrected. In more than too cases, the 6th District Court of
Appeal rejected challenges to the attorney's performance by issuing single-sentence orders
that lacked explanation. Other cases saw the appellate justices repeatedly rationalize poor
conduct. In one instance, they suggested that an alcoholic lawyer's repeated absences and
tardiness during trial may have been a knowing tactic to permit him time to sober up before
the jury saw him. Twice, justices found no problem with lawyers who could not legally
represent their clients because they had been suspended by the State Bar of California.
Tulsky, supra note 18, at 3A. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The
Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CriM. L. & CIMINOLOOY 242, 284 (1997) ("Under Strickland,
ineffective assistance is easily alleged but almost impossible to prove."); Kenneth Williams, Ensuring
the Capital Defendant's Right to Competent Counsel: It's Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REV.
129, 138 (2o05) ("[Ilt is almost as difficult to prove ineffectiveness now as it was prior to Strickland.
Courts have been unwilling to find that an attorney's performance was deficient even in the most
egregious cases .. "); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2o62, 2068 (2000) ("It is thus exceedingly difficult to win such a claim
under the standard established in Strickland."); Kelly Reissmann, Comment, Our System is Broken: A
Study of the Crisis Facing The Death-Eligible Defendant, 23 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 43, 47 (2002) ("The
Strickland standard for ineffective counsel is almost impossible to meet.").
307. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 305, at 831.
308. This is true despite the highly deferential standard the Court applies to evaluating the
strategic choices made by lawyers. Strickland establishes a "strong presumption" that a lawyer's
performance falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689.
309. Dripps, supra note 3o6, at 278.
310. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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If, under the Strickland standard, courts can routinely refuse to find
ineffective assistance of counsel even where there has been a clear
breach of professional norms, then the erosion of those norms is
unavoidable. The combination of the low constitutional standard with
the reluctance of lawyer disciplinary bodies, prosecutors, judges and
defense attorneys themselves to meet their ethical obligations has
resulted in the evisceration of the right to counsel for poor criminal
defendants.
F. TRAINING, EVALUATION, AND SUPERVISION
A lack of supervision of defenders impairs the quality of
representation afforded poor defendants, as does the failure to evaluate
counsel to ensure that the lawyer's training, experience, and ability
appropriately match the complexity of the cases assigned. The absence of
attorney standards can mean defenders of the indigent lack the
qualifications to deliver competent criminal defense representation.
Ongoing training and supervision are crucial in ensuring that defense
lawyers develop and maintain their skills, particularly in specialized
areas, and in ensuring that they be held accountable for the level of
representation they provide to clients.
I. Supervision
Without practice standards, and the supervision and evaluation to
enforce those standards, there is no mechanism to ensure the quality or
adequacy of indigent defense services. The ABA's Ten Principles
recognize this critical feature of an indigent defense system with
Principle Ten: "Defense counsel is supervised and systematically
reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally
adopted standards." '' As an initial step in assuring competence,
however, defense attorneys must not be assigned to cases for which they
lack the experience or competence.312 As the sixth of the ABA's Ten
Principles provides: "Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience
[should] match the complexity of the case."313
The importance of matching an attorney's qualifications with the
difficulty of the case has long been recognized in death penalty litigation,
given the complexity and demands of capital defense. In that context
attorney qualifications are a common element of standards established
through statute, state supreme court rule, or indigent defense system
directive." 4 Yet, it is also inappropriate in the extreme to assign a rape
311. See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note 112, at i.
312. In fact, this is an ethical obligation as well as a practical consideration. See supra Part V.E.
313. See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note I 12, at I.
314. See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, VOLUME III Bi (20OO), available at http:/lwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/
indigentdefense/compendium/pdftxt/vol3.pdf.
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case where the defendant is facing a life sentence to an attorney who has
never handled such a defense before, as has happened to multiple
Montana defenders."5 In Illinois, one capital defendant was represented
by a real estate attorney. When asked if he had ever handled a criminal
trial by himself, the lawyer responded, "Well, is paternity criminal?',
6
Massachusetts, despite its serious problems in compensating and
retaining lawyers, has established an excellent system for ensuring that
attorneys have the knowledge, skills and experience to handle the cases
they are assigned.317 The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS)
created a tiered certification process. Attorneys seeking appointment
must verify their trial experience and CLE compliance. They must also
provide recommendations from practicing criminal defense attorneys. In
order to be certified as eligible to accept cases in superior court, an
attorney must have tried at least six jury or six superior court criminal
trials to verdict in the last five years as lead defense counsel. The
applicant must fully describe the cases, including names, indictment
numbers and charges, names of judges and prosecutors, dates of trials,
and the major issues of each case, and offer as reference three criminal
defense practitioners familiar with the applicant's work. The chief
counsel of CPCS must individually approve each applicant. Attorneys
seeking appointment in the district court in misdemeanor and concurrent
felony cases must be admitted into a county bar advocate program and
complete a five-day training seminar entitled "Zealous Advocacy in
District Court." Attorneys must be reevaluated and recertified every
four to five years.' s
Even where an attorney's knowledge and experience are
appropriately matched to her case assignments, counsel's performance
still must be appropriately monitored and evaluated to ensure quality
representation. Ordinarily, a public defender organization has a
hierarchy of management in place that can respond and correct inferior
performance. But, surprisingly, even public defender management may
not deliver much supervision or performance evaluation to ensure
competent representation. In Montana, for example, the chief public
defender in one county admitted that he does not engage in any
meaningful supervision. "I just try to address specific concerns as they
315. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN
MONTANA 35-36 (2004) [hereinafter MONTANA REPORT].
316. Marshall, supra note 35, at 959.
317. For a complete description of the eligibility and certification requirements in Massachusetts,
see Committee for Public Counsel Services, Certification Requirements, http://www.mass.gov/cpcsl
certreqs/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
318. See COMMITTEE FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL SERVICES, ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL: POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, Chap 3.2 (2oo4), available at http://www.mass.gov/cpcs/manuals/pcmanual/
3_2CerificationDistrictCourtCasesChap3Sept220 4 .pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6).
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come up... . I don't follow lawyers around and make sure that they're
dotting all their I's and crossing their T's.... The individual attorneys
monitor their performance. '
Another Montana county chief defender carries the largest case load
in her office, which precludes her from providing any meaningful
supervision to subordinates.32° Good management here would include
conducting in-court observations, reviewing case files, discussing theories
of the case, directing training, and monitoring the overall work of the
lawyers. All this is impossible to achieve where the supervisor also
carries a full caseload. In Alaska, a legislative audit of the public
defender agency noted the lack of supervision of attorneys within the
agency and quoted one lawyer's assessment: "Everyone is on their own-
sink or swim. 32'
If effectively supervising public defenders within an office is
sometimes problematic, holding appointed counsel and contract
attorneys accountable for their performance presents an even greater
difficulty. Without an independent supervisory check on defense
attorneys, incompetent lawyers can be appointed repeatedly, even in the
face of multiple bar suspensions or disbarments. In Illinois, attorneys
who were previously or subsequently disbarred served as counsel for
thirty-three defendants who received death sentences.3" One of those
lawyers had seventy-eight complaints lodged against him. Another
attorney, who had been previously disbarred represented four
defendants who received death penalties. The attorney was subsequently
disbarred a second time.323
Oversight is important in maintaining accountability. It is perhaps
even more important that the supervision be provided by an independent
entity rather than the judiciary or politicians. As discussed in the part on
Independence," 4  too often judges, burdened with overwhelming
caseloads themselves, are more attuned to clearing the docket than to
seriously considering whether an attorney has the requisite skills to
mount a competent defense.35  "[C]ourts may give preference in
appointments to attorneys who dispatch cases expeditiously, without a
level of motion practice, investigation, or pleas for expert assistance that
319. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 57.
320. Id.
321. ALASKA TIME STUDY, supra note 272, at 19.
322. See Marshall, supra note 35, at 959.
323. Id. For a discussion of these problems, see generally REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (April 2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/indexhtml. See also Williams, supra note
306, at 145.
324. See supra Part V.C.
325. See supra Part V.A.
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would slow dockets and drain limited funds. '326 In addition, popularly
elected state judges are not immune from the pressures of campaigning
and may favor those lawyers who contribute to their judicial
campaigns.3"7
2. Training
If attorneys are to deliver effective assistance of counsel to poor
defendants they, like all lawyers, must be competent, zealous
advocates.2 Criminal law is a complex and ever-changing legal area
requiring specialized knowledge and skills. As evidenced by the
consistent call for regular, organized high-quality training in national
criminal defense standards, initial training and ongoing education are
crucial to ensuring that lawyers are capable of providing high-quality
criminal representation.329 The ABA's Ten Principles, which distill the
myriad sets of national standards and identify fundamental elements of
an effective system, advocate mandatory training.33 As former Attorney
General Janet Reno succinctly put it, "training can make such a
difference."33'
Despite the wide recognition of the common sense of providing
adequate and ongoing training for defenders, jurisdictions all across the
country fail to do so. This lack of training is often manifested by
inadequate performance. A well-trained Cincinnati attorney described
an inexperienced, court-appointed attorney as "oblivious" about
managing the felony case to which he was assigned. "It was startling to
me how little he prepared the case. It's because he's got no training. He's
got a trial coming up on a serious felony, and he didn't know the basics of
investigation, including that he should interview all potential witnesses
326. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional
Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 8oi, 812 (2004); see also, Marshall, supra note 35, at 958.
In far too many cases, these appointments are a form of patronage, having everything to do
with connections, and nothing to do with qualifications. Indeed, there are many instances in
which it appears obvious that judges are choosing lawyers whom the judges trust will not
put up much of a fight and will keep the assembly line moving.
Id.
327. See Brown, supra note 326, at 812 n.46.
328. Competence is also the ethical standard for a lawyer's work. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.").
329. See NLADA, Defender Training and Development Standards 12 (I997) for a preface listing a
wide array of guidelines, standards and reports recognizing the critical importance of training for
defenders.
330. TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note I12, at 1 ("Defense counsel is provided with
and required to attend continuing legal education. Counsel and staff providing defense services should
have systematic and comprehensive training appropriate to their areas of practice and at least equal to
that received by prosecutors.").
331. Reno Remarks, supra note 25, at viii.
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before trial."33 ' Similarly, a Pennsylvania county judge admitted that the
"younger attorneys are in way over their head[s]. '33 3 The expert report
prepared for systemic litigation in Montana found that "[tihere is no
orientation program for newly hired indigent defense attorneys, no
systematic and comprehensive training, and no technical assistance. '3' A
similar situation exists in New York. After monitoring public defense
systems in multiple counties for over a year, the New York Civil
Liberties Union concluded that the programs were unable to "provide
sufficient, or sometimes any, training, supervision, or technical assistance
to ensure that attorneys are equipped with the skills and knowledge to
adequately represent their clients., 331 Prior to 2004, in Virginia, there
were neither formal training programs for public defenders or court-
appointed counsel, nor minimum qualification standards.336  Not
surprisingly, one aspect of the problem is lack of resources to create
training programs where public defense dollars are in short supply and
needs are great. In southwest Louisiana, for example, the public
defender office had no program for professional development and was
able to budget only $4000 per year for travel, very little of which was for
professional training. In contrast, the jurisdiction's prosecutor's office
spends approximately $ioo,ooo a year for its staff to attend seminars and
conferences.337
Introductory training for the newly hired lawyer, while vital, is not
the only need, however. Ongoing specialized advanced training for more
experienced lawyers is key to keeping skills current. For instance, as
Janet Reno asserted, "understanding the latest technology used in crime
analysis no longer is a luxury for an attorney.""' 3 In implementing the
new training standards required for court-appointed work in his state,
Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice Leroy R. Hassell concentrated his
332. Nicole J. De Sario, The Quality of Indigent Defense on the 4 oth Anniversary of Gideon: The
Hamilton County Experience, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 49 (2003).
333. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STATEWIDE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES IN
PENNSYLVANIA 72 (2002) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT].
334. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 37.
335. Testimony of Donna Lieberman, Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union,
before The New York State Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services (Feb. I I, 2oo5),
available at http://www.nyclu.org/indigentdefense tstmny-o21105.html; see also Statement of E.
Vincent Warren, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU Found. Nat'l Legal Dep't, before the New York State
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services 5 (Feb. II, 2oo5), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/warren.pdf.
336. VA. BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON VIRGINIA'S INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 4 (2005) (discussing
specialized training for capital cases mandated by legislation since I99I). A central charge of the newly
established Virginia Indigent Defense Commission is to establish and monitor qualifications and
training requirements for defenders. See VA. CODE § 19.2-163.OI (2OO6), discussed infra Part VI.A.3.
337. MICHAEL M. KURTH & DARYL V. BURCKEL, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA
24-25 (2003).
338. Reno Remarks, supra note 25, at viii.
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energy on providing advanced skills for more experienced lawyers and
sponsored a program exclusively for experienced practitioners.339
The federal defender system, under the Criminal Justice Act,34
provides a model for the delivery of training for defenders in recognition
of the critical role training plays in maintaining proficiency in criminal
practice." Federal defenders, regardless of their respective experience
levels, have training opportunities. Those opportunities are tailored
based on experience. New attorneys take a two-week class instructing
them on the key aspects of their new roles as federal defenders. The
course includes instruction on litigation and sentencing guidelines.
Attorneys subsequently receive training at the National Criminal
Defense College, intended as a follow-up to their initial training. At the
Defense College, topics covered include trial advocacy, client interaction,
investigation, motion practice, and use of experts.342 Similarly, state
prosecutors recognize the importance of training and can utilize the
resources and expertise of the National College of District Attorneys to
provide prosecutors, their investigators and administrative personnel
with specialized training. 3 While prosecutors often benefit from the
sophisticated training provided by "America's School for Prosecutors,"
as it is known, state defenders rarely have the funds to take advantage of
the defense-oriented training provided by the National Criminal Defense
College, where federal defenders receive much of their training.'
339. Supreme Court Training Session Offered for Skilled Lawyers Who Defend Indigents in
Criminal Cases; Basic-Skills Course Set by Indigent Defense Commission, VA. LAWYER, Feb. 2005, at
16-17, available at http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/febo5/access.pdf; see also Indigent
Criminal Defense Training, VA. LAWYER, June/July 2005, at 25, available at http://www.vsb.org/
publications/valawyer/julo5/access.pdf (discussing the first seminar sponsored by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Virginia). The training focused on high-tech evidence such as DNA and drew
350 on-site attendees and an additional ioo videoconference participants. Id.
340. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2005)).
The Act establishes the statutory framework for the indigent defense systems in each of the ninety-
four federal judicial districts. Each district court is responsible for designing a plan to provide legal
representation for poor defendants, which may include a federal defender office or the appointment of
panel attorneys. Currently eighty-nine federal districts are served by federal public defenders,
however, panel attorneys are still utilized to represent defendants who the defender office cannot
represent due to workload or conflicts of interest.
341. See Committee Defends Independence of Representation: An Interview with Judge Patti B.
Saris, in THE THIRD BRANCH, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/apro5ttb/interview/index.html.
342. For a general description of training and supervision within federal defender programs, see
Inga L. Parsons, "Making a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN. SURv. AM.
L. 837, 861.
343. For a description of the National College of District Attorneys, which is the training arm of
the National District Attorneys Association devoted exclusively to training prosecutors, and its course
offerings, see http://www.law.sc.edu/ncda/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
344. For a description of the National Criminal Defense College and their training programs, see
http://www.ncdc.net/coUege.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
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Even though the federal and prosecutorial training models remain
elusive for many states, some states have been developing adequate
training. A recent evaluation of the impact of standards found that 37%
of county-funded systems and 50% of state public defense systems with
some or all state funding reported use of training standards.345 In
addition, virtually every recent state reform effort has included
recommendations or provisions for education and training for
defenders. 346 This reflects a wide recognition of the need for and
importance of training.
G. DEFENDER RESOURCES
A lack of ancillary resources, critical to effective representation,
plagues defender systems nationwide. The assistance of support staff,
investigators, paralegals, social workers and independent experts is rarely
available to the degree necessary to provide competent representation.
The scarcity of defender resources usually stands in stark contrast to the
prosecution's access to the additional resources and services of other
governmental agencies, the costs of which are not reflected in their
budgets. Although, as the United States Justice Department has
suggested, it is difficult to measure accurately this disparity of
resources,"' this gap undermines the validity and the effectiveness of the
adversary system.
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is more to competent
representation than merely having an assigned lawyer. Meaningful access
to justice includes the "raw materials integral to the building of an
effective defense," and a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair where that
access is denied."'s National standards have long recognized the
importance of giving lawyers the appropriate tools essential to the
defense function, including technology, facilities, legal research, support
staff, paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and
experts.349 The role of support staff is critical both to the quality of
345. Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense
Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV. 245, 273 (2oo4).
346. See, e.g., REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 242, at 26-27; MONTANA
REPORT, supra note 315, at 36-39; TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 22, at 46-47. An
innovative program for training has been initiated in Virginia. The attorneys who seek to represent
indigent defendants are offered the opportunity to work alongside an experienced defense lawyer
through a statewide mentorship program. See Mentorship Program Developed for Indigent Defense
Counsel, VA. LAWYER, Oct. 2005, at 20. And, in North Carolina, the statewide Office of Indigent
Defense Services has established "listservs" for defense lawyers to enable the sharing of information
and expertise. See N.C. INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., supra note 209, at 6.
347. See DEFRANCES & LTIRAS, supra note 29, at 3.
348. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) ("[Mlere access to the courthouse doors does not by
itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process.").
349. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-1.4
(1992): "The legal representation plan should provide for investigative, expert, and other services
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representation a defender can offer and the cost-effectiveness of that
representation. As one Alaska judge bluntly told legislative auditors,
where there are inadequate support services, "failure is built in."35
i. Investigators and Support Staff
Adequate investigation is the most basic of criminal defense
requirements,35' and often the key to effective representation. An early
study of public defender offices in the wake of the expansion of the right
to counsel in Argersinger found that institutional resources were the most
prevalent explanation for the variation in effectiveness scores among
defender programs. 52 Specifically, an in-depth analysis of nine urban
public defender programs found that success in the courtroom was
frequently tied to the availability of investigators.353 Investigators, with
their specialized experience and training, are often more skilled than
attorneys, and invariably more efficient, at performing critical case-
preparation tasks such as gathering and evaluating evidence and
interviewing witnesses.354  Without the facts ferreted out by an
investigation, a defender has nothing to work with beyond what she
might learn from a brief interview with the client. With such limited
information regarding the strength and nature of the case, any attorney
would be hard pressed to make the sensible strategic decisions necessary
to adequately defend an accused or even have any leverage in plea
bargaining.
necessary to quality legal representation. These should include not only those services and facilities
needed for an effective defense at trial but also those that are required for effective defense
participation in every phase of the process." The ABA's Ten Principles address the importance of
adequate resources for public defense; Principle Eight calls for parity between defense counsel and the
prosecution in resources such as technology, facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals,
investigators, and access to forensic services and experts. TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra
note 112, at3.
350. ALASKA TIME STUDY, supra note 272, at 31.
351. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.1 (1993) states:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the
event of conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure information in the
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate
exists regardless the accused's admission or statements to defense counsel of facts
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.
352. Paul B. Wice & Peter Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National
Survey and Analysis, IO CRItM. L. BULL. 161, 179 (1974).
353. Id. at 167-68.
354. In addition, it can be problematic for an attorney to interview witnesses alone. Should the
need arise at trial to impeach the witness, the attorney may be put in the difficult situation of having to
call herself as a witness as the only person who can testify to the earlier inconsistent statements the
witness made during the investigative interview. Commentary to ABA Standard 5-1.4 states: "[W]hen
an attorney personally interviews witnesses, the attorney may be placed in the untenable position of
either taking the stand to challenge the witnesses' credibility if their testimony conflicts with
statements previously given or withdrawing from the case." ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-1.4 (1992).
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Yet, all across the country, public defenders, appointed counsel and
contract attorneys do not have access to appropriate investigative
resources. A Montana public defender, with no investigative services,
commented that he had to be a "private investigator .. in addition to
being the attorney, [making it] difficult to juggle the time necessary to do
that." '355 In Pennsylvania, most public defenders and contract attorneys
cannot recall the last time they used an investigator, and one desperate
public defender admits he encourages his clients to conduct their own
investigations 6 A part-time New York county assistant public
defender's heavy caseload precludes him from spending any time on his
assigned cases other than in court, so investigation is well beyond his
reach.357 His frustration is shared by the full-time public defender who
has neither the time nor the resources to investigate his cases either."58
In many jurisdictions, appointed counsel and contract defenders
must secure the approval of the court before incurring any fees for
investigators or experts. Judges who have the authority to authorize such
expenditures, however, are often reticent to expend taxpayer funds.359 In
Virginia, judges so rarely approve funds for investigators or experts that
defenders simply have ceased to ask."' One Virginia attorney admitted
that she does not use investigators because the state will not pay for
them; shockingly, others confessed that they simply do not conduct
investigations because they lack the time and resources. 6' A similar
situation existed in Georgia, where attorneys commented that getting
investigators, even in death penalty cases, was like "pulling teeth.""
Hiring an investigator for a non-capital case in Mississippi is possible
only if the lawyer pays for it herself.3 And, in Ohio a judge once refused
to award funds for an investigator in a murder trial because one of the
defense lawyers had been an investigator thirty years earlier.
64
A recent survey of nearly 2000 felony cases in four Alabama circuits
vividly illustrates the chilling effect this kind of systemic denial of
investigative resources has on future requests. The contract attorneys
355. MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 20.
356. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STATEWIDE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES IN
PENNSYLVANIA 69 (2002) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT].
357. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., THE STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN SCHUYLER
COUNTY 12 (2004).
358. Id.
359. RHODE, supra note 13, at 129; NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., ASSEMBLY LINE
JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI'S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS I I (2003) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE].
360. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 67.
361. Id.
362. GA. CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEF., REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION
ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PART I 56, n.196 (2002) [hereinafter GEORGIA CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT].
363. ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE, supra note 359, at 6.
364. De Sario, supra note 332, at 56.
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there did not request investigators or experts in 99.4% of the cases.365 As
a Texas defense attorney explained, "Formal denials of specific requests
are rare. But this is because of an unwritten understanding that requests
will only be made in cases of extraordinary need. Hence, although
virtually every case requires some sort of investigation, the attorney
himself must perform these tasks in an uncompensated or under-
compensated capacity."
366
One Pennsylvania public defender candidly admitted that the lack of
investigator services available to defenders influences the outcome of
cases.3  This is particularly true when the prosecution benefits from
generally higher staffing levels and has the investigative resources of law
enforcement available. In Kentucky, for instance, the chief public
defender of a four-county area blamed insufficient staff for his office's
inability to adequately represent clients. He pointed specifically to the
state prosecutor's "huge investigative advantage" as a significant factor
in the disparity and concluded that "[r]esources influence results. ' 36 The
lack of investigative services was identified as a major problem in
Pennsylvania counties, particularly in light of the disparity of
investigative resources available to the district attorneys and the public
defenders. The 2002 evaluation concluded: "Juxtaposed with the vast
resources of local law enforcement at the disposal of the District
Attorney, the public defender who does not have investigative




Defenders who seek the assistance of experts in defending their
clients face many of the same hurdles as they do in securing help with
investigation. While the prosecution frequently has at its disposal an
assortment of government personnel such as crime investigation and
laboratory professionals, psychiatrists, scientists, and doctors, defenders
must rely on the state's witnesses or seek funds to compensate an
independent expert of their own. Relying on the state's expert witnesses
raises questions of independence. 37' A Virginia public defender described
365. GIDEoN's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 19.
366. BUTCHER & MOORE, supra note 195, at s8.
367. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 356, at 69.
368. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 400-01 (1993).
369. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 356, at 70.
370. In explaining why the public defender needs adequate budget resources to retain outside
experts, one report evaluating an Ohio county's public defender office put it this way:
The public defender should never take at face value the State's evidence regarding ballistics
tests, drug tests, or psychological evaluations, but should be able to verify those tests by
retaining its own experts to conduct testing and testify in court. Their own independent tests
may prove that their clients were not the 'shooters,' that the supposed 'cocaine' was really
Pillsbury flour, and that the accused has an I.Q. of a four-year old.
MARSHALL J. HARTMAN ET AL., MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL REVIEW OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY
June 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the state's lab experts as "cops with lab coats. They are openly hostile to




Unfortunately, courts are often quite reluctant to give funds for
experts. An appointed attorney in Georgia, having been denied an expert
each of the twenty times he applied for one remarked, "If there was
more money for experts, by God, my clients would not be in jail.""37 One
Virginia public defender described the difficulty in getting funds
approved for experts this way: "It's as if judges are taking out their
wallets themselves. They just say no. '37 3 Similarly, Montana defenders
are usually forced to rely on the state's experts because, as one defender
put it, "Can't use them, can't get them. We just don't have the money in
the budget." '374
Certainly not every case requires expert testimony, but independent
professionals often are essential to challenge the state's evaluation of
forensic evidence or competency. Even so, a study in Calcasieu Parish,
Louisiana found only two instances in three years where experts were
used by the public defender's office in defense of clients. 5 Remarkably,
one Virginia judge denied a public defender's request for a DNA expert
in a seven-year-old murder case where DNA was the only remaining
evidence. The judge was apparently swayed by the prosecutor's
argument that the cost would have been too much of an expense to the
state.376
PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 56-57 (2000). Another argument for the importance of independent experts
is the rising tide of errors discovered in state crime laboratories across the country. For instance, in
response to an audit of its embattled crime lab, Virginia recently established a scientific review panel
and ordered a review of more than i6o past cases. Christina Nuckols, Governor Appoints Panel to
Oversee Virginia's Crime Lab, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 9, 2005, at B3. The Texas state laboratories are
undergoing massive reviews because of widespread errors found recently. Editorial, With Shoddy
History, Texas Crime Labs Could Use Oversight, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 16, 2005, available at
http://www.statesman.com/opinion/content/editoriaUl/t5/6crimelabedit.html.
371. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 64.
372. GEORGIA CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 362, at 67.
373. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 64.
374. MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 21.
375. KURTH & BURCKEL, supra note 337, at 24.
376. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 65. Some states, such as North Carolina,
have turned to statewide commissions to appoint and compensate experts. See IDS's MAIN
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 209. Oklahoma employs a unique approach to ensuring that both public
defenders and contract attorneys have access to the appropriate experts. Each request is reviewed by
the chief of psychological services or the chief of forensics to determine whether the evidence in a case
warrants the services of an expert. These knowledgeable individuals are able to better target the area
of expertise necessary and even negotiate better prices with a host of fee-based expert service
providers. This ability to help attorneys focus their use of experts means that resources are used more
efficiently and effectively. See Letter from James Drummond, Chief, Non-Capital Trial Div., Okla.
Indigent Def. Sys., to Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus (Nov. 24, 2005) (on file with authors).
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3. Other Resources: Support Staff andTechnology
In addition to access to experts and investigators, defenders need the
full complement of support services and technology that a modern law
office would require. Secretaries and paralegals can assist with clerical
and administrative tasks, client communication, and case preparation and
free up time for legal work only the attorney can handle. In Lake
County, Montana, neither of the two public defenders has a secretary or
a paralegal, thus they either have to interrupt their work to answer the
phone or ignore incoming calls.377 Alaska defenders complain of having
their time consumed by filing, mailing, copying and other clerical tasks as
a result of inadequate support staff. More than half of the defenders
indicated that more than io% of the tasks they routinely perform could
be done by someone with less training, such as a secretary, paralegal,
investigator, or other support staff. As one lawyer said, "I shouldn't be
doing clerical work.11
378
When defenders are forced to handle these support tasks themselves
it exacerbates the problem of case overloads since a significant amount
of the attorney's time is consumed by administrative tasks, which could
be performed more cost-effectively by others. For example, the Alaska
Judicial Council found that even though public defense attorneys and
prosecutors appeared to spend similar amounts of time on their cases,
the defense attorneys did so without the benefit of substantial
investigative services or administrative support available to
prosecutors.3 79 As a result, the Council recommended increasing these
resources as a means of improving defenders' ability to handle increasing
case loads.3'8
Defenders also need the proper tools to adequately represent
clients, including the availability of legal research materials or electronic
databases, computers and other equipment. However, equipment and
resources that most law firms and prosecutor's offices take for granted
are often denied to public defender offices. When the public defenders in
Lake County, Montana need to do legal research, without the funds to
subscribe to online legal research resources, they must drive seventy
miles to the University of Montana Law School library. 8I In
Montgomery County, Ohio, the lack of basic equipment was so dire that
some defenders resorted to bringing their personal computers to the
office to prepare motions and memoranda.382 The lack of equipment also
hinders the efforts of the few support staff available to defenders.
377. MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at i9.
378. ALASKA TIME STUDY, supra note 272, at 30-31.
379. LARRY COHN ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS: 1999 285 (2004).
380. Id.
381. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 19.
382. HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 370, at 55.
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Defenders must share county cars, and cell phones and digital cameras
are just a few of the items denied to investigators from the San
Bernardino County Public Defender Office, but provided to the
investigators in the District Attorney's office."'3 A recent assessment of
Virginia's public defender offices found, for example, that the offices
"lack the most basic equipment necessary to run a modern law office."
384
These lawyers have outdated computers, limited printing capabilities, no
capacity to take digital photos or even view those from the medical
examiner's office, no ability to retrieve criminal history information on
their clients and no access to the technology that would enable them to
utilize the multimedia capabilities of the circuit court. The public
defender cannot keep up with the prosecutor's office technology and,
therefore, is greatly disadvantaged.358
Even public defender offices that have adequate basic technology,
such as computers, case tracking software, and online research capability
may find it impossible to keep up with the rapidly changing use of
technology in the courtroom. In Connecticut, for instance, while the
Division of Public Defender Services dedicated its resources to replacing
outdated computer equipment and continuing to provide computerized
legal research and case tracking information for its attorneys,386 the Chief
State's Attorney's Office established a special unit to educate
prosecutors on the latest multimedia courtroom presentation
techniques. 387 Connecticut prosecutors are being trained on sophisticated
legal software to present audio and visual evidence to make their
arguments more compelling to juries. Each district in the state has
acquired laptop computers outfitted with popular courtroom
presentation software, theater-sized projection screens, an LCD
projector, and document cameras, which can be used to project objects
and documents. 38 Prosecutors are learning to utilize all this while
defenders are not.
Without access to what the Supreme Court has called the "raw
materials" of an effective defense, 389 defenders cannot provide competent
representation to indigent defendants. The result, sadly, is that criminal
trials may become fundamentally unfair. Like the prosecution, defenders
must have the appropriate tools to do their job, including technology,
383. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, EVALUATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 53 (2001).
384. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 37.
385. Id. at 38.
386. CONN. Div. OF PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
http:/lwww.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content/Annual2oo5/2005Chap6.htm.
387. Martin B. Cassidy, Prosecutors Turning to Multi-Media to Make Case, GREENWICH TIME
(Conn.), Aug. 28, 2005.
388. See id.
389. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,77 (1985).
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facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, and
access to forensic services and experts. Chief Justice Warren Burger
wrote in 1972 that "society's goal should be that the system for providing
counsel and facilities for the defense should be as good as the system
which society provides for the prosecution."3" In many places we have
yet to make much progress in achieving that goal.
VI. REFORMS TAKEN
Many states have taken steps to improve systems that provide
attorneys to poor people. Some of these offer real hope, but others seem
doomed to failure based on inadequate government commitments. In
this Part we consider changes instituted by legislatures and reforms
resulting from litigation.
A. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Within the past several years Texas,39' Georgia,392 Virginia,393
Washington,394 and Montana,395 among other states such as North
Carolina 3,6 and North Dakota,397 have all studied the key indigent defense
concerns and have passed legislation modifying their criminal justice
systems. Each of these states provides a case study that illuminates the
varying means state legislators have used to address problems involving
the right to counsel. Since these changes are still in their infancy, their
efficacy cannot easily be measured; nevertheless, each state is to be
commended for at least establishing some structural changes, including
some sort of oversight panel.
i. Texas
We begin with Texas, which may have the most detailed legislative
response in the entire nation.
The Texas Fair Defense Act of 2001 established three foundational
pieces needed for any criminal justice system: a comprehensive mandate
for new local rules and standards to improve indigent defense, a body to
administer statewide indigent defense policies, and state funding
dedicated to help counties improve indigent defense.'
8
390. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,43 (972).
391. Texas Fair Defense Act, 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 906 (West).
392. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-I (2004).
393. 2004 Va. Legis. Serv. ch. 884 (West).
394. 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. I57.
395. MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-101 (2005).
396. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-498 (2005).
397. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-61-O1 (2005).
398. The Texas Fair Defense Act is a testament to what the efforts of a few determined individuals
can achieve. Texas Senator Rodney Ellis first proposed the Act in 1999, but it was vetoed by then
Governor George W. Bush. Reports by the Texas State Bar and the Fair Defense Project helped to
identify significant problems with indigent defense in Texas. Senator Ellis and members of the Fair
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a. Statewide Comprehensive Mandate for New Local
Rules and Standards
Specifically, the Act sets forth five major legal requirements that
counties must satisfy in the new system. Counties must create: (1)
procedures for providing prompt access to appointed counsel; (2) fair
and neutral methods for selecting appointed counsel; (3) qualifications
for appointed counsel; (4) financial standards and procedures for
determining when a person is indigent; and (5) procedures and fee
schedules for appointed counsel, experts, and investigators."
b. Appointed Counsel, Public Defenders, and Compensation
Section 6 of the Act specifies how lawyers are to be selected from a
public appointment list, and that such assignments are to be "allocated
among qualified attorneys in a manner that is fair, neutral, and
nondiscriminatory."'  Though the Act provides that attorneys will rotate
through the public appointment list, judges still make the actual
selections and this raises a concern about the independence of such
appointments if the guidelines are not followed. The judges of a
particular county court will keep that county's appointed counsel list,4"'
which also raises questions about the independence of such counsel. One
mitigating consideration here is that counsel must actually apply to be on
the appointed counsel list.4 2 Counsel who are to be appointed to capital
cases must meet separate qualifications.'
The Act takes into consideration that public appointment lists may
not be the best option for all districts. Alternative selection programs
must be approved by two-thirds of the judges within that county.40 4 The
Act also creates a mechanism for the appointment of a public defender.4 s
Compensation rates for private attorneys who provide indigent defense
Defense Project, which was organized by Texas Appleseed, a non-profit public interest law
organization, worked to reintroduce the bill that became law. Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras,
Texas Enacts Landmark Reforms, 16 CRIM. JUST. 56, 56 (Fall 2ooi).




403. Id. art. 26.052.
404- S.B. 7, 77th Leg., 2001 Tex. Reg. Sess., sec. 6 (West).
405. The commissioner of courts of two or more counties may enter into a written agreement to
jointly appoint and fund a regional public defender. The commissioners' court or courts will also
specify the duties, qualifications, appointment procedures and other relevant items should they
endeavor to appoint a public defender. The commissioners' courts will select a public defender after
having received proposals from government entities and non-profit corporations. Such proposals must
include a budget, descriptions of personnel positions, maximum allowable caseloads, training
information, anticipated overhead, and policies concerning investigators and experts. The total cost of
the proposal may not be the only consideration in awarding the public defender contract, and in order
to be eligible, the entity awarded the contract must be headed up by a chief public defender who "(I)
is a member of the State Bar of Texas; (2) has practiced law for at least three years; and (3) has
substantial experience in the practice of criminal law." TEx. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.o44.
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are to be determined by the judges of the courts of a given county or
judicial district, but no payment will be awarded until the attorney has
submitted an itemized bill for services performed to the judge presiding
over the case."" The Act provides for an appeal process for attorneys
whose bill is disapproved by the appointing judge.4" While the statutory
system here makes sense, the presiding judge makes decisions about
selection and compensation of attorneys. Thus, the independence of the
appointed counsel may be subject to compromise, and the crucial
element of independence remains a serious issue.
c. Indigent Defense Task Force
The Indigent Defense Task Force was established as a standing
committee of the Texas Judicial Council. °8 The Task Force is composed
of eight ex officio members of the judicial council including the Chief
Justice of the Texas Supreme Court along with other members of the
judiciary and legislature.' Its mission is to
improve the delivery of indigent defense services through fiscal
assistance, accountability and professional support to State, localjudicial, county, and municipal officials. The purpose of the Task Force
is to promote justice and fairness to all indigent persons accused of
criminal conduct, including juvenile respondents, as provided by the
laws and constitutions of the United States and Texas.
The Task Force sets the policies and standards for indigent defense
in Texas and may receive revenue so as to discharge its duties."' The
remaining sections of the Act provide for counties to report indigent
defense information to the Task Force.
The creation of the Task Force is an important reform, but it is by no
means the solution to the state's problems. Much of the funding for
indigent defense remains with the counties, and Texas only spent $4.65
per capita on indigent defense in Fiscal Year i999.41' Though the Task
Force may add to funds provided at the county level from the Fair
Defense Account, such additions would have to be substantial to
406. S.B. 7, 77th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. sec. 8 (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05)
(Tex. 2001).
407. Id.
408. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 71.001.
409. Id. § 71.051. The Task Force also has five members appointed by the Governor with the
advice and consent of the senate; three are members of the judiciary, one is a criminal defense
attorney, and the other is a public defender or an employee of a public defender. Id.
41o. Tex. Task Force on Indigent Def., Who We Are and What We Do, http://www.courts.
state.tx.us/oca/tfid/whoweare.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6).
41H. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 71.058, 7I.O60.




significantly improve this figure."3 Moreover, having judges make up a
majority of the Task Force raises independence questions.
d. Evaluating the Changes
In November 2003, the Texas House Committee on County Affairs
was asked to perform an interim study of the impact of the new Act.4"4 A
year later, the Task Force funded a study by Texas A&M's Public Policy
Research Institute to examine how the Fair Defense Act requirements
have affected indigent service delivery and how county implementation
strategies may affect counties' effectiveness in meeting these
requirements.415
The key findings in the two studies are startling, leading to both
optimism and pessimism:
" "Statewide spending [is] up 50%
* The public has increased access to local practices and
expenditures."7
* So far, there has been ioo% compliance with state reporting
requirements on expenditures and indigent defense plans.'"
413. See Julie Anderson, Texas Fair Defense Act: State, Counties, Address Increased Costs of
Indigent Defense Services, COUNTY PROGRESS (Tex.), Apr. 2005, at 12, 13.
Since 2001, the approximate amount of money spent on indigent defense services in Texas,
according to (state) reports, is as follows:
* $91.7 million in FYoi (all county funds, prior to implementation of the Act)
* $113.9 million in FY02 ($io6.7 million in county funds and $7.2 million in state funds)
* $130 million in FY03 ($118.5 million in county funds and $I1.5 million in state funds)
* $139.6 million in FYo4 ($128 million in county funds and $ 1.6 million in state funds).
Texas counties absorbed the remaining amount of increased costs:




414. See HOUSE COMMrrTEE ON COUNTY AFFAIRS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INTERIM
REPORT 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.house.state.tx.us/committees/reports/78interim/
county-affairs.pdf [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
415. THE PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, STUDY TO ASSESS THE IMPACTS OF THE FAIR DEFENSE
ACT ON TEXAS COUNTIES (2005), available at http:/lwww.courts.state.tx.uslocaltfidlStudy%20to%
2oAssess%2othe%2olmpacts%200f%20the%2oFair%2oDefense%2oAct%200n%2oTexas%2oCount
ies%2oweb%2oversion.pdf [hereinafter IMPACTS OF FDA]. The Institute was aided by a well-known
criminal justice professional, Dr. Tony Fabelo, who is a member of the National Committee on the
Right to Counsel.
416. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 414, at II.
417. Id.
418. See id. at 17.
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9 Texas is providing more defendants with indigent defense services
since the Act was adopted.4'9
e State funding is not keeping pace with the increased demands for
indigent services on county government.42
2. Georgia
In response to pressure from study groups, media coverage,
litigation, and the bar, the state legislature passed the "Georgia Indigent
Defense Act" in 2003." ' Many provisions of the Act are similar to the
Texas Act discussed above, but one important difference is that Georgia
requires that each of the state's forty-nine judicial circuits have a circuit
public defender office effective January I, 2005 .4" Furthermore, all
circuit defender systems that did not opt out of the structure as described
in the Act are funded by the state.423 This funding includes cases heard in
the superior courts and juvenile delinquency cases, but other courts still
rely on local government funding. Local governments do have the ability
to contract with the circuit public defender to cover their indigent
defense needs. 24
a. Circuit Public Defenders
The Act describes in some detail how the circuit public defenders
are to be compensated, the minimum staff size of assistant public
defenders' offices, which is based on the number of superior court judges
in the circuit, and the type of additional personnel that may be hired,
including investigators and administrative staff.425 Circuit and assistant
419. In this short period, the number of individuals receiving appointed counsel has increased
significantly. In FY 2004, 371,167 adult defendants were served, up from 278,479 during the first year
of the Fair Defense Act. Overall costs increased nearly 20% during the same timeframe, rising from
$114 million in 2002 to $139 million in 2004. Despite these overall increases, however, attorney costs
per case have risen a modest 3.3% per year-just enough to keep pace with inflation. See HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON COUNTY AFFAIRS, TEXAS H.R., A REPORT TO THE H.R. 79TH TEX. LEG.. available at
http:/lwww.house.state.tx.uslcommittees/reports/78interim/county affairs.pdf.
420. IMPACTs OF FDA, supra note 415, at 52 ("Statewide, both the number of indigent defendants
requiring representation, and the overall costs associated with attorney fees have increased steadily
since the inception of the FDA.").
421. H.B. 770 (Ga. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_o4/versions/
hb77o_HB_77o_APP_12.htm. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Georgia established the Chief Justice's
Commission on Indigent Defense. The Commission has published two reports and has collected data
on the state of indigent defense in Georgia. CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON INDIGENT DEF., THE STATUS OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA, REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE,
PART t I (2002), available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idcreport.doc. The
reports include findings and recommendations for improving the quality of indigent defense in
Georgia, many of which were adopted in the 2003 legislation. The Reporter for the Commission,
Professor Paul Kurtz, graciously reviewed an early draft of the materials in this Part.
422. Ga. Pub Defender Standards Council, About Us, http://www.gpdsc.comlaboutus-main.htm
(last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
423. Id. (some Georgia counties that are not part of the system do receive state funding).
424. Id.
425. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-12-25 to 29 (2005).
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circuit defenders are not allowed to "engage in the private practice of law
for profit.' 6 Importantly, this means that those hired by the state as
public defenders are full-time employees.
While it is admirable that Georgia has endeavored to fund the
personnel costs of the circuit public defender offices, these offices will
not necessarily represent all the indigent defendants in Georgia.
Moreover, the state will not provide funding for the overhead expenses
of the circuit public defenders.' 7 Though lower court systems are to
comply with the same standards as the circuit defenders," the financial
burden falls to the locality. This does little to help poor counties
adequately provide defense for indigents. Because the circuit defenders
rely on the counties to fund their overhead costs, questions have been
raised as to whether these offices will have adequate space, resources,
and even phone service.
The Act also sets out the process for selecting circuit public
defenders. Each circuit has its own selection panel consisting of five
members who have "significant experience working in the criminal
justice system or who have demonstrated a strong commitment to the
provision of adequate and effective representation of indigent
defendants.""'29 The qualifications for a circuit public defender provide
that the person must:
(i) Have attained the age of 25 years; (2) have been duly admitted and
licensed to practice law in the superior courts for at least three years;
(3) be a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; and (4)
if previously disbarred from the practice of law, have been reinstated
as provided by law."30
b. Georgia Public Defender Standards Council
The Council was created as an independent agency within the
judicial branch. It is "responsible for assuring that adequate and effective
legal representation is provided, independently of political
considerations or private interests, to indigent persons who are entitled
426. Id. § 17-12-33.
427. Id. § 17-12-34.
The governing authority of the county shall provide, in conjunction with the other counties
in the judicial circuit and in a pro rata share according to the population of each county,
appropriate offices, utilities, telephone expenses, materials and supplies as may be
necessary to equip, maintain, and furnish the office or offices of the circuit public defender
in an orderly and efficient manner. The provisions of an office, utilities, telephone expenses,
materials, and supplies shall be subject to the budget procedures required by Article 1 of
Chapter 8i of Title 36.
Id.
428. Id. § 17-12-23(d).
429. Id. § 17-12-20(a). The Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the Chief Judge the Georgia
Court of Appeals each appoint one member of the panel.
430. Id. § 17-12-21.
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to representation."43 ' The Council is made up of one member from each
of Georgia's ten judicial districts,432 and one circuit defender who has
been elected by a majority of the circuit public defenders.433
The director is responsible for the administrative needs of the
Council as well as for training attorneys who provide defense to
indigents.434 As its name suggests, the Georgia Public Defenders
Standards Council is charged with establishing the requirements for
indigent defense in the state of Georgia. Examples of such requirements
are the caseload limits and staff sizes set by the Council.435 The following
average case load limits are not to be exceeded per attorney per year):
150 felonies (excluding death penalty cases),43" or 300 misdemeanor
cases, or 250 juvenile offender cases, or sixty juvenile dependency clients,
or 250 civil commitment cases, or twenty-five appeals to the Georgia
Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals.437 As explained above,
strict case load limits are essential to ensuring the quality of any indigent
defense system.
Georgia, like Texas, has taken an important step toward ensuring
the quality of indigent defense by passing its own indigent defense
reforms. It is noteworthy that the state itself will fund the circuit public
defenders and their personnel. Nonetheless, these offices will require
local funding for their overhead costs, and they are not set up to
represent all the indigent defendants in the state.
431. Id. § 17-12-I.
432. Id. § 17-12-3(b)(i). Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the Chief Judge of the Georgia Court of Appeals each
appoint two members of the Council. Which districts an official will appoint from rotates so that they
do not keep appointing from the same two districts. Id. §§ 17-I2-3(b)(2)(A), (B).
433. Id. § 17 -12-3(b)(3). Those appointing members of the Council should
[sleek to identify and appoint persons who represent a diversity of backgrounds and
experience, and shall solicit suggestions from the State Bar of Georgia, state and local bar
associations, the Georgia Associations of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the councils
representing the various categories of state court judges in Georgia, and the Prosecuting
Attorneys' Council of the State of Georgia as well as from the public and other interested
organizations and individuals within the state.
Id. § 17-I2-3(c). Once again, as in other states, the judiciary dominates the membership of the
Council.
434. Id. § 17-12-5. The full responsibilities and qualifications for the council's director are included
in this section.
435. Id. §§ i7 -t2-8(b)(i), (3).
436. Death penalty cases are to be handled by the statewide Georgia Capital Defender, Georgia
Public Defender Standards Council, About Us, http://www.gpdsc.comlaboutus-main.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2006).
437. Ga. Pub. Defender Standards Council, Standard for Limiting Case Loads and Determining the
Size of Legal Staff in Circuit Public Defender Offices, available at http://www.gpdsc.com/cpdsystem-




In 2004, the ABA published a lengthy report on indigent defense in
Virginia."5 Among the findings of this report were that there was no
"state entity that effectively advocates for indigent defense needs in
Virginia" and that "inadequate resources and an absence of an oversight
structure form the basis of an indigent defense system that fails to
provide lawyers with the tools, time and incentive to provide adequate
representation to indigent defendants."439 These conclusions have not
been disputed. The report also noted that Virginia's unwaivable statutory
fee caps were a "disincentive to many assigned counsel" that kept them
"from doing the work necessary to provide meaningful and effective
representation to their indigent clients."'  The fee caps were, and still
are, amazingly low. Maximum fees at the time were $112 for
misdemeanors or juvenile cases eligible for jail or prison sentences; today
they are $i58."' The state paid $io96 for felonies punishable by more
than twenty years of confinement;"2 today the state pays $1235." The
state offered only $395 for all other non-capital felony cases; today that
figure is $445 .4' These findings relate specifically to Virginia's assigned
counsel system. Virginia also has a developing public defender system,
but it fared no better under the report than the assigned counsel system
did. The reviewers wrote that the Public Defender Commission was
"more concerned with assuring the public and elected officials that public
defenders can handle cases as cheaply or cheaper than appointed
counsel" than advocating for more funding for indigent defense. 5
Soon after the release of this report, Virginia established the
Virginia Indigent Defense Commission. The Commission was charged
with setting standards and providing training for court-appointed
attorneys, as well as taking over for the existing Public Defender
Commission. 46
a. Appointed Counsel
The Virginia Act specifies fairly detailed qualifications for appointed
counsel in both misdemeanor and felony cases."7 The Commission also
438. See INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20.
439. Id. at ii.
440. Id. at iii.
441. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (2005). As the report noted, while other states also cap fees for
appointed counsel, the caps in the other states are waivable and range up to $25,ooo in non-capital
cases. As of the writing of this Article, legislation is being discussed in Virginia to revamp the fee
structure.
442. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 2.
443. Id.
444. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.
445. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at iii.
446. VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-163.01.
447. In misdemeanor cases, counsel can be individuals who have been members of the Virginia
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has the discretion to waive any of the above requirements for
"individuals who otherwise demonstrate their level of training and
experience.",, 8 Once qualified to serve as court-appointed counsel,
attorneys must complete six hours of continuing legal education every
two years.
The statutory standards for indigent defense are important, but
Virginia continues to suffer from its inexcusable and unwaivable fee caps
for court-appointed attorneys, still among the lowest in the nation,"9
though the legislature has approved a modest increase."' 0 Guidelines and
standards are certainly necessary for improving the quality of indigent
defense, but immense case loads cannot be avoided without dramatically
increasing the funding for indigent defense.
b. Virginia Indigent Defense Commission
This new oversight commission was created by the state to set up
requirements for court-appointed counsel and public defender offices.
Half of the commission is made up of either legislative or judicial
personnel, while at least three members are attorneys in private practice
with an interest in indigent defense.45' The inclusion of attorneys in
State Bar for less than a year and "have completed six hours of MCLE-approved continuing legal
education developed by the Indigent Defense Commission." Id. § 19.2-i63.o3. For one who has been a
member of the bar for more than one year, he or she has to either have completed the six-hour course
mentioned above, or "certify to the commission that he has represented, in a district court with the
past year, four or more defendants charged with misdemeanors." Id.
The requirements for appointed counsel in felony cases are understandably more stringent.
Counsel in felony cases must be members in good standing of the Virginia State Bar, have completed
the six-hour course mentioned above, and have served as lead or co-counsel in four felony cases from
start to finish, including any appeals. For those who have been members of the Virginia Bar for more
than a year and have tried four felony cases from start to finish including appeals with the past year,
the six-hour course requirement and the co-counsel requirement are waived. Those in good standing
for more than one year who can certify that they have been lead counsel in five felony cases from start
to finish, including appeals, in the past five years can waive out of the four felony cases within the past
year requirement. There are also specific requirements for those who seek appointment to juvenile
and domestic relations cases. Id.
448. Id.
449. VA. INDIGENT DEF. COMM'N, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2005), available at
http://www.publicdefender.state.va.us/VaIDC% 202005% 2oAnnual %2oReport% 2oExecutive %20Sum
mary.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
450. Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, About Us, http://www.publicdefender.state.
va.us/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6).
451. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.02. § 19.2-163.02 provides:
The Virginia Indigent Defense Commission shall consist of 12 members, including the
chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Courts of Justice; the chairman of the
Virginia State Crime Commission; the executive secretary of the Supreme Court [of
Virginia] or his designee; two attorneys officially designated by the Virginia State Bar; two
persons appointed by the governor; two persons appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Delegates; and two persons appointed by the Senate Committee on Privileges and
Elections. At least one of the appointments made by the Governor, one of the
appointments made by the Speaker, and one of the appointments made by the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections, shall be an attorney in the private practice with a
demonstrated interest in indigent defense issues. Person who are appointed by virtue of
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private practice and designees of the Virginia State Bar ensures that the
legislative and judicial members will not be the only audible voices in the
Commission.
The Commission is responsible not only for setting the standards
and developing training for those providing indigent defense, but also for
overseeing the funding of any public defender offices created by the
General Assembly.45" It is not clear from the Act, however, how much
funding will be made available to distribute among the public defender
offices. The Act was enacted too recently to gauge the legislative
commitment to providing necessary financing to improve indigent legal
services.
The significance of the oversight and reporting functions of the Act
should not be underestimated, but case load limits and adequate funding
are crucial to improving the quality of indigent defense. The state here
funds indigent defense without local government assistance.453 Without
increased financial support for the public defender system, however,
there will be no major improvement in the quality of legal services
offered.454 Moreover, because mandatory and low fee caps for appointed
still counsel remain, private attorneys will still have an incentive to avoid
trial and to spend as little time as possible in service to their indigent
clients.
4. Washington
In 2004, the Seattle Times published a series of articles that brought
to light the urgency of the indigent defense crisis in the State of
Washington. The series highlighted the severe problems in some counties
caused by the prevalence of flat-fee contracting and correspondingly high
caseloads and inadequate funding.455 Given the series' documentation of
their office shall hold terms coincident with their terms of office. All other appointments
shall be for terms of three years.
Id.
452. Va. Indigent Def. Comm'n, Agency Directory, http://www.publicdefender.state.va.us/
agencydirectory.htm (last visited Apr. I4, 20o6) (providing a listing of Virginia's Public Defender,
Capital Defender and Appellate Defender offices).
453. Compare with states such as Washington, which only fund at the appellate level. Alabama,
Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Florida also fund indigent defense at the state
level for both appeals and trials.
454. Unfortunately, reforms in Virginia appear to be off to a rocky start, as seen by the resignation
of the Chief Public Defender of Fairfax County after less than one year in the position. She said that
even after legislative reforms her office had so many clients (more than 8ooo last year) and so few
lawyers (only twenty) that the attorneys could not adequately represent the defendants at trials and on
appeal. She further complained that the Indigent Defense Commission was not treating the office
fairly. The Executive Director of the Commission responded by stating that "inadequate funding has
been a long-standing, statewide problem, not limited to Fairfax. [We need to have] local and state
policy-makers ... properly fund indigent defense services in Virginia." Jackman, supra note 8. '
455. Ken Armstrong et al., Attorney Profited, but his Clients Lost, SEATtLE TIMES, Apr. 5 2004, at
At [hereinafter Armstrong, Attorney Profited]; Ken Armstrong et al., Frustrated Attorney, 'You Just
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these serious difficulties, the legislative efforts at reform seem limited
and curious. Several years ago, Washington passed legislation that set up
the Office of Public Defense ("OPD"). At first glance, this reform
appears to be a major step forward. Upon review, however, the
legislation is surprisingly narrow in scope.
The OPD was created "[i]n order to implement the constitutional
guarantee of counsel and to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of
the indigent appellate services. ' ' 456 The State of Washington funds the
OPD as an "independent agency of the judicial branch."457 What is
striking here, however, is that Washington established the OPD to
oversee indigent defense only at the appellate level and not at the trial
level:
The Office of Public Defense administers state funds appropriated for
appellate indigent defense, develops administrative procedures,
standards, and guidelines for appellate indigent defense services,
recommends criteria and standards for determining and verifying
indigency, coordinates with the Supreme Court and the three Courts of
Appeal to determine how attorney services should be provided, and
provides studies and recommendations to the Legislature regarding
indigent defense services in Washington State.4
This is a serious concern. While the state has the non-profit
Washington Defender Association, which was "created in 1983 to
promote, assist, and encourage public defense systems which insure that
all accused persons in every court receive effective assistance of
counsel,"459 Washington still lacks a statewide trial court equivalent of the
OPD.460 Simply, Washington has no single source for disseminating
Can't Help People', SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6 2004, at Ai; Ken Armstrong et al., The Empty Promise of
an Equal Defense, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 4 2004, at Ai [hereinafter Armstrong, Empty Promise]. With
costs rising for indigent defense, several counties initiated low-bid, flat fee contract systems in which a
lawyer takes all of the indigent defense cases in a jurisdiction for a fixed fee. Armstrong, Empty
Promise, supra, at As. Although national standards recognize that contracts may be a component of
an indigent defense system, these types of low-bid contracts awarded primarily on the basis of cost are
prohibited. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-3.1 (1992). They create
a financial disincentive for attorneys to provide adequate representation since the attorney must
handle all referred cases and also pay for all services such as investigation and expert witnesses.
Armstrong, Empty Promise, supra, at Ai.
The situation in the state of Washington is striking, for serious problems certainly exist, as
reflected in the Seattle Times series. However, when members of the Committee conducted a site visit
to the Defender Association in Seattle, the King County defender program, they found that many
aspects of that defense system worked extremely well. Committee Site Visit Report (on file with
authors).
456. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.70.005 (2005).
457. Id.
458. See generally WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., ANNUAL REPORT 10-11 (2OO3), available at
http://www.opd.wa.gov/Publications/Annual%2oReport/2oo 3 %2oAnnual%2oReport.pdf (providing
the OPD Client Communications Protocol Guidelines).
459. Wash. Defender Ass'n, Home Page, http://www.defensenet.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6).
46o. Unfortunately, Washington is not alone in taking this limited approach. Michigan, Illinois,
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information about indigent defense at the trial level, nor does it have any
oversight commission considering the trial process in the state.
The OPD staff and members of its advisory committee are similar in
composition to the other state entities discussed above. 6' Once again, the
appointment of committee members by the governor and the judiciary
raises concerns that the committee will be serving interests other than
that of providing constitutionally adequate indigent defense.
5. Montana
Montana took a great leap forward in overhauling its indigent
defense system when its legislature enacted extensive reforms in 2005.
This groundbreaking legislation created a statewide public defender
system, and Montana became the first state in the nation to follow the
ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System as a guide to
its criminal defense reform.462
Although the deficiencies of Montana's county-based system were
documented in a comprehensive report almost thirty years ago, 63 a class-
action lawsuit filed by the ACLU in 2002 spurred the passage of the
Montana Public Defender Act of 2005. The suit, filed against the state
and seven counties, alleged that the delivery of the right to counsel in
those counties was plagued by constitutional deficiencies. One of the
plaintiffs was a young woman who had been detained in jail for seven
months, during which her attorney failed to initiate an investigation into
the charges against her. Another plaintiff had been detained for more
than six weeks without having had a detailed conversation with his
attorney about the facts of his case.464
Specifically, the action alleged that the state had abdicated its
constitutional duty to ensure effective lawyers for the poor by delegating
the indigent defense function to its counties without sufficient funding or
oversight. As a result of the state's abdication, county programs were
plagued by serious deficiencies, including a virtual absence of adversarial
and Idaho all have state funded appellate systems with no financing or serious oversight of trial
systems.
461. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.70.OtO-.030 (2005). Concerns over independence
may arise upon examining the selection process for the OPD director since the position is appointed
by the State Supreme Court, from a list submitted by the advisory committee. Id. § 2.70.oo. The
advisory committee is made up of individuals designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Washington, the Governor, the Washington State Bar Association, the Court of Appeals Executive
Committee, and the President of the Senate. Id. § 2.70.030.
462. See Maurice Possley, Montana Aims to Fix Public Defender System: State's Effort is First to
Use Guidelines Suggested by ABA, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005, at II.
463. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 22 & n.12 (citing NAT'L CENTER FOR DEF. MGMT.,
MONTANA STATEWIDE DEFENDER SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STUDY (t976)).
464. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files Class-Action Lawsuit Against
Montana's Indigent Defense Program (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/
CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=9695&c=48.
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advocacy, high attorney caseloads, the inability of lawyers to
meaningfully confer with their clients or to develop a defense, lack of
investigatory and expert services, excessive plea bargaining, and
unnecessary pre-trial incarceration. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
requiring the state to provide adequate representation for poor Montana
defendants.
65
Acting as an expert witness, the NLADA prepared a comprehensive
evaluation of Montana defense services and found little had changed in
the nearly thirty years since the first national report had documented the
shortcomings of the system. The 2004 assessment concluded that the
"defense system in Montana delivers ineffective, inefficient, unethical,
and conflict-ridden representation to the poor." 66 It documented
significant problems such as inadequate funding and resources, a lack of
independence from political interference, poorly supervised and
inexperienced attorneys struggling with excessive caseloads, and
inconsistent eligibility standards for representation.467
On the eve of trial, the ACLU and the state agreed to postpone the
trial to allow the state legislature to act to remedy the situation. As part
of the agreement, the state attorney general lobbied lawmakers to create
a state commission and a chief state public defender to establish and
oversee a system of regional public defense offices. 46' In the face of
mounting pressure to act, including statements encouraging systemic
reform by the Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court,469 the
legislature approved a sweeping new law that was heralded as a national
model for providing defense lawyers for poor defendants.470
The new legislation not only mandates an independent oversight
commission, but empowers the commission to set standards for defender
education, training and experience, caseloads, access to support services
such as paralegals and investigators, and performance criteria and
evaluation. Although the new law pumps an additional two million
dollars per year into the system to fund these dramatic structural
changes, even those celebrating the reform acknowledge that significant
465. See Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133 (Mont. ist Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr.
14, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.orgfFilesPDFs/white-martz%2oamend%2ocmplt.pdf.
466. MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 13-14.
467. Id. at 4-5.
468. Kowalski, supra note 9.
469. Id. Chief Justice Gray stated
There's no uniformity, there's no consistency. It isn't efficient and these systems are not
necessarily ensuring quality defense for indigent defendants across the state.... I'm hopeful
that the Legislature in the 2005 session will draw up some kind of systemic approach to a
public defense program. It will be a major legislative package and it won't be cheap.
Id.
470. See Possley, supra note 462.
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fiscal challenges remain."' The Act provides a one-year transition period
and requires the new system to be operational by July I, 2006.472
Like reforms in other states, the reforms in Montana are still too
new to fully evaluate. Nonetheless, Montana's new standards-based
system provides an impressive precedent for other states considering
reform. Montana's experience also further highlights the contribution the
ABA Ten Principles can make in educating policymakers and shaping
effective systems. In addition, the role of litigation cannot be overlooked
as a key component in capturing the attention of legislators and
precipitating change.
B. REFORMS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL RULINGS IN LITIGATION
Where a state's political branches have refused to act in response to
evidence of an inadequate indigent defense system, reformers have
increasingly turned to the courts for relief. As a result, over the last
twenty-five years a significant amount of litigation has sought remedies
for an assortment of problems plaguing indigent defense systems.473 The
cases have targeted the adequacy of attorney compensation, excessive
caseloads, the overall system of providing counsel, and which level of
government, state or local, must bear the expense of providing lawyers
for poor criminal defendants.474
The first wave of litigation, initiated primarily by attorneys, focused
on the property rights of the appointed lawyer, raising "takings"
arguments under the Fifth Amendment and resisting the view that
criminal defense lawyers have a professional obligation to represent poor
defendants even without compensation."' Over time, the challenges have
become broader, with a shift in emphasis from the rights of appointed
attorneys to the rights of defendants to receive an effective defense. 476 In
the context of defendant rights, funding remains a central question, but it
is linked to the variables that negatively affect a defender's performance,
such as unreasonable caseloads and lack of resources.
Commentators have had an ongoing debate about the effectiveness
of litigation in achieving enduring, systemic reform of indigent defense
systems.4 7  Nevertheless, litigation has produced significant victories in
471. See Jennifer McKee, ACLU Lauds Montana Plan to Fix Public Defender System, BILLINGS
GAZETTE, June 9, 2005, available at http:l/www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2oo5/o6/o9/state/
exp0rt210559.txt.
472. See Montana Public Defender Act, Mont. Code Ann., § 47-I-1O (2005).
473. See Lefstein, supra note 35, at 849-51.
474- Id. at 849-50 nn.66-69 (collecting cases).
475- Wright, supra note 60, at 244-45; see also State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983)
(holding failure to reimburse criminal defense attorneys for their services constitutes a taking in
violation of state and federal constitutions).
476. Wright, supra note 60, at 245.
477. Compare Wright, supra note 60, at 251 (reformers should be "wary about the power of
[VOL. 57:103 1
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
which state courts have acknowledged the constitutional inadequacy of
indigent defense systems and ordered reform. These victories, however
limited in their long-term impact, suggest that litigation may have a
significant role to play in precipitating change. For instance, the state
supreme courts of Arizona,47 Oklahoma,479 and Louisianaas° have each
provided powerful precedent, if not sustainable practical results, in
finding their systems deficient and subsequently sparking legislative
action." '
i. Arizona
In State v. Smith, an- individual criminal defendant challenged
Mohave County's contract defense system.482 Smith argued on appeal
from his burglary and assault conviction that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel due to his attorney's "shocking, staggering, and
unworkable" caseload.4s3 Although the Arizona Supreme Court did not
find that Smith's attorney was incompetent, it used the occasion to assess
the deficiencies of the Mohave County indigent defense system, which
utilized a bid system to award public defense contracts to private
attorneys. This system awarded contracts to the lowest bidders, but failed
to consider the time required to effectively represent clients; the support
costs such as investigators, paralegals, and secretaries; and the experience
or skills of the attorney before awarding a contract.
litigation to improve defense funding in the long run."), and Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure
of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1751-52 (2005)
(litigation has been unsuccessful in generating sustainable structural or fundamental change to
indigent systems in the long-run), and Bernhard, supra note 295, at 335 (arguing that courts can and
will act to improve the quality of criminal defense services), with Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled, supra
note 3o6, at 2o63 ("[T]he best short-term means for overcoming this political process failure and
improving the quality of indigent defense is litigated reform.").
478. See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1384 (Ariz. 1984).
479. See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Okla. 199o).
48o. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,791 (La. 1993).
481. Of course, these are not the only cases to result in significant reform. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Green v. Washington, 917 F. Supp. 1238, 1271-82 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding delays in appellate
representation by state defender office are caused by state underfunding of appellate defenders and
that lengthy delays are presumptively unconstitutional); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Ark.
1991) (finding legislatively-imposed fee caps on court-appointed attorneys for indigent clients
unconstitutional); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1139 (Fla. 199 o)
(indicating that although court cannot order the legislature to provide certain funds for criminal
defense, if funds are not available within adequate time court will order immediate release pending
appeal of certain bondable felons); In re Pub. Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d 101, 103-
04 (Fla. 1998) (affirming order that bars a Florida public defender's office from accepting new cases
because of excessive backlog); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (Kan. 1987) (holding
that state has obligation to offer counsel to indigents charged with felonies and to pay such counsel at
non-confiscatory rate); N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 414 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(granting a permanent injunction and prompting an increase in fees for appointed counsel).




As a result of the low-bid contract system, defense counsel routinely
accepted caseloads far in excess of the NLADA caseload guidelines. The
court relied on NLADA guidelines in concluding that Smith's attorney's
caseload was "excessive, if not crushing."' ' For example, Smith's
attorney handled a "part-time" caseload of 149 felonies, i6o
misdemeanors, twenty-one juvenile cases, and thirty-three other cases in
the year Smith was convicted, in addition to a private civil practice.48 The
court concluded that "an attorney so overburdened cannot adequately
represent all his clients properly and be reasonably effective."' Smith
also asserted that the attorney spent "only two to three hours
interviewing the defendant and 'possibly' six to eight hours studying the
case."
487
The Arizona Supreme Court found that Mohave County's bid
system violated defendants' due process rights and right to counsel, and
ordered that all subsequent convictions obtained using the same
procedure were presumed to be a Sixth Amendment violation. The state
would carry the burden of rebutting this presumption until it improved
the bid system. The rule applied to any county that utilized a method of
appointment that failed to take into consideration the caseload factors
identified by the court including the time required to effectively
represent clients; support costs such as investigators, paralegals and
secretaries; and the experience or competency of the attorney.
Shortly after the decision, Mohave County adopted a new system
where court-appointed attorneys were paid by the hour, more than
doubling the cost of the previous low-bid system. 4"9 However, the long
term effect of the court's strong statement about excessive caseloads and
implicit endorsement of the NLADA caseload standards is uncertain. A
1993 study found a wide range of noncompliance with Smith, with some
counties continuing to handle caseloads at twice the level or above than
required by the court.4' In 1997 the President of the Arizona State Bar, a
criminal defense lawyer, lamented the hollow promise of Gideon and
commented that in Arizona "indigent defendants are often led into court
by attorneys who are devastatingly overloaded by cases, who are
compensated too poorly to allow anything but a rudimentary review of
484- Id. at 138o.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1381.
487. Id. at 1378.
488. Id. at 1381, 1384.
489. Caroline A. Pilch, State v. Smith: Placing a Limit on Lawyers' Caseloads, 27 ARIZ. L. REV.
759, 767 (1985)-
490. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN ARIZONA 7 (1993).
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Systemic reform of Oklahoma's indigent defense system was spurred
by the state supreme court's decision in State v. Lynch.492 In 1989, two
attorneys appointed to represent an indigent capital murder defendant
requested fees far in excess of the statutory maximum of $3200.'93 The
trial court approved the fee request, holding the fee cap unconstitutional.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, finding the cap unconstitutional
as applied to defendants because such a low rate of compensation was a
taking of private property.'
Although the court "invite[d] legislative attention to this
,,4951 ,
problem, it relied on the judiciary's "direct and inherent constitutional
power to regulate the practice of law,, 6 and established an interim set of
attorney fee guidelines. Embracing the concept of parity, the court set an
hourly rate for appointed defense attorneys that was tied to that of local
prosecutors. "In order to place the counsel for the defense on an equal
footing with counsel for the prosecution, provision must be made for
compensation of defense counsel's reasonable overhead and out-of-
pocket expenses.
4 9
In response to Lynch, the Oklahoma legislature undertook sweeping
reform of the state's criminal defense services. Within a year, the
legislature enacted the Criminal Defense Act, which established a new
state agency, the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS) to provide
trial, appellate and capital post-conviction criminal defense services to
poor defendants.498 In addition, the Act instituted major changes in the
funding and delivery of defense services at trial and on appeal. 49
Unfortunately, the promise of this potentially transformational structure
has never been wholly fulfilled.
During its relatively brief history, OIDS has continually struggled
with a lack of fiscal support, which has interfered with its mission and
compromised its effectiveness. According to its 2004 Annual Report, the
agency has repeatedly been forced to seek supplemental appropriations
from the legislature and struggles with yearly budgetary shortfalls. In
491. Michael L Piccarreta, The Promise of Gideon, ARIZ. ATr'Y, Mar. 1997, at to.
492. 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 199o).
493. Id. at 153-54. Lynch was convicted, but sentenced to life in prison, rather than to death as
the prosecution had sought. The lawyers requested fees and expenses of $17o73.o3 and $io,995.oo. Id.
494. Id. at 1152-54.
495. Id. at I61.
496. Id. at 1162.
497. Id. at II61.




order to address funding reductions, OIDS has had to eliminate
positions, furlough employees, and refuse to enter into contracts with
conflict counsel, despite the fact that these drastic measures "hindered
the agency's ability to effectively represent its clients."5" In fact, shortly
after its creation, lack of funds nearly resulted in a shutdown of the
agency when the original funding mechanism, an additional fee on traffic
tickets, failed to generate enough revenue to meet the OIDS payroll.'Y
3. Louisiana
In Louisiana, the challenge originated with a single overworked
public defender who petitioned the court for help with excessive
caseloads and lack of investigative assistance in his office in New
Orleans. °2 At the time he was assigned to represent Leonard Peart on
rape, robbery, and murder charges, the defender was also responsible for
approximately seventy other felony cases, and had a trial scheduled for a
different client on every available court date. Moreover, his clients
routinely waited in jail one to two months before he was able to meet
with them for the first time."°
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
finding that the New Orleans indigent defense system was
unconstitutional, it found that caseloads were so excessive and
investigative resources so limited that clients were "not provided with the
effective assistance of counsel the Constitution requires."" Like the
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Smith, the Louisiana court created a
rebuttable presumption that indigent defendants represented by
overworked public defenders are not receiving effective assistance of
counsel.5" The court required pretrial hearings on whether lawyers could
effectively handle the number of cases assigned to them. It also
prohibited prosecutions from going forward in cases where effective
assistance could not be provided because of a lawyer's workload and lack
of resources."
In the years following Peart, the legislature did increase funding to a
degree. The state supreme court created the first statewide indigent
defense commission, charged with promulgating and enforcing indigent
defense qualification and performance guidelines throughout
Louisiana." Despite these positive steps, however, over time the funding
500. OKLA. INDIGENT DEF. Sys., ANNUAL REPORT 1-4 (2004), available at
http://www.ok.gov/-oids/reports/ann-rpt-2oo4.pdf.
5oi. Id. at 3.
502. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993)
503. Id.
504- Id. at 790.
505. Id. at 783.
506. Id.
507. See TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 22, at 58.
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has failed to keep up with heavy caseloads ° and a recent assessment of
indigent defense in Louisiana found that the "trial-level indigent defense
system in Louisiana is rife with systemic deficiencies.""s In addition,
"Peart motions" have not been a particularly effective tool for criminal
defendants."'i
4. The Promise
These three celebrated cases provided the impetus for much needed
reform and compelled three state legislatures to provide some additional
funding in the short term. In the long run, however, even these strong
judicial pronouncements were seemingly unable to sustain enduring
structural or fundamental change to indigent defense systems."' It
remains to be seen whether legislative action generated by more recent
cases will have a more enduring impact. For instance:
- In response to a class action lawsuit filed by the ACLU against the
State of Montana, the state legislature enacted groundbreaking public
defender legislation in June of 2005. Montana's Public Defender Act is,
as noted above, the first in the nation crafted with the intent to
construct a system based on the ABA's Ten Principles of a Public
Defense Delivery System." '
& The Massachusetts' state legislature passed legislation in July 2005
that made significant changes to its system of indigent defense and
substantially increased funding, partly in response to Lavallee v.
Justices."3 The changes include increased pay for court-appointed
lawyers, restrictions on the number of hours the state will compensate
attorneys, additional defender positions, and the creation of a
commission to study the idea of decriminalizing certain misdemeanors
to reduce caseloads and relieve docket pressure.14
5o8. Note, supra note 477, at 1738.
509. TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 22, at 58.
510. Note, supra note 477, at 1737.
511. For an assessment of the shortcomings of these cases, see id.
512. Mike Dennison, Public Defender System Cited as National Model, GREAT FALLS TRIB., June 8,
2005, at 17A; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Hails Montana's Public
Defense Bill as Leading National Trend (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/
CriminalJustice/CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=i8 4 ii&c=4 8. For a full discussion of the Montana response
to the ACLU class action, see supra, Part VIA.
513. 812 N.E. 2d 895 (Mass. 2004). The Lavallee suit was filed on behalf of unrepresented indigent
criminal defendants in Hampden County. Id. at 899. The county was experiencing a critical shortage of
lawyers available for appointment due to the low rates of compensation. Id. As a result, indigent
defendants were being held in custody without counsel. Id. at 902 nio. The court concluded that
petitioners were being deprived of their right to counsel and subjected to severe restrictions on their
liberty and other constitutional interests. The court held that upon a showing that counsel was not
available to represent an indigent defendant despite good faith efforts, the defendant could not be
kept more than seven days and the criminal case against such a defendant could not be continued
beyond forty-five days.
514. See MASSAcHusErrs REPORT, supra note i09, at 5.
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e In State v. Citizen,515 the Louisiana State Supreme Court declared
that the state legislature, rather than local governments, is responsible
for providing adequate resources for public defenders.' Where
adequate funds are unavailable, defense counsel can request that the
prosecution be halted. 7 Several months after the decision, and in the
face of mounting national criticism of the state's indi ent defense
system and the state Chief Justice's calls for reform, the state
legislature took some initial steps to address the significant funding and
structural issues. The legislature passed a small funding increase and
approved legislation that authorized information gathering and
standardizing of the definition of a "case" and defining what it is to be
indigent."9
5. The Risks of Litigation
Not all litigation has resulted in positive outcomes for reform. The
danger in bringing such challenges is that the plaintiffs will fail in their
efforts to persuade the courts to intervene, thus inadvertently bolstering
a flawed system and making subsequent challenges that much more
difficult. Such is perhaps the case in Mississippi, where the state supreme
court recently rejected a county's challenge to the state's refusal to
provide any funding to pay for lawyers for indigent criminal
defendants. 2
Quitman County, an impoverished Delta community, sued
Mississippi, alleging that the state law requiring local governments to pay
for indigent defense was a violation of the United States and Mississippi
Constitutions. 2 ' The state supreme court rejected the county's
contention, however, refusing to find the state's failure to provide any
funding for indigent defense unconstitutional. 2 In fairly unsympathetic
language, the court's majority said if the county was concerned about
indigent defense, it could have budgeted more for it.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
State and local governments have had more than forty years to
respond to Gideon's trumpet call, yet the evidence is overwhelming and
undeniable that many states have simply failed to meet their
515. 898 So. 2d 32 5 (La. 2005).
516. Id. at 336.
517. Id. at 338-39.
518. In his State of the Judiciary Address delivered before the Joint Session of the Louisiana
Legislature on May 3, 2005, the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.,
called for immediate indigent defense reform. "We have taken steps in the past to make the right to
counsel real and meaningful in Louisiana. Unfortunately, these efforts have not proven to be
adequate. Much more needs to be done." Id.
519. Mark Ballard, Senate Sends Indigent Defense Bill to Blanco, THE ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.),
June 21, 2005, at 8A.
520. Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005).
521. Id. at 1034.
522. Id. at 1041.
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constitutional obligation to provide competent legal representation to
criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. The
comprehensive national research by the National Committee on the
Right to Counsel provides compelling support for the conclusion that
that we have a true constitutional crisis. Although some parts of the
country have started model approaches to providing indigent defense
services, the overall picture is bleak. The pervasiveness of this failure is
particularly shocking in light of the decades of repeated attempts to call
attention to and repair the deep flaws in indigent defense systems across
the nation. We can no longer afford to ignore the denial of constitutional
rights to the very vulnerable in our society, nor can we tolerate the
resulting erosion of the integrity of the criminal justice system and the
legitimacy of criminal convictions.
There has been no shortage of recommendations for improving
indigent defense systems over the years. In fact, the ABA Ten Principles
of a Public Defense Delivery System provides an excellent blueprint of
the fundamental criteria necessary to construct an effective public
defense system. The recommendations that follow, however, go beyond
the familiar recitation of the necessary ingredients of an effective system;
they also suggest ways in which groups or individuals might go about
generating these much needed reforms.
The recommendations begin with the essentials of an effective
indigent defense system: an independent structure within which
competent attorneys labor for adequate compensation, under reasonable
working conditions, and with the proper tools necessary to deliver
competent representation. A key component, of course, is that these
essentials be funded at adequate levels.
A. INDEPENDENT STRUCTURE
RECOMMENDATION I: Establishing an independent, statewide
nonpartisan authority responsible for the defense function should
be the cornerstone of any reform of a state's indigent defense
system.
The imperative of independence is not only reflected in the
commitment to this goal in national standards, but is vital to insulate
defenders from political and judicial pressures. Defense counsel cannot
be vigorous advocates for their clients when their compensation or
continued employment depends upon catering to the predilections of
judges or legislators, and political pressure can distort the attorney-client
relationship. At a minimum, judicial oversight creates serious problems
with the perception of and opportunities for abuse. Just as the
prosecution represents the government with autonomy and executes its
responsibilities with relatively little interference from the judiciary or the
legislature, so should the defense.
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In addition to insulating the defense function from political and
judicial pressures, a statewide oversight entity provides a mechanism for
achieving many of the key components of an effective public defense
delivery system and should:
" establish attorney qualification standards;
" coordinate eligibility standards to ensure consistency of access to
public representation;
* facilitate appropriate appointments, matching attorney experience
with the complexity of the cases;
* monitor and evaluate attorney performance and track caseloads;
" develop and provide training, both to entry-level defenders and
advanced practitioners;
" provide access to technology and other resources; and
* serve as an advocate in the political process and provide a voice for
the support of indigent defense.
With greater capacity for centralized management of defenders'
services, an independent oversight body can provide uniformity in the
quality of representation by insisting that defendants be represented by
capable attorneys, mandating reasonable working conditions, and
providing the proper tools for effective representation.
B. COMPETENT ATTORNEYS
RECOMMENDATION 2: States must establish and enforce standards for
attorneys who represent poor criminal defendants, including
minimum qualifications, training, and performance
requirements.
Without competent attorneys, no system of public representation of
poor defendants will be successful. Regardless of the type of delivery
system a state chooses to provide indigent defense services-contract,
court-appointed, public defender or some hybrid-states should ensure
that each defense attorney has at least minimum qualifications in
criminal defense. A tiered system of qualifications required for
appointment for different levels of cases, depending on the experience
and training of the attorney, would be ideal. It would ensure that a
defender has the requisite knowledge and skills to deliver competent
representation to a defendant, whether the case is a simple misdemeanor
or a complex felony matter. Monitoring and evaluating defenders based
on performance standards would also guarantee that attorneys provide
effective representation and meet professional and ethical expectations.
[Vol. 57:1031
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C. CASELOADS
RECOMMENDATION 3: States must establish and enforce appropriate
workload limits to prevent the overburdening of defenders and
avoid undermining the quality of representation they are able to
deliver.
Even the most dedicated and able lawyers cannot provide effective
representation to their clients when they have simply too many clients.
States have a number of options to control workloads, such as caseload
standards, decriminalization, and alternative justice programs:
i. Caseload Standards
To ensure that defenders have sufficient time to devote to each
client, states must control workloads. The most direct route is to
establish caseload limits. Although national caseload standards are
available, states should consider their own circumstances in defining a
reasonable defender workload. Factors such as the availability of
investigators, level of support staff, complexity of cases, and level of
attorney experience all might affect a workable definition. Data
collection and a consistent method of weighing cases are essential to
determining current caseloads and setting reasonable workload
standards.
2. Decriminalization to Reduce Crowded Dockets
States can take steps to reduce crowded dockets by decriminalizing
certain non-serious misdemeanors, e.g., operating a vehicle with a
suspended license, or with no license or insurance; shoplifting; disorderly
conduct; disturbing the peace; or trespassing. States could reevaluate
those misdemeanors that carry possible jail time, but for which
incarceration is rarely sought or imposed, and treat them as civil
infractions. This would serve several purposes. By reducing crowded
court dockets, decriminalization can relieve some of the pressure on
courts to move cases through the system quickly at any cost. In turn, this
would provide judges with additional time to devote to more serious
cases. In addition, removing these cases from the criminal docket would
lighten the caseload of defenders and prosecutors, and also reduce the
funds needed to provide state-funded defenders. The savings could then
be used to fund other needs in a resource-starved defense system.
3. Alternative Justice Programs
States could expand the use of alternative justice programs such as
diversion into drug courts, mental health courts, or alternative treatment
programs. Problem-solving courts, such as community, domestic
violence, drug, and mental health courts, may hold promise for reducing
caseloads. These alternative courts generally stress a collaborative,
multidisciplinary problem-solving approach, rather than an adversarial
one. Their goal is to address the defendant's underlying psychosocial
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issues by providing appropriate treatment or services as a way of
reducing recidivism. Although some observers debate the proper role
and ethical obligations of a defense attorney in this novel setting, the
potential benefits for poor defendants and defender workloads are
worthy of study and consideration.
D. COMPENSATION
RECOMMENDATION 4: Fair compensation, including adequate
overhead and a fair fee, should be paid to all publicly funded
defenders.
It is fundamentally unfair to expect lawyers to perform increasingly
demanding work when they are inadequately compensated. The financial
burden imposed on publicly funded defenders compromises the quality
of representation they provide. Inadequate compensation results in a
scarcity of qualified attorneys willing to represent poor defendants and
raises significant access to justice questions. In pursuing this goal of fair
compensation, states should consider:
i. Salary Parity with Equivalent Prosecution Attorneys (Where
Prosecutors are Fairly Compensated)
Salary parity is more than just a question of economic fairness.
Parity also eliminates the appearance that the government values the
defense function is valued less than the prosecution function. Equalizing
compensation between defenders and prosecutors acknowledges the
equivalent roles the two play in the criminal justice system.
2. Law Student-Loan Forgiveness Programs for Public
Defenders and Pprosecutors
Low pay and significant law school student-loan debt leave many
defenders and prosecutors struggling financially and discourage many
talented lawyers from careers in public service. Loan forgiveness
programs, similar to those offered to doctors, nurses, and teachers,
reduce a certain portion of student-loan debt for those who work in
underserved areas. This would make it easier to attract and keep good,
experienced lawyers as public defenders and prosecutors.
E. PROPER TOOLS
RECOMMENDATION 5: States must equip their indigent defense systems
with the appropriate tools to enable a defender to deliver
competent representation. This includes staff support, such as
investigators, paralegals, and secretaries; technology and research
capabilities; and access to independent experts and other
professional services.
i. State-Provided Resources
Without access to the raw materials and support services a lawyer
needs to mount an effective defense, defenders cannot provide
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competent representation and criminal trials become fundamentally
unfair. Frequently, public defenders also face a considerable gap
between the ancillary resources provided them and those available to
prosecutors. This creates an uneven playing field. Providing these
defender resources is often more cost-effective and efficient than
saddling an already overburdened defender with clerical or
administrative tasks in addition to an overwhelming caseload. The
quality of representation improves where resources are available. With
appropriate resources, lawyers are able to conduct more thorough
investigations, produce and file pretrial motions, challenge the
government's evidence with an independent expert, or simply
communicate more frequently with clients. Providing the support and
resources state defenders desperately need may be an apposite area for
federal involvement.
2. Federal Resources
The federal government should establish an independent, federally
funded defender resource center to assist and strengthen state and local
indigent defense systems. Such a center could help states provide
competent criminal representation for poor defendants by offering
training, support, research assistance, brief and motion banks, advice on
identifying and using experts and other services. Twenty-five years ago
the ABA recommended the creation of just such a resource center.
Establishment of a non-profit Center for Defense Services continues to
be ABA policy.23 The Center's mission would be to strengthen the
services of publicly funded defender programs throughout the nation. A
federal resource center of this nature could collect and analyze data and
conduct research, sponsor pilot programs, award grants, and explore
other ways to assist state and local governments in providing indigent
defense services.
VIII. GENERATING REFORM
The essential recommendations outlined above, namely an
adequately funded, independent structure within which competent
attorneys labor under reasonable working conditions with the proper
tools necessary to deliver competent representation, are neither new nor
particularly visionary. We know how to structure, staff and fund an
effective indigent system. Despite four decades of repeated calls for
reform, many states have failed to take action. The challenge is not in
knowing what to do to address the indigent defense crisis, but rather how
523. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 121 (Feb. 1979), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/policy.html (recommending the creation of a
federal Center for Defense Services); see also GiDEoN's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 42.
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to compel state legislatures and executives to establish, fund, and support
a constitutionally adequate indigent defense system. Unfortunately,
appealing to constitutional sensitivities has not worked in the face of
strained state budgets, political pressures, a lack of a constituency to
advocate for poor criminal defendants, and the popularity of "tough on
crime" rhetoric.
The Committee was not content to merely join the chorus for reform
that has continually gone unheeded. Rather, the recommendations under
consideration include a host of potential actions concerned citizens and
policymakers might undertake to motivate state legislatures to address
the deficiencies in their indigent defense systems. The task of protecting
the rights of poor defendants, and thus ensuring the fairness of our
courts, the legitimacy of criminal convictions and the integrity of criminal
justice, requires the concerted effort of all. Federal, state and local
governments, prosecutors, defenders, judges, bar and professional
associations, law firms, law schools, and the media all have a role to play
in upholding the promise of Gideon.
A. SUSTAINED MEDIA ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE INJUSTICES OF A STATE
SYSTEM, PERHAPS HIGHLIGHTING INNOCENT VICTIMS, EXONERATIONS OR
THE ROUTINE DENIAL OF JUSTICE
This type of sustained, negative attention serves as both a public
education campaign and a shaming process and has been successful in
states as diverse as Massachusetts, Georgia, and Washington." In
addition to calling attention to the problems in a defense system, media
exposure can help build a constituency for reform. Compelling stories
about how the system failed innocent clients or the unfairness of
assembly line justice educate the public and capture its interest. In
combination with the broad public support for the Sixth Amendment,
the media spotlight may provide state legislators the support they need
to take action.
B. INITIATE OR THREATEN SYSTEMIC LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE SYSTEM
A significant amount of litigation throughout the country has
targeted the delivery of indigent defense services. Although not all of it
has been successful, important settlements in Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, significant victories in New York, Massachusetts, and
Montana, and favorable rulings in Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida, and
524. Such negative attention may ultimately turn out to be successful in Virginia as well. The
legislature there is considering restructuring its program of compensating counsel in light of comments
by a "Washington, D.C. law firm [that] says it is poised to file a ... class-action lawsuit over a
compensation system that ranks last in the nation." Hugh Lessig, Virginia Warned on Poor's Legal
Aid, DAILY PRESS (Hampton Roads, Va.), Feb. 2, 2oo6, at AI.
[VOL. 57:1031
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
elsewhere suggest that systemic litigation has the potential to spur
legislative action and to educate the public about the failings of a given
system. Law firms can make a significant contribution by providing pro
bono assistance for these efforts.
C. THOSE WORKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SHOULD TAKE
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THEIR ETHICAL
AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT COMPROMISED AS A RESULT
OF THE PRESSURES FROM THE SYSTEMIC FAILURE OF THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION
If all players in the criminal justice system vigilantly guard against
violating their own professional codes of ethics, despite the pressures to
take shortcuts, we would have strong support for the provision of
appropriate indigent defense services.
In keeping with their ethical obligations, for example, attorneys
could refuse to take cases where adding to their caseloads threatens their
ability to provide competent representation. Judges and prosecutors
could be more vigilant in guarding against plea bargaining abuse and
invalid waiver of the right to counsel. Furthermore, all participants in the
criminal justice system should report observed ethical violations to
disciplinary bodies.
D. STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE
IN ADVOCATING FOR REFORM OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND
PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN THOSE REFORM EFFORTS
State and local bar associations are well positioned to provide
leadership for necessary reforms of indigent defense systems. As
participants in the criminal justice system, bar members can monitor the
defense function and call attention to misconduct or ethical violations by
prosecutors or judges. As a respected institution within the larger
community, a bar association can help educate the public, propose,
reform and provide a much-needed voice on behalf of poor criminal
defendants.
Bar associations can also establish active and effective disciplinary
bodies to create enforceable standards for defense lawyers, judges, and
prosecutors so that the ethical violations in indigent defense systems can
be remedied.
E. ACADEMICS SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CASE AND AGITATE FOR
THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD TO FACILITATE A
MORE EFFECTIVE REVIEW OF CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
A change in the law defining ineffective assistance of counsel would
open an avenue for reform effectively choked off by the stringent
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Strickland standard. If the Strickland barrier were reduced or removed,
criminal defendants could successfully challenge the quality of their
government-provided representation in the context of collateral review.
Post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance claims would influence
the expectations for, and presumably improve, attorney performance at
the trial level.
CONCLUSION
The problems explored in this Article, and in the work of the
National Committee on the Right to Counsel, demonstrate without
question the crisis of the American criminal justice system in terms of
providing lawyers for poor people.5 The problems are very real and will
only get worse unless action is taken."'6 With these proposals, we hope
real change can occur. The only way to effect such change is to have a
discussion that goes beyond the limited groups that have raised these
questions in the forty-year period since Gideon v. Wainwright. One
commentator has stated the matter well:
How can those in power be persuaded to use that power to confront
the continuing crisis in indigent representation? There is no answer to
this quandary, but it is clear that the campaign to enhance public
support for indigent defense services must be framed in a manner that
resonates with groups broader than the traditional progressive
communities that have long championed the rights of criminal
defendants.527
We believe that recommendations outlined here, and under
consideration by the National Committee on the Right to Counsel, are a
good first step toward having that serious discussion.
525. Barbara Babcock's comments are fully supported by what we found:
I was giving speeches on Gideon as a promise broken-how the Court had guaranteed a
body with a law degree next to the defendant but had failed to breathe life into that body.
How too many public defender offices start idealistically and then are overwhelmed by
rising caseloads and receding funding, until no amount of dedication will suffice to do a
good job in the routine cases.
Babcock, supra note 35, at 1515; see also Goldstock et al., supra note 6o, at I8, referring to the
"starving of Gideon" which "not only threatens wrongful convictions and even executions, it starves
America's sense of justice.... The law requires that a defendant, even the poorest defendant be
represented." As stated by one experienced state judge:
Bench and bar alike are forced to turn a blind eye to the deficiencies in the current system.
Many indigent defense attorneys, underpaid and overworked, cut corners and unwittingly
or even intentionally violate their personal and professional responsibilities. Gradually they
become insensitive to the effects of inadequate representation on a whole class of persons
alienated from the basic guarantees of due process and effective access to the courts.
Cooks & Fontenot, supra note 35, at 197.
526. Last year the poverty rate in the U.S. went up more than 12%-more than 37 million people
now live in poverty. Associated Press, U.S. Poverty Rate Rises to 12.7 Percent, CBS NEWS, Aug. 30,
2005, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo5/o8/3o/ap/business/mainD8CABOO8i.shtml. And, about
80% of all criminal defendants are poor. See HARLOW, supra note 12, at i.
527. Marshall, supra note 35, at 963-64.
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